





































Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 





















































Since the beginning of the twentieth century, some of the most forceful accounts 
of modernity have located the traumatic shocks of war, urbanization, and technological 
change at the heart of modern experience and modernist literature. Surprise Encounters 
argues that a dominant framework of shock and rupture has obscured a nineteenth-
century conception of surprise, which transformed models of mind and narrative on both 
sides of the Atlantic. I draw on Ralph Waldo Emerson’s formulation of life as “a series of 
surprises” to distinguish a paradigm of surprise from Walter Benjamin’s influential 
definition of modernity as a “series of shocks and collisions.” For Emerson, the fact that 
we live in an uncertain universe of chance requires moment-by-moment exposure to 
contingency. The challenge, as he framed it, was to invent new forms of living and 
writing that allow the unexpected to amplify rather than deaden receptivity, to enrich 
rather than impoverish experience. 
“Surprise,” one of Emerson’s “lords of life,” guided such American writers as 
Henry James, Gertrude Stein, and Nella Larsen, but also Benjamin’s shock poets par 
excellence—Baudelaire and Proust. Each translates Emerson’s central question—How do 
I live so that every moment is new?—into compositional terms, to ask: How do I write so 
that every sentence is new? Their widely various responses to the Emersonian call hinge 
on unexpected syntactical and scenic turns that reorient attention and restructure narrative 
form. My chapters locate surprise in Proust’s and Baudelaire’s techniques for collapsing 
  
timelessness with the ephemeral (modernist methods I trace back to Emerson’s “method 
of nature”); in the lacunae that lodge between past and future tenses in James’s scenes of 
recognition; in Stein’s cultivation of fresh grammars of attention; and in Larsen’s 
challenge to Anglo-American master plots that deadeningly dovetail with the 
deterministic logic of race and reproduction. Each writer’s dedication to renewal—
temporal, psychic, grammatical, narrative—reframes the present as an open site of 
experiential and experimental possibility.  
Beyond representing surprise, the writers of this study are dedicated to training 
new habits of attention to the unpredictable events that punctuate daily life. In this 
endeavor, they join psychologists William James and Silvan Tomkins in theorizing 
surprise as a sudden event that both arrests and spurs processes of feeling and thinking. 
The literary subject of each chapter is a theorist of emotion and modern experience who 
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“Experience…has a way of boiling over, and making us correct our present 
formulation.” 





In the first scene of A la recherche du temps perdu, Marcel’s drama of going to 
bed revolves around two poles of experience: the shock of the unfamiliar and the 
analgesic of habit. The Combray bedroom of his childhood patterns the struggle of falling 
asleep and waking that will endure for the remainder of the novel. As the narrator recalls, 
a “magic lantern” intended to bring him pleasure succeeds only in destroying the room’s 
comforting familiarity (Swann’s 13). Bathed in the lantern’s “multicoloured apparitions,” 
a doorknob whose handling was so unconscious “it seemed to open of its own accord” 
suddenly becomes a threatening intruder (14, 13). The recast room wrenches the narrator 
from the intimacy that “the anaesthetizing influence of habit” had wrought between his 
consciousness and its surroundings. When his mind and its lodgings are aligned, Marcel 
is free to pay “no more attention to the room than to the self” (14). Having neutralized 
disturbances between physical and psychic space, the narrator can reflect on other things. 
But the defensive labor performed by the “housekeeper” habit is never complete (12). In 
each new or defamiliarized bedroom a painstaking process repeats itself: the shock of the 
unknown must be subsumed into self-sameness through the ongoing work of habituation.  
 The alternation between newness and numbness that defines Combray extends 
into a broader paradigm of modernity in Walter Benjamin’s account of modern 
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experience. The childhood bedroom may seem far removed from the onslaught of war, 
urbanization, and technological change, but in Benjamin’s framework, sensory assaults of 
every order—whether issuing forth from the magic lantern, from “the amorphous crowd 
of passers-by,” or from shell-fire at the front—all contributed to a “crisis of experience” 
at the turn of the twentieth century (Guermantes 13, Illuminations 165).1  In his 1939 
essay, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” Benjamin generalizes Sigmund Freud’s concept 
of shock—trauma undergone in wartime—into the defining structure of modernity 
(Illuminations 161).2 Modern consciousness, in Freud’s conception, must act as a 
“protective shield” against relentless blows generated by the “excessive energies at work 
in the external world” (Freud qtd. in Illuminations 161). As Benjamin deduces, however, 
guarding oneself against unanticipated experiences comes at the high cost of a generally 
dulled receptivity to all new encounters. In this context, “protection against stimuli” 
works according to the same mechanisms as the conception of defensive habit that Proust 
introduces in Combray (Freud qtd. in Illuminations 161). Modernity’s assault on 
receptive consciousness leaves open only two experiential possibilities in the modern era: 
those of shock and shock-defense. When experience becomes coterminous with crisis the 
traumatic course of history is figured as a closed circuit that does not allow for 
contingency or change.3  
                                                
1 As Martin Jay has argued, “no one became so acute and persistent a diagnostician of the 
crisis than Walter Benjamin” (Songs 329). 
2 Benjamin also draws on the work of Henri Bergson and Georg Simmel to diagnose the 
withering of experience in a shock-saturated modern age, but he privileges the historicity 
of Freud’s framework of shellshock. However, he dehistoricizes Freud’s theory when he 
generalizes it beyond the conditions of war that are its context.  
3 Following the atrocities of World War II, Benjamin’s declaration of “the destruction of 
experience” seems to prophesize the course of the twentieth century. See Giorgio 
Agamben’s extension of Benjamin’s polemic in Infancy and History: The Destruction of 
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Benjamin’s story of modern “breakdown” privileges the modernist writer as the 
primary navigator of modern life defined as a “series of shocks and collisions” 
(Illuminations 182). He anoints Baudelaire the first “modern poet,” observing how deftly 
he parries sensory inundation into poetic forms that preserve the city’s visceral 
immediacy. According to Benjamin, the modernist hallmarks of Baudelaire and Proust 
record psychic and temporal rupture. They also register the writers’ respective distances 
from the moment of breakage between the modern era and an auratic pre-modern period. 
In this account, the past being broken with seems at once to float outside of history and to 
be situated in the nineteenth century, where Baudelaire could bear witness to its 
depletion. Baudelaire’s correspondances stand closest to a “fullness” of “authentic 
experience,” which has been “irretrievably lost” (Illuminations 181). Half a century later, 
Proust’s mémoire involontaire can only access such authenticity through accidental 
encounters. It has thus become “a matter of chance whether an individual…can take hold 
of experience” (Illuminations 158). The modern writer’s dependence on chance confirms 
for Benjamin the “increasing atrophy of experience” (Illuminations 159).4  
Surprise Encounters will argue that Proust and Baudelaire were central to a robust 
strain of transatlantic modernism that embraced contingency and chance as a primary 
source of experiential potential as opposed to “poverty [Armut]” (Illuminations 182). As I 
                                                                                                                                            
Experience. From this vantage, some strains of contemporary trauma theory have claimed 
that all history is structured by trauma. For example, Cathy Caruth has influentially 
defined trauma by “an inherent latency of the event that paradoxically explains the 
peculiar temporal structure, the belatedness, of historical experience: since the traumatic 
event is not experienced as it occurs, it is fully evident only in connection with another 
place, and in another time” (“Introduction” 8). It falls to the critic to locate and narrate 
the traumatic latency of historical experience. 
4 Benjamin understands Proust’s mémoire involontaire to be first and foremost a critique 
of Bergson’s idea that “the contemplative actualization of the stream of life [la durée] is a 
matter of free will” (Illuminations 157-58). 
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will show, the dominant definition of modern experience as a “series of shocks and 
collisions” has obscured an equally powerful conception of experience, which Ralph 
Waldo Emerson was first to define as “a series of surprises” (Illuminations 175, EL 413 
and 483). “Surprise,” one of Emerson’s “lords of life,” guided such American writers as 
Henry James, Gertrude Stein, and Nella Larsen, but also, as I have discovered, 
Benjamin’s shock poets par excellence: Baudelaire and Proust (EL 490-91). For writers 
on both sides of the Atlantic, a fundamental belief in an open-ended world of chance is 
matched by equally open models of time and perception. Caught within shock’s closed, 
recursive loop, one is continually returned to a moment of rupture in the past that wasn’t 
fully experienced as it took place. By contrast, the open temporality of surprise retrieves a 
vital prospective dimension. As we will see, when sudden encounters are framed in the 
terms of surprise, the “loom of time” weaves threads of the past and future into 
unpredictable patterns that simultaneously suspend and mobilize the experience of the 
moment into what Gertrude Stein will call “the continuous present” (EL 490, WL 27). 
Shuttling between retrospection and prospection the perceptual field expands. While 
shock deadens perceptual consciousness, a surprise encounter serves to amplify 
receptivity—to enrich rather than impoverish experience. 
The aim of this study is not to displace the dominance of shock with surprise in 
discussions of modernity. In fact, it is precisely this kind of either/or zero-sum thinking 
that the logic of surprise avoids. The conceptual distinction I want to make is a matter of 
shifted emphasis rather than of critical opposition. My most immediate claim is that when 
a structure of surprise is differentiated from the rubric of rupture, shock becomes only 
one possibility among many for understanding modern encounters. As Philip Fisher has 
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argued, some of the primary affects of aesthetic study—“including wonder, the sublime, 
as well as ‘that favorite modern aesthetic category, shock’”—are best understood within 
the broader category of an “aesthetics of surprise and suddenness” (Wonder 1). It is on 
these grounds that he later contends, “surprise, the eliciting of notice, becomes the very 
heart of what it means to ‘have an experience’ at all” (Wonder 200). As we will see, 
Fisher’s aesthetic conception of surprise aligns with its psychological definition as a 
category of experience that encompasses an array of responses to sudden encounters. 
Surprise can be so variously experienced and spur such diverse aesthetic responses 
because it is a neutral structure of attention. When the perceptual apparatus is suddenly 
reoriented, any predetermined affective or linguistic content is temporarily cleared from 
consciousness. This study examines the work of writers who seek narrative means of 
holding open the interval of surprise in order to explore the temporal and perceptual 
dimensions of an encounter that precedes interpretation. 
Each of my chapters examines a writer who translates Emerson’s central 
question—How do I live so that every moment is new?—into compositional terms, to 
ask: How do I write so that every sentence is new? This dedication to sentence-by-
sentence renewal renovates literary representations of time and perceptual consciousness. 
As we will see, surprise encounters are often framed within the narrative unit of the 
scene. Those writers who develop scenic representations of surprise frequently confront a 
formal question: how does one render the immediate experience of being seized by 
surprise—an apprehension that precedes full comprehension—without domesticating the 
unexpected into narrative or syntactical convention? Even the simple statement, “I am 
surprised,” is a necessarily retrospective evaluation of a moment or an event that has 
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already passed. Formal features like James’s syntactical shuttling between past and future 
tenses, Stein’s efforts to develop a grammar of feeling, and Larsen’s reconfigurations of 
plot around the logic of weather exemplify a broader commitment to surprise that helped 
to transform modernist models of mind and narrative at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. In each case, an affective force that reorients attention assumes an aesthetic force 
that restructures lexical and literary forms. 
The writers I focus on pair the representational challenge posed by surprise with a 
pedagogical challenge. Beyond rendering surprise at the level of the sentence, the scene, 
or the plot-turn, they take on the paradoxical task of training themselves and their readers 
in a practice I call reading for surprise. For Proust, as for all of the writers of this study, 
reading for surprise means cultivating newly attuned habits of attention that are open 
rather than defensively closed to the unexpected. A habitual openness to surprise 
facilitates receptive exchanges with stimuli that braid the familiar and the strange. As the 
Recherche epitomizes, one’s response to unexpected encounters depends as much on 
perceptual orientation as it does on the object of encounter. Just as sudden events may 
assume different valences, Proust’s narrator learns that habits of reception are contingent 
and changeable. His learning curve is protracted over the course of four thousand 
pages—an entire lifetime—but the novel is punctuated by episodes that glimpse the 
possibility of realms of experience beyond bipolar thinking. However, those crucial 
scenes are easily overshadowed by more dramatically embattled dynamics that cast habit 
in one of two opposed roles: helpmate or saboteur. As the Combray bedroom exhibits, 
protective habits act as a last line of defense (albeit an exceptionally vulnerable one) 
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against foreign infringements on the familiar. But helpmate habit’s anodyne aid is no 
match for the aggressive assault of shock.  
The saboteur version of habit is vividly illustrated by the memorable thesis of 
Samuel Beckett’s essay on Proust: “habit is the ballast that chains the dog to his vomit” 
(19). The iron-strength manacle he describes stands in stark contrast with the weak-willed 
“housekeeper” of childhood. “Paralys[ing] our attention,” this kind of habit is the 
adversary of aesthetic innovation and social transformation; for Beckett it is the force that 
stultifies Marcel’s creative potential (20).5 Beckett’s assessment of the novel chimes with 
a European modernist avant-garde that embraced shock’s revolutionary potential to 
shatter the enslaving shackles of habitual conformity and complacency.6 Defined against 
habit-as-enabler or habit-as-deadener, shock alternately appears as an assailing or 
liberating blast. Benjamin himself swung between these seemingly contradictory views 
on the shock of the new. As we have seen, he decries the modern break with prelapsarian 
plenitude. At other moments, however, he declares his allegiance with avant-garde efforts 
to explode the homogeneity of history to make way for radical social change.  
Benjamin’s heightened attunement to these two versions of shock—shattering 
forces that alternately diminish or rejuvenate experience—models a widespread critical 
approach we might understand as reading for rupture. In a broad sense, to read for 
rupture is to locate literary sources and symptoms of harrowing (or heroic) breakage. 
                                                
5 Beyond this famous phrase, Beckett opens up the multivalent operations of habit in the 
Recherche. According to his reading, habit can be the source of perceptual paralysis and 
boredom, but the “suffering of being” is greater when the chaotic “free play of every 
faculty” is unguided by habits of selective attention (20). Habit can be a shackle, but it 
can also be a “lightning-conductor”—a channel of creative force and inspiration (19). 




Such an expansive rubric encompasses wide-ranging interdisciplinary and transhistorical 
work that confronts aesthetic responses to crisis and catastrophe. Exemplars of this kind 
of reading tend to locate a disjunctive event that decisively divides “before” and “after,” a 
“now” that is discontinuous with an irretrievable “then.” Within the field of modernist 
studies, the rhetoric of rupture has provided a powerful paradigm for grappling with the 
devastation of two world wars, and the upheaval of urban and technological change. The 
interpretative framework has taken a particularly strong hold in a modernist context 
because, in Marjorie Perloff’s words, modernism also “perceived its own mission as a 
call for rupture” (154). Many artists and writers of this period declared themselves to be 
generating moments of breakage in order to radically transform social and aesthetic 
experience.7 The double valence of rupture within modernist art explains why the tropes 
of shock and habit can alternately assume a negative or positive charge in the work of a 
writer like Proust as well as a critic like Benjamin. The rhetoric of a radical break serves 
the modernist artist who wants to establish the newness and nowness of their work against 
what has come before; it also serves the modernist critic who wants to understand the 
critical act as one of heroic opposition.8 Whether modernist art is framed as a 
symptomatic sign or vehicle of shock, reading for rupture leaves little room to recognize 
experiences that mediate between polarized extremes.  
                                                
7 Susan Stanford Friedman concisely puts it this way: “Modernism requires tradition to 
‘make it new.’ Tradition comes into being only as it is rebelled against” or broken down 
(510). 
8 For example, Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane’s foundational study 
Modernism: 1890–1930 (1976) defined modernist literary criticism as a “cultural 
seismology,” which gauges the interruptive force that is either recorded or produced by 
the modern “art of crisis” (19; Bradbury, Modern World 7).  
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The modernist artist and critic’s congruent investments in an oppositional 
framework provide one explanation for why the rubric of rupture has maintained such 
diagnostic force in the field. However, the dogged staying power of dichotomies that pit 
“the modern” against tradition and “the now” against the past is surprising given the 
strength and longevity of critical rebuttals to the story of modernism-as-break.9 Indeed 
the narrative of modernity as an “apocalyptic moment of transition into the new” was 
already being vigorously interrogated in the decades following Benjamin’s essay on 
Baudelaire (Malcolm and Bradbury 51). By the mid-1960s the “nouveau frisson” had 
“begun to give way to familiarity: the codification of modernism was now underway” 
(Perloff 157). For the last half-century, critics have continually returned to a central 
question: what does it mean to institutionalize explosive shocks and radical revolt as the 
established norm?10 Surprise Encounters is indebted to a series of studies that reframe 
this question by examining what Franco Moretti describes as “the range of intermediate 
possibilities” available to writers who sought to “mitigate [the] extremes” of modern 
experience instead of exacerbating them (Signs 16-17).11 In the chapters that follow, I 
                                                
9 See, for example, Raymond Williams’s “When Was Modernism?” in The Politics of 
Modernism. 
10 As Lisi Schoenbach has recently observed, this question has been posed by multiple 
generations of modernist critics from Harry Levin, Lionel Trilling, and Raymond 
Williams, to Rebecca Walkowitz and Douglas Mao (13). 
11 Moretti, for example, seeks an alternative to a dominant Benjaminian model of city 
experience in an essay on Balzac’s urban novels. Benjamin’s broad application of 
Freudian shock, he contends, fundamentally misunderstands urban experience by 
presuming a rigid system of expectations and a singular event that violates them. By 
contrast, he argues that an unexpected event which takes place in a city is less likely to be 
isolated and unrepeatable than it is to be a novel amalgam of the known and unknown. 
He further holds that daily urban life fosters elasticity (rather than rigidity) in the city 
dweller’s perceptual apparatus (Signs 116-17). Studies that have influenced my own work 
likewise focus on an elastic perceptual receptivity that allows for a non-dualistic 
responsiveness to modern experience. In particular, two areas of modernist scholarship 
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examine the work of modernists who investigated the internal contradictions of their own 
rhetoric of rupture. As the Recherche exemplifies, when shock and habit are understood 
to be locked in antagonistic relation, their assigned roles as enemy or ally can only be 
reversed, not altered. Proust demonstrates that the ongoing process of mediating those 
antagonisms is also a practice of developing habits of surprise.  
!!! 
If Proust’s childhood bedroom provides a touchstone for a shock-centered 
modernist paradigm, a hotel room visited in the garrison town of Doncières presents an 
alternative to the rupture-oriented model of reading the Recherche, but also modernism 
more generally. Critics who read modernist texts as a record of breakdown tend to 
subsume references to surprise within a rubric of shock, so that the terms serve as 
synonyms for the assaulting forces that deaden experience.12 But such an approach 
misses the care with which Proust and others differentiate a wide range of sudden 
experiences, which might be disabling or enabling, destructive or creative. 
Near the beginning of Le côté de Guermantes, Marcel travels to the military base 
at Doncières to visit his friend Robert de Saint-Loup. In the Doncières hotel, he expects 
“to face the world with that ‘self’ which…had never grown up since Combray”—in other 
words, to be stifled by “the unbreathable aroma which every unfamiliar 
bedroom…exhaled” (Guermantes 79). While Marcel braces himself “to find it 
                                                                                                                                            
have guided my inquiry: the fields of pragmatist studies and everyday life studies. Critics 
who emphasize modernism’s engagement with the ordinary include Olson, Phillips, 
Randall, and Sheringham. For literary approaches to pragmatism, see Poirier, Posnock, 
Richardson, and Schoenbach. 
12 For example, Benjamin quotes Valéry as evidence that “the category of surprises,” 
experiences for which we are unprepared, “are evidence of the insufficiency of man” 
rather than of his capacity (Illuminations 161). Agamben follows Benjamin’s lead in 
using surprise and shock synonymously to designate those forces that rend “gap[s] in 
experience” (Infancy 47). 
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miserable,” as he wonderingly observes upon arrival, “I had no time to be miserable 
because I was never alone” (79). And yet, since the moment of maternal separation at 
Combray, the narrator has sought contemplative solitude in each bedroom. In the 
presence of an unknown person or object, he expects to vacillate between a sense of 
threat and boredom, foreclosing aesthetic receptivity with an anesthetic response. But in 
the Doncières hotel, “strangers [étrangères]” and “neighbours [voisins]” are 
indistinguishable. The room’s inhabitants “acquired a sort of life…real as a colony of 
people, living in silence, it is true, but which you were obliged to encounter, to avoid, to 
greet when you returned” (79). The animate objects that populate this “enchanted domain 
[féerique domaine]” uncannily enmesh familiarity and unfamiliarity: 
I was exempted from effort, an exemption usually granted to us only by the things 
with which long use has made us familiar, the first time I set my feet on those 
steps, familiar before I even knew them, as if they possessed something which 
had possibly been left and incorporated in them by former masters whom they 
used to welcome every day, the prospective charm of habits I had not yet 
contracted…(80) 
When habit is uncoupled from monotonous repetition it allows for contingent contact 
with the lives of objects that are irreducible to his relation with them. Imprinted by 
multiple histories of use and residence, the Doncières hotel feels hospitable in its 
foreignness. The narrator is able to imagine its furnishings as having existences 
independent of his own, without needing to erase their marks of otherness or put them to 
work for him. With the objects “released from any practical use” and Marcel relieved of 
effort, they cohabitate in a communal space of “simply being there” (79). This shared 
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“thereness” reorients the narrator from past habits towards “prospective” forms of 
engagement that can’t be anticipated. 
Instead of being paralyzed by the shock of new objects at Doncières, the narrator 
is electrically galvanized by encounters framed in the terms of surprise. For example, as 
he tours the winding hallways, he is drawn by “a more familiar sense of curiosity in 
regard to the smaller rooms which, without the least concern for symmetry, ran around it 
in vast numbers, in amazement [étonnées]” (79). Exploring further, he reports, 
behind a hanging curtain I discovered nothing more [je surpris seulement] than a 
small closet whose escape had been blocked by the other wall, hiding there rather 
sheepishly, staring at me…I went to the bed, but the presence of the eiderdown, 
the small columns, the tiny fireplace, heightening my attention beyond its usual 
pitch in Paris, prevented me from giving myself up to the normal routine of my 
idle thoughts… (81) 
“No longer shut in,” the narrator opens to reciprocal exchanges where his own surprise 
merges with the sense that the rooms and their furnishings are equally startled by him 
(80). The bedroom objects resist effacement in their unavoidable “presence,” but their 
company requires nothing from him beyond simple acknowledgement. Come nighttime, 
he is tempted to let himself “be dragged back towards [his] usual patterns of memory,” 
but new points of contact between his body and the bed require a “pleasurable attention” 
to the altered dimensions of slumber: “The same is true of sleep as of our perception of 
the external world. It needs only some modification of our habits to make it poetic” (81).  
 At Doncières, the narrator sidesteps agonistic all-or-nothing models of change to 
explore the mutual “modifications” that are possible in the middle ranges of experience. 
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Though his fears of an embattled stay at the hotel are assuaged, it remains significant that 
the episode unfolds under the sign of conflict. The soldiers rehearsing combat maneuvers 
outside the hotel window provide a martial backdrop to the narrator’s surprise 
encounters, which recalls the word’s military origins. In its earliest usage, “surprise” 
(rooted in the Old French surprendre) referred to an unexpected military seizure—the 
unforeseen capture or overtaking of one force by another (OED). Each scene of surprise I 
will examine follows the pattern laid out in Doncières: the threat of antagonism is 
introduced only to be averted or attenuated by an unexpected turn of attention. The 
meaning of surprise has since expanded beyond combat stratagems to encompass events 
that cannot be anticipated, or for which one is unprepared. The verb “to surprise” means 
“to ‘take hold of’ or affect suddenly or unexpectedly” (OED). An emotional cast inflected 
its martial etymological roots, so that surprise primarily describes the dynamics of 
affective forces rather than military forces. As we will see, however, there remains some 
uncertainty over whether surprise can be counted as an emotion with stable 
characteristics. The OED signals its ambiguous status by defining surprise as “a sudden 
access of emotion,” rather than an emotional state unto itself. The fact that the same word 
designates the surprising event and the startled response causes further definitional 
indeterminacy. Psychologically blurred distinctions between agent and object of surprise 
are often matched by syntactical indistinctions. In this study, I follow the lead of writers 
and theorists who maintain this understanding of surprise as an emotional and perceptual 
opening or moment of access that makes way for a range of possible emotional states—




 Having dodged the bedroom battle he fears at Doncières, Proust’s narrator finds 
his perceptual habits reoriented as opposed to ruptured so that new perspectival 
calibrations become possible. For example, he describes the hotel wallpaper as “a violent 
red dotted with black and white flowers which suggested they would take some getting 
used to” (Guermantes 86). But instead of having to subsume the unknown into the 
known, he enters a space of mutual inhabitation where differences are not collapsed but 
exchanged: “they affected me as something novel, forcing me not into conflict but into 
contact with them…imprisoning me in the heart of a sort of poppy from which I viewed 
the world, quite otherwise than in Paris” (86, my emphasis). Where he might have 
imposed his subjugating will on the “novel” environment, Marcel embraces the subtle 
changes those surroundings institute in him. The hotel bedroom objects look back at the 
Proustian perceiver, engaging him in an ongoing proprioceptive process where activity 
and passivity, inside and outside find a strange coincidence. Suspended by surprise, the 
narrator can both observe the hotel room’s flower-printed walls and dwell within “the 
heart” of poppies that ultimately alter how he “viewed the world” (86). 
Proust’s extraordinary attunement to the animated elements of the bedroom’s 
“enchanted domain [féerique domaine]” exemplifies what Jane Bennett calls a 
“phenomenology of enchantment” in her polemic against narratives of disenchantment 
that leave modern life “devoid of surprise” (4). For Bennett as for Proust, “To be 
enchanted is to be struck and shaken by the extraordinary that lives amid the familiar and 
the everyday”; it is to be seized by “the surprise element that lurks in every object of 
experience” (Bennett 4, 94). As the Doncières episode exemplifies, “surprising 
encounter[s]” can galvanize the perceptual field into a new vision of the world (Bennett 
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5). However, Proust appears far less confident that this “uneasy combination of charm 
and disturbance” is guaranteed to mobilize “an energizing feeling of fullness or 
plenitude—a momentary return to childhood joie de vivre” (Bennett 104). In Proust’s 
Recherche, the “electric charge” of surprise rarely sparks triumphant transformation 
(Bennett 104). After all, the Doncières episode ends with a phone call from the narrator’s 
grandmother that leaves him “throbbing with the same anguish [he] had felt in the distant 
past”—a feeling that bears little resemblance to the “childhood joie de vivre” that Bennett 
invokes (Guermantes 133). But even as she emphasizes spontaneous plenitude, Bennett 
admits that the surprise-fueled encounters she locates at the heart of modernity are “a 
precarious concatenation”: “fortuitous circumstances” must conjoin with “deliberate 
strategies” to bring them to pass (104).  Surprise Encounters examines the compositional 
strategies used by a line of literary modernists to “hone a sensory receptivity” in 
themselves and their readers (Bennett 4). For Proust, as for all of the writers in this study, 
somatic habits of receptivity are developed and renewed in a practice of reading that 
palpably extends the practice of living life as “a series of surprises.” 
While aesthetic approaches to representing the surprise encounter are remarkably 
varied, those examined in this study feature temporal contours in common. In each case, 
the experience of surprise recalibrates the relationship between the past and future 
according to a distinctive three-fold movement: (1) an unanticipated encounter disrupts a 
previous pattern of perception, prompting (2) a turn of attention, heightened and attuned 
to the present moment, as well as (3) a perceptual opening towards unforeseen, perhaps 
otherwise unforeseeable possibilities of future engagement. The prospective turn projects 
a vantage from where one can reflect on the present moment as a recollected past that 
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might be recast or better grasped. In the Doncières bedroom, this elastic web of 
anticipatory projections and retrospective reflections renovates the rigid mold of past 
perceptual patterns. In this way, the shuttling temporality of surprise opens the vital 
(though always provisional) possibility that the future can look different from what 
preceded it, and that the past could have assumed a different shape than the one it took.13  
!!! 
The supple continuum of time that shapes modernist representations of surprise 
corresponds to the psychological continuum, which theorists since Descartes have drawn 
in efforts to make sense of the fluctuating phenomenon that is variously termed a passion, 
an affect, and an emotion.14 From the time that Descartes first counted surprise among the 
                                                
13 These formulations are deeply indebted to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s conception of 
reparative reading, which clears space for the realization “that the future may be different 
from the present,” so that the reparatively positioned reader can also entertain such 
“ethically crucial possibilities as that the past, in turn, could have happened differently 
from the way it actually did” (Touching 146). 
14 As I will further elaborate in specific discussions of each theorist, I use the terms 
“emotion” and “feeling” in accordance with William James’s theory of emotion, while 
my references to “affect” will follow Silvan Tomkins’s lead (who is himself working in a 
Jamesian tradition). Influenced by this body of work, I contest the rigid distinction that a 
poststructuralist strain of affect theory asserts between affects understood as 
physiological sensations and emotions understood as psychological states. Rei Terada 
neatly distills this mind/body divide when she defines “emotion” as “a psychological, at 
least minimally interpretive experience whose physiological aspect is affect” (5). In 
Terada’s work (as in mine), a third term—feeling—mediates between these two domains 
of experience. But for other critics working in a Deleuzian tradition, the unstructured, 
free-flowing “autonomy” of affect is defined against what Brian Massumi calls “the 
tawdry status of a private ‘emotion’”: its enslavement to bounded formations of 
signification, “subjective content” and linear narrative (“Too-Blue” 186, “Autonomy” 
221). It becomes crucial, Massumi concludes, “to theorize the difference between affect 
and emotion” so that “psychological categories” will not “creep back” in, thus “undoing 
the considerable deconstructive work that has been effectively carried out by 
poststructuralism” (“Autonomy” 221). The very term “emotion,” as Charles Altieri 
observes, has been “contaminated by centuries of association with rhetoric” that equates 
it with stationary beliefs, behaviors, and identifications (50). The apparently antithetical 
relation between affect and emotion has thus come to rest on precisely the reductive 
Cartesian division that it purports to undo, but more often simply inverts. In general, I 
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primary “passions,” it has spurred debates regarding its duration and strength, its negative 
or positive charge, and its enabling or inhibiting relationship to perception.15 The 
Cartesian continuum of responses to a “sudden and unexpected arrival” distinguishes 
surprise from wonderment and astonishment on a scale of increasing intensity (Passions 
58).16 He declares wonder to be the “first of all passions” because it yokes our capacity 
for aesthetic delight with the “serviceable” use-value of making us “learn and 
retain…things we have previously been ignorant of” (Passions 52, 59). Amplified 
reactions to “novel objects of the senses” tip the scales away from wonder’s enabling 
utility towards the dangerous potential for surprise to arrest thinking and acting (Passions 
58). For Descartes, surprise immobilizes rather than supports “attention and reflection,” 
thereby “eradicat[ing] or pervert[ing] the use of reason” (Passions 59-60).  
The Cartesian conception of surprise introduced a central tension between 
gradated continuity and interruptive arrest which has remained central to theorizations 
that have followed. It was not until Charles Darwin shifted the continuum to place 
attention and surprise side-by-side rather than on opposite ends that Descartes’s notion of 
an irrational irruption was issued a meaningful challenge. As Darwin writes in The 
Expressions of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), “attention, if sudden and close, 
graduates into surprise; and this into astonishment; and this into stupefied amazement” 
                                                                                                                                            
will take Terada’s cue to use the term “feeling” to signal the integration of psychological 
and physiological processes that are not reducible to subjectivity, language, or narrative, 
but are also not entirely divorced from those structures. 
15 Psychologists have debated whether surprise is more accurately categorized as an 
instinctive reflex than as an emotion or affect. Silvan Tomkins holds the full “surprise—
startle” range of experience to be properly affective, but his student Paul Ekman goes on 
to claim that the briefer “startle reactions” are largely reflexive. See Ekman’s “Is the 
Startle Reaction an Emotion?”  




(278).17 In the early 1960s, psychologist Silvan Tomkins amended the Darwinian model 
based on his observation that surprise initiates attention rather than the other way around. 
In Tomkins’s system of affects, surprise acts as a “circuit breaker” that “orients the 
individual to turn his attention away from one thing to another” (Affect 273). Surprise 
plays a role opposite to all the other affects; rather than supplying sensory information, its 
“resetting” function clears the perceptual apparatus, rendering it freshly receptive to 
incoming information, but also preventing the immediate coalescence of any interpretable 
message (Affect 273).18 
Tomkins’s psychological model of surprise is particularly helpful for 
understanding the aesthetic conception of surprise as the capacity for affectively charged 
experiences without any specific affective content. In Tomkins’s schema, surprise has 
pride of place as the “ancillary to every other affect” (Affect 273). As an auxiliary of the 
“central assembly” of perception, surprise is less an affect proper than an infrastructure 
                                                
17 Understood as an adaptive response, surprise is most often categorized as an 
“orientation reaction” alongside “interest-excitement,” but Tomkins’s account also places 
equal emphasis on its capacity to disorientate (Affect 503). He argues that Darwin’s stress 
on surprise’s adaptive use-value neglects its potentially disabling interruptive aspect, 
which momentarily overwhelms one’s capacity either to continue with the present 
activity or to initiate a new one. Once surprise’s interruptive force has cleared the 
perceptual apparatus of all preceding information to make way for new stimuli, that same 
clearing function can suspend one’s ability to perceptually locate or engage the object of 
surprise.  
18 Adam Frank gives this very concise account of Tomkins’s theory of affects: “Tomkins 
proposed that humans and other animals have evolved affect systems that are distinct 
from both the drives and cognition. Humans, according to Tomkins, are born with eight 
or nine innate affects that act as the primary motives: the negative ones, fear-terror, 
distress-grief, anger-rage, shame-humiliation, and contempt-disgust; the positive ones, 
interest-excitement and enjoyment-joy; and the reorienting affect of surprise-startle. 
These are at once individual and shared; individual in that they are experienced in or on 
an individual physiology, and shared in that they take place primarily on the skin and 
musculature of the face and in the tones of the voice and are communicated both to the 
self and to others, or sometimes to the self as an other” (3).  
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that gives place to other affects.19 Its “feeling tone” is relatively neutral, but can be 
charged with a positive or negative valence depending on the nature of the stimulus and 
the perceiver’s interpretation of it (Affect 273).20 Almost immediately, surprise opens 
onto feelings generated in the process of interpreting what happened in a sudden moment 
of seizure. Accordingly, the unexpected event can be variously experienced: on the 
extreme end of the affective continuum it might be felt as a shock, but it could just as 
easily segue into more middle-ranging experiences of interest, confusion, or anxiousness.  
Surprise is so easily confused and conflated with other affects because it has 
already passed into something else by the time it can be reflected upon.21  As Paul Ekman 
observes, “Once you have determined the nature of the surprising event, you are no 
longer surprised” (Unmasking 35). How then is surprise expressed in all its open-ended 
immediacy? Darwin, Tomkins, Ekman and others have primarily focused on reading the 
                                                
19 Tomkins defines the “central assembly” as “the transmuting mechanism and other 
components of the nervous system functionally assembled to it at the moment” (Affect 
338). Clearing the central assembly for incoming information, surprise plays an opposite 
role to the eight other affects, which supply the nervous system with information (Affect 
498). 
20 As is the case for all Tomkinsian affects, surprise names a continuum designated with 
the hyphenated “surprise-startle.” Surprise’s neutral “feeling tone” shades towards 
“mildly negative” as one moves closer towards the “startle” end of the scale (Affect 273). 
This inclination towards negative feeling increases in proportion with the increased 
rapidity and density of neural firing in response to the sudden, intense stimuli that have 
triggered surprise-startle in the first place. As greater intensity tips neutral surprise 
towards negativity, its tendency towards combining with more negatively charged affects 
such as fear or distress increases. Less intense levels of neural firing lean surprise 
towards its coalescence with more neutral or positive affects like interest or enjoyment. 
Tomkins’s elaboration of the Darwinian model has largely defined contemporary 
understandings of surprise, but also a psychology of affect more generally. See Ekman, 
Silvia, Scherer. 
21 Tomkins’s system of affects is defined by their “freedom to combine” (Shame 45). 
This freedom defines not only the relationship between the different affects, but also 
between the different systems that constitute the “central assembly.” Since the affect 
system “provides the primary motives of human being,” this freedom is necessary to 
explain the potentially infinite range of human motivators.  
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signs of surprise that are registered in its distinctive facial expression of raised eyebrows 
and a dropped jaw.22 The characteristic surprise utterance is the exclamation “oh!” 
produced by the open-mouthed intake and audible exhalation of air. This quasi-linguistic 
vocalization calls attention to the visceral materiality of language that blurs the boundary 
between articulate speech and involuntary sound, merging bodily and linguistic 
expression.  
Studies of the language of emotion have tended to set articulations of surprise 
apart from other emotional expressions. Its uniqueness is attributed to the fact that it lacks 
specific content and strangely intermingles interruption with integration. Psycholinguist 
Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky designates surprise a “super-emotion” on the basis that it 
exemplifies the “gradient” nature of “emotive language in general” (156). She examines 
expressions of surprise on an “iconicity-conventionality scale” that ranges from 
spontaneous interjections and exclamations to fixed idioms and euphemisms. The quasi-
onomatopoeic “oh” sound has proven to be strongly iconic, “expressing the emotion 
experienced by a speaker faced by a sudden, unexpected turn of events” with “possible 
universality” (158). As one moves towards the “conventional” end of the scale, the 
linguistic signs of surprise pass from a direct reaction into a retrospective response: “the 
speaker reports his/her emotional (positive or negative) reaction to a new state of affairs” 
with formulaic phrases like “I can’t believe it!” or “is that so?” (163). Kryk-Kastovsky’s 
enumeration of common lexical constructions of surprise supports Ekman’s contention 
                                                
22 The mouth opens as the jaw relaxes and drops, which Darwin posits to be an effect of 
energy being siphoned from unused sensory apparatuses (i.e. taste and vocalization) that 
momentarily slacken or halt in order to concentrate the energy around the more 
immediately vital apparatuses of visual and aural attention. See Tomkins, Affect 273, 279; 
Darwin 278-289; Ekman, Unmasking 37-45 
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that we can only declare ourselves surprised after the fact. In a study of preposition use in 
the language of emotion, Meredith Osmond explains that we are surprised “at” rather 
than “with” something because the latter preposition implies duration, whereas the 
“surprise group” of emotional expressions only refer to “the moment of discovery of 
some situation,” which “cannot be prolonged at will or recreated by recalling the moment 
of impact” (114). The psychological and psycholinguistic accounts of the visceral but 
fleeting experience of surprise and its necessarily belated expression have important 
implications for aesthetic forms of engagement with it. To represent surprise in a literary 
form means finding a language for an experience that exceeds reflection and expression 
as it takes place, and which cannot be recreated through recollection. In narrative terms, 
the representation of surprise requires a refractive temporal syntax that protracts the 
instantaneous, but also a phenomenological lexicon that traverses the uncertain threshold 
between inner and outer.   
As demonstrated in Doncières, the phenomenological uncertainty of this traversal 
alters the way the narrator “views the world.” In an earlier essay entitled “On Reading” 
[“Sur la lecture”] (1906), Proust establishes the centrality of surprise encounters to his 
theory of reading.23 Proust roots his theory in the practice of reading he began to develop 
in the childhood room where he would retire with a book after mealtimes (On Reading 
26). Significantly, the autobiographical bedroom he details resembles Doncières rather 
than Combray. As in the Doncières bedroom, Proust’s sense of “simply being there” 
                                                
23 The piece was originally published as the preface to Proust’s translation of Sesame and 
Lilies, where his reading of John Ruskin’s text is manifest in commentative footnotes, as 
well as in the interpretive liberties he takes as translator. It was then published 
independently of the Sesame et les lys translation in Pastiches et mélanges as “Journées 
de lecture.” Proust’s preface develops his own theory of reading against Ruskin’s 
embrace of all-consuming encounters with books that displace the outside world. 
  
22 
interpenetrates with “lives profoundly different” than his own, plunging him “into the 
depths of the non-ego” (Guermantes 79, On Reading 17). “Full to the brim with the soul 
of others,” the young Marcel enjoys solitude without isolation (On Reading 19). This 
immersive feeling of being alone in another’s company is coextensive with a field of 
perception cultivated by reading. In the bedroom, he learns to bring the same acutely 
responsive attention to literary encounters and object encounters. Having evocatively 
recalled a series of surprise encounters with books and objects from his youth, Proust 
reveals the essay’s primary motive. His aim is to recreate in the mind of the reader “the 
original psychological act called reading with enough force for him to be able to follow 
now, as if within himself,” the theory of reading that he goes on to propose. Proust thus 
confers on the bedroom scene a tutelary power to “awaken” in his audience a receptivity 
displayed by the figure of the young Marcel. Just as Proust keeps solitary company with 
bedroom objects, the act of reading “allow[s] the impetus of another mind to be received 
in the midst of solitude” (On Reading 41). But what privileges the encounter with a book 
over encounters with other things is that reading allows for “an intervention which, while 
coming from another, takes place in our own innermost selves” (On Reading 40). 
In childhood, Proust effortlessly gives himself over to this “foreign intervention 
[intervention étrangère]” (On Reading 41). However, he resists idealizing the youthful 
reader, whose uninhibited receptivity is not yet paired with reflection. It is only over time 
that a reader learns to take the author’s “Conclusions” as his “Incitements”— the start-
point rather than the end-goal of reading. “To maintain the mind’s full, fruitful work on 
itself” in reading is to practice a “discipline” of attention over the course of life (On 
Reading 31, 39). Proust outlines habits of attention that shuttle between “our innermost 
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self [la fond au nous-même]” and “another mind [un autre esprit]”—between what is 
most intimate and most remote (On Reading 40). To avoid unreflective communion as an 
end unto itself, the reader must attune himself to the discrepancies as well as the 
congruencies between his consciousness and the book. Proust stresses the strangeness of 
an encounter that is as much an invasion as a reciprocal exchange.24 Resisting our efforts 
to “penetrate” its depths, the book turns us back on our “innermost self,” but also points 
us outward to the world beyond its pages: “that mist which our eager eyes would like to 
pierce is the last word of the painter’s art…he tells us… Look! Learn how to see!” (On 
Reading 37). The act of reading, in other words, will ideally provoke perception and set 
“creative activity in motion” (On Reading 43). 
As “Sur la lecture” reveals, Proust’s conception of books as creative instigators 
rather than static idols finds an unexpected source in Emerson. Proust warns against an 
all-consuming absorption that displaces the world with “a beautiful Platonic myth” and 
replaces volition with a neurasthenic “impossibility of willing [une sorte d’impossibilité 
de vouloir]” (On Reading 41). At the end of a long passage outlining such dangers, 
Proust compares Emerson to the archetypal literary guide. Just as Virgil led Dante “to the 
threshold of paradise,” Emerson acts as an “initiator whose magic keys open to our 
                                                
24 George Poulet develops Proust’s account of reading into a literary critical approach 
that paves a middle road between “extreme proximity and extreme detachment” 
(“Phenomenology” 63). Instead of holding the book myopically close or at a distanced 
remove, we might allow ourselves to be permeated by “an existence which is not mine, 
but which I experience as though it were mine” (60). This strange merging of me and not 
me “provokes a certain feeling of surprise” (58-59). As Proust has shown, surprise 
consists in the temporal disjuncture between an immediate apprehension and its belated 
interpretation. Poulet makes explicit the critical import of its disorienting temporal and 
perceptual order. Suspended between sudden seizure and “reflective” delay, the 
“astonished consciousness…of the critic” must mediate “the mysterious 
interrelationship” of the work and the self (63). In both Proust’s and Poulet’s account, the 
reader’s capacity for surprise depends on the mediation of intimacy and distance. 
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innermost selves the doors into which we would not have known how to penetrate” (On 
Reading 43). Aligning Emerson with the tutelary figure of Virgil, Proust figures himself 
as a modern Dante who is led to probe his own depths rather than dropping into the pits 
of hell. Tellingly Emerson’s own source of creative “stimulus” is Plato (On Reading 41). 
Instead losing himself in the realm of abstracted Platonic forms, his reading is “at once 
essential and limited”: Emerson “rereads some pages of Plato,” Proust observes, for the 
sole purpose of beginning to write (On Reading 35, 43). Indeed the whole of “Sur la 
lecture” is evidence that Proust has internalized Emerson’s central tenets of reading 
understood as a spur for writing; the reader-writer is instructed to absorb books “actively 
and not passively; to esteem his own life as the text, and books the commentary” (EL 
239).  
For Proust, as for Emerson, learning to read one’s “own life as the text” means 
learning to read for surprise. The self we are turned back on, whose depths we probe, is a 
profoundly unsettled self. I have introduced surprise by way of Proust’s bedroom, but as I 
will elaborate in Chapter One, those Proustian contingencies of time, perception, and 
selfhood can be traced back to his reading of Emerson. And as we will see in the chapters 
that follow, to track the temporal and perceptual turns of Emersonian surprise through 
two of his most famous and enigmatic essays, “Circles” (1841) and “Experience” (1844), 
is also to begin to untangle the convolutions of Jamesian syntax, Steinian grammar, and 
Larsen’s indeterministic approach to plot and character. At the opening and close of 
“Experience,” Emerson affirms “Surprise” as a “lord of life”—a guide to living, writing, 
and reading that provides at least one interpretive frame for the essay’s opening query: 
“Where do we find ourselves?”  (EL 469, 491, 471). The immediate response to the 
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disorienting question—“In a series of which we do not know the extremes, and believe 
that it has none”—only exacerbates the reader’s uncertainties (EL 471). But it also offers 
clues as to how we might proceed: without any guarantees, but with a belief in the 
“middle region of our being” (EL 480). As Emerson reinforces, “the mid-world is best” 
(EL 481). This opening invocation of seriality without extremity resonates with a hinge 
phrase at the heart of “Experience”: “Life is a series of surprises, and would not be worth 
taking or keeping, if it were not.” Such a life is powered by “a spontaneity which forgets 
usages and makes the moment great” and “by pulses…undulatory and alternate.” 
Continuing in the same paragraph, Emerson writes: “We thrive by casualties. Our chief 
experiences have been casual” (EL 483). In the movement from “casualties” to the 
“casual,” he recalls the etymological evolution of the word surprise: the life-and-death 
stakes of a military attack are conjoined with passing, incidental, or seemingly 
insignificant events. 
While “Experience” is famously written in the wake of his son Waldo’s death, 
Emerson resists fixation on the singularity of that loss and on time past. His theory of life 
understood as a series of surprises insists on the multiplicity of “uncalculated and 
uncalculable” events that move us into the future (EL 483). The serial nature of events is 
cast and recast by successive moods that change our perception from one instant to the 
next: “Life is a train of moods like a string of beads, and, as we pass though them, they 
prove to be many-colored lenses which paint the world their own hue” (EL 473). The 
seriality and successiveness of experience is at once the source of life’s continuity and the 
newness of every lived moment. Each passing mood, distinct and fleeting, is connected 
by an unbroken lineament that moves us “Onward and onward!” (EL 486). Even as 
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Emerson grieves the “death of [his] son, more than two years ago,” he comes to the 
powerful realization that the “flux of moods” and the flow of time cannot be stilled, even 
“when we clutch hardest” (EL 485, 473). This insistent onwardness makes our life seem 
“not present, so much as prospective” (EL 486). As a “lord of life,” surprise is laced 
through experience; at the end of the essay, Emerson identifies it as a thread on “the loom 
of time” (EL 490). Its open weave supports a posture of responsiveness that allows 
Emerson decisively to declare at the essay’s close, “All I know is reception” (EL 485). 
 Emerson first articulates his central claim that “life is a series of surprises” in 
“Circles” (EL 413). In this essay, the paradoxical temporality of surprise—a convergence 
of instantaneity and “incessant movement”—is expressed and enacted by the essay’s 
spiraling figures and sentences (EL 412). The essay begins with a vertigo-inducing claim: 
“The eye is the first circle; the horizon which it forms is the second; and throughout 
nature this primary figure is repeated without end” (EL 403). The essay itself is an 
exercise in “reading the copious sense of this first of forms” as it dilates from “a ring 
imperceptibly small…to a new and larger circle…to immense and innumerable 
expansions” (EL 403, 404, 405). Our orbit of vision expands to the point that “There is no 
outside, no inclosing wall, no circumference to us” (EL 405). As in “Experience,” the 
essay’s disorienting opening statement comes full circle to give the final word to surprise:  
The one thing which we seek with insatiable desire is to forget ourselves, to be 
surprised out of our propriety, to lose our sempiternal memory, and to do 
something without knowing how or why; in short, to draw a new circle…The way 
of life is wonderful: it is by abandonment. (EL 414) 
  
27 
Drawing a new circle depends on being surprised out of our propriety—on unsettling the 
proper as it pertains to social and linguistic conformity, but also to subjectivity more 
generally. Just as Emerson denies delimiting rules of decorum and language usage, he 
resists the idea of essential properties belonging to a stable subject. For the 
“experimenter” and “endless seeker,” there is no proper self to claim as one’s own (EL 
412). 
 In “Circles,” Emerson associates surprise with an immersive experience of self-
loss or self-forgetting. Echoing the passage just cited, Stanley Cavell writes, “the 
achievement of the human requires not inhabitation and settlement but abandonment, 
leaving. Then everything depends on your realization of abandonment” (Etudes 19).25 
But if a new circle of surprise is contingent upon the abandonment of conscious thought 
and directive action, how is it to be drawn? While Emerson refrains from programmatic 
recommendations, it is not by accident that he pairs “Use and Surprise” in the poem that 
opens “Experience.”26 In “Circles,” the “use” of surprise is coextensive with the “use of 
literature” (EL 408). The act of reading “afford[s] us a platform whence we may 
command a view of our present life, a purchase by which we move it” (EL 408). In other 
words, “literature is a point outside of our hodiernal circle, through which a new one may 
                                                
25 On abandonment and leaving in Emerson also see Sharon Cameron’s “The Way of Life 
by Abandonment: Emerson’s Impersonal” and Branka Arsić’s On Leaving: A Reading in 
Emerson. 
26 The epigraphic poem begins like this: 
   The lords of life, the lords of life,— 
I saw them pass, 
In their own guise, 
Like and unlike, 
Portly and grim,— 
Use and Surprise, 
Surface and Dream, 
Succession swift and spectral Wrong… (EL 459) 
  
28 
be described” (EL 408). Literary reading provides, in short, perspective. In the all-
consuming moment of lived surprise, “there is no outside” (EL 405). Reflection is only 
possible through a belated process of trying to remember what happened in the moment 
we forgot ourselves. “We value the poet” because his representation of the experience 
allows us to be within but also slightly to the side of the circle drawn, to feel surprise and 
to reflect on the feeling as we inhabit it (EL 406). 
Beyond these two foundational essays, surprise manifests itself across Emerson’s 
vast body of work as a signature of time and of syntax. He describes and enacts the 
experience of surprise in sentences that turn on themselves and on one another. Whether 
the Emersonian turn is articulated in spatial or temporal terms, it tends to mark a point of 
transition where the relationship between the past and the future, the concrete and the 
abstract remains undecided—and perhaps undecidable. His sentences continually dilate 
from a discrete detail to an expansive horizon, or just as often, contract from vast 
generality to minutiae close at hand: “I am a God in nature; I am a weed by the wall” (EL 
406). The surprise of such a sentence is in its vertiginous leap from a wide, distant 
abstraction back to “the near, the low, the common” (EL 68). But the bewildering scalar 
shift is counterbalanced by the parallel construction of the formulation. When we give 
equal weight to its parts, “our little circles absorb us and occupy us as fully as the 
heavens” (Emerson qtd. by Tanner 28). God and the weed are recognized as one and the 
same.  
The Emersonian time of living and writing “absorbs past and future into the 
present hour” (EL 270). He is often taken to be disavowing the past, but in fact, his 
conception of  “an everlasting Now” requires an unending process of “transition from a 
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past to a new state” (EL 271). At transitional moments we turn back to what has come 
before in order to turn to face what is yet to come. The present becomes an envelope for 
retrospection and prospection. If surprise is a thread on the loom of time, its “warp and 
woof are past and future” (Society 163). Accordingly, the role of the writer and scholar is 
to “take up into himself all the contributions of the past, all the hopes of the future” (EL 
70). Having gathered the lineaments of time into himself, his task is (in Richard Poirier’s 
terms) “to refloat the world, to make it less stationary and more transitional, to make 
descriptions of it correspondingly looser, less technical, more uncertain” (Poetry 40). The 
metaphor of floating is particularly apt for describing the “transitional, alternating” 
movement of surprise throughout Emerson’s essays (EL 641). He mobilizes images of 
maritime and atmospheric drift, which James, Stein, and Larsen will all take up in their 
respective representations of surprise. For example in the following formulation, he 
describes the “splendid novelty” of art that synthesizes or balances polarized extremes—
“a thread” that twines “two strands”: “The sea-shore, sea seen from shore, shore seen 
from sea” (EL 641). From a vantage suspended between departure and arrival one can 
inhabit both points of view. For Branka Arsić, this line captures “a moment when 
everything has been left (the shore), but nothing has been gained or attained.” She 
evocatively describes a state of open-endedness, which I ascribe to the experience of 
surprise: “everything is still possible, and all meanings are equally true, for nothing is yet 
decided” (On Leaving 88). It is precisely this floating feeling that each writer seeks in 
what Emerson describes as the surprise “event.” 
Who is equipped with the resources to answer Emerson’s call for unrelenting 
unsettlement? It may seem as though only those who enjoy a contemplative life 
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supported by independent means—those like Proust, James, and Stein—have the luxury 
of suspending themselves in contingency in the way he demands. Surprising the self out 
of its propriety can sound like a solipsistic endeavor, available only to a very few. But as 
Emerson maintains, as long as we inhabit an “uncalculated and uncalculable” universe, 
we are inherently exposed to chance and risk (EL 483). Practices of reading and writing 
for surprise are presented as primary means of coping with such radical instability. As we 
will see in Chapter One, William James advises his audience of teachers and students that 
reading Emerson serves as preparation for accommodating the challenge of living in a 
world that brims over with uncertainty. Both Emerson and James ask their readers and 
listeners to make an “ethical and practical” choice in the face an unknown future: the 
choice between obeying dogmatic orthodoxy and abandoning oneself to demands for 
responsive action in the absence of fixed rules or criteria (EL 407). If ethics are defined 
by the possibility of choosing, the central choice for Emerson is between acting in 
conformity or acting out of surprise—between clinging to false certainties or doing 
“something without knowing how or why” (EL 414). On the one hand, Emerson is 
acutely aware of the psychological, social, and material constraints on the freedom of 
such a choice. On the other hand, the very possibility of “ethical reformation” depends on 
following an unknown course of action (EL 256). David Robinson writes, “this 
affirmation of the ethical imperative to act, even within the framework of a less than 
absolute surety, is a fundamental premise of his later thought” (and, as Eduardo Cadava 
amends, in all his writing) (Robinson qtd. in Cadava 69). Emerson regularly compares the 
ethical to the laws of nature in order to dispel the illusion of immutable principles; both 
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are subject to the unpredictable movements of time and history. Just as “there is no end in 
nature,” there is no such thing as a final ethical position (EL 403). 
!!! 
Surprise has had a contested function in discussions of readerly ethics over the 
past few decades. Since J. Hillis Miller instantiated the phrase, an “ethics of reading” in 
the late 1980s (with a book with that title), the experience of surprise has defined what it 
means to read ethically in a deconstructive literary line. As Barbara Johnson succinctly 
puts it, a reading practice is ethical “to the extent that it encounters and propagates the 
surprise of otherness.” Ethical reading requires exceptional closeness between the critic 
and the object of criticism, even while emphasizing that any fullness of encounter with 
the  “other” remains “impossible” (World 15). At the same time that Hillis Miller and 
others were popularizing a literary ethics of surprise, D.A. Miller argued that “Surprise—
the recognition of what one ‘never suspected’—is precisely what the paranoid seeks to 
eliminate” (164). In The Novel and the Police (1988) he explicates and performs a way of 
reading that has variously been dubbed “suspicious,” “symptomatic” or “paranoid.” 
According to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, the primary legacy of what Paul de Man first 
termed a “hermeneutics of suspicion” is a critical form of attention “averse above all to 
surprise” (Touching 146). To avoid the expected, the critical object is held at a deliberate 
distance that allows for detached but all-seeing surveillance. Whether surprises are to be 
proliferated or excised, ethical and symptomatic models of reading unexpectedly overlap 
where they privilege disclosures yielded in moments of revelatory exposure. 
In recent years, a growing number of literary critics have sought alternatives to a 
practice of symptomatic reading, which Sharon Marcus and Stephen Best have usefully 
defined as “a mode of interpretation that assumes that a text’s truest meaning lies in what 
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it does not say, describes textual surfaces as superfluous, and seeks to unmask hidden 
meanings” (1). The critical impulse towards detecting and unveiling hidden or repressed 
meanings requires a diagnostic framework which often dictates in advance what the critic 
expects to find. Since suspicious readers don’t want to be caught off-guard, any 
unforeseen phenomena are necessarily bad surprises. It’s not hard to see how a 
symptomatic methodology easily falls into lockstep with a Benjaminian brand of 
vigilance. Reading in a suspicious mood within a Freudian framework of trauma means 
anticipating shocks at every textual turn. A critical rubric of rupture has a protective 
function insofar as it allows the critic to preempt shocks and thus diffuse their force; 
identified in advance, a shock might be uncovered without being felt. In this way, the act 
of interpretation is separated from affective experience.  
One reason symptomatic reading is so widely practiced is because the protocols of 
exposure can be trained and replicated. Further, the dramatic act of unveiling—especially 
a spectacle like shock—is easy to recognize and affords esteem to the critic (Marcus and 
Best 1). As Sedgwick attests, suspicious procedures intended to avert surprises are 
“nothing if not teachable” (Touching 136). By contrast, critics like Johnson, Gayatri 
Spivak, and Jane Gallop routinely attest to the pedagogical paradoxes of cultivating 
surprise as the basis of a literary ethics. If, by definition, surprises cannot be anticipated 
and may well have morphed into something else by the time they register, how might the 
practice of reading for them be practiced and taught? “Set[ting] oneself up to be 
surprised, as Johnson frames it, is an “impossible but necessary task” (World 15). Her 
own deconstructionist approach to the undertaking involves fostering “a new form of 
ignorance”: it is only when we willfully forget what we know how to do “that knowledge 
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can go on making accessible to us the surprise of an otherness we can only encounter in 
the moment of suddenly discovering we are ignorant of it” (World 15-16). In the same 
vein, Gallop advises that we work against our preconceptions by focusing on the 
“surprising” details of a text. This means “giving up the comfort of the familiar, of the 
already-known, for the sake of learning, of encountering something new, something [the 
reader] didn’t already know” (“Ethics of Reading” 11). To open oneself to surprise, 
according to Spivak, is to “encounter the many-leveled, unfixable intricacy and openness 
of a work of literature”; it is to suspend oneself “in the text of the other” (“World” 671, 
“Righting” 532).  
As each of these critics makes clear, a literary ethics of surprise is not a goal that 
finds a final resting place when achieved. Construed as an event and a task, reading opens 
the way for an “ethical call that may or may not happen,” but is always to come, without 
guaranteed arrival (Spivak, Live Theory 107). When asked about her approach to teaching 
“literary reading,” Spivak responded, “One can’t plan to be ethical…It surprises you, it is 
unexpected, you cannot plan the lack of coercion…it’s not that you’re being ethical, it’s 
that the ethical might flower…” (Live Theory 119). On the one hand, the desire for 
ethical achievement risks instrumentalization, just as cultivated habits of surprise seem to 
suggest routinized predictability. There can be no set strategy for fostering or modeling 
surprise encounters with “the singular and the unverifiable” (“Righting” 532). On the 
other hand, these critics and teachers are deeply invested in an ethics of reading that can 
be taught and practiced. But the pedagogical potential of their formulations is limited by 
a definitional tautology between surprise and ethics: to read ethically is to allow oneself 
to be surprised; to be open to surprise is to allow for an ethical encounter. The ethical 
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imperative to foster surprise at first seems diametrically opposed to the paranoid agenda 
of eliminating surprise. Yet, in the call for infinite accountability to an unfathomable 
other we might also hear echoes of a suspicious reader’s motto, “you can never be 
paranoid enough” (Touching 142). 
One way to break open this tautology is to retrieve a pedagogy of surprise from 
the sublimity of post-structuralist ethics. Anne-Lise François has identified the call for 
“infinite, never-to-be-satisfied ethical responsibility” as a postmodern inheritance of the 
romantic sublime, which likewise requires an endless responsiveness to what is 
unrepresentable (xvii). An aesthetics of the sublime, like an aesthetics of shock, goes 
hand-in-hand with the high stakes of exposure and revelation. The romanticized work of 
the critic is to reveal, to uncover, to express the inexpressible. As François argues, 
Romanticism’s emphasis on the heroic work of the imagination has a legacy in critical 
models that only recognize value in labored recoveries and dramatic disclosures (xvii). If 
the practice of reading for surprise is threatened by hostilities towards the unexpected and 
by the reductive impulse to treat all experiences of suddenness as shocks, it is equally 
challenged by a potentially paralyzing overemphasis on the extremity and unattainability 
of the ethical demand. I have found, however, that the subjects of this study are more 
interested in the indefinite than the infinite, the uncertain than the unfathomable. As each 
chapter will elaborate, Emerson, Baudelaire, James, Stein, and Larsen cultivate an ethos 
of contingency that deviates from the trajectories of revelation or redemption. Like 
Proust, these writers render scenes of surprise, but they also assume the position of 
reader. For example, James’s prefaces to the New York Edition and Stein’s Lectures in 
America both return to the authors’ own oeuvres with the aim of cultivating a reading 
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experience that is shaped by surprise in the same way they describe the process of writing 
as having been. For these writers, an art of composition governed by surprise will ideally 
foster a practice of reading for surprise.  
!!! 
Emerson’s often-overlooked importance for Benjamin’s exemplary recorders of 
shock provides the starting point for this project and for a transatlantic remapping of 
modernism. As I demonstrate in Chapter One, Baudelaire’s and Proust’s modernist 
hallmarks actively engage with the Emersonian temporality of an “everlasting Now” 
(Society 167). In the Recherche, Proust draws on Emerson’s Neoplatonic vision of an 
infinitely renewable universe where pattern and uncertainty partake of one another. An 
Emersonian desire to fuse timelessness with instantaneity is evident not only in Proust’s 
mémoire involontaire, but also in the correspondances Baudelaire draws between the 
immutable and the ephemeral. In “Le peintre de la vie moderne” Baudelaire identifies 
Emerson as a transatlantic representative of the modern era whose influence stretches 
beyond the confines of nineteenth-century New England into the cosmopolitan center of 
Paris. I argue that Baudelaire’s urban wanderer—the quintessential figure of European 
modernity—has an American source in Emerson’s poet-walker, a fact that confirms the 
crucial importance of this intercontinental exchange. To conclude, I contend that 
Emerson’s intercontinental reach was matched by his interdisciplinary reach. Just as 
Baudelaire and Proust looked to Emerson for training in fresh perceptual habits, William 
James identified Emersonian surprise as the foundation of a practical philosophy of 
education and experience. 
In Chapter Two, I trace Henry James’s trajectory from an economy of shock in 
his first expatriate novels, to a more integrative model of surprise in his last three 
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completed novels of consciousness. By pitting America against Europe and innocence 
against experience, James initially constructs his novels according to the oppositional 
logic that subtends shock modernism. For example, an early work like The American 
(1877) stages a cultural collision between a new-world sense of wonder and a shock-
saturated Old World. Around the same time James was developing the naïve American 
hero Christopher Newman, his critical writings characterize Emerson as a similarly 
unworldly innocent. By contrast The Ambassadors and The Golden Bowl, which 
epitomize the dense and fully realized style of James’s late phase, are organized around 
surprise encounters between representatives of each continent. The protagonists of the 
three novels partake of the same “responsive sensibilities” that his brother William James 
so revered in Emerson (WI 856). Reading Emerson, as William affirmed, can facilitate a 
“recognizant” turn towards those contingencies intrinsic to a world of chance (WI 862). 
Henry’s late novels draw on the fluid images of flow used by his brother to describe the 
unpredictable “stream of experience,” but he goes further in his struggle to find a syntax 
that is expressive of endless flux. I map the convolutions of his increasingly elaborate 
sentences around the distinctive temporal pivot of surprise. Henry James’s acrobatic 
shuttling between past and future tenses and interior and exterior space carves out a 
shared ground of experience where the borders between the known and unknown become 
a commutable frontier of open potential. 
Chapter Three examines the habits of attention that Stein developed in response to 
the sudden onslaught of fame and notoriety in early 1930s. While critics have focused on 
the influence of William James’s psychology on Stein, I argue that it is Henry James who 
provides her with a model of consciousness that is at once permeable and protective in 
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the face of an unprecedented audience. Indeed, when Stein asserts that Henry James was 
“doing what American literature had always done,” I understand her to be saying that his 
conduct of life, inseparable from a conduct of composition, can be traced back to the 
source of literary surprise that we find in Emerson (Writings 56). In her chapter on Henry 
James in Four in America, Stein establishes the writer’s capacity to merge spontaneous 
receptivity with militant discipline as a touchstone for her own mode of composition. 
Only with such a robust yet flexible infrastructure of attention in place can Stein develop 
the improvisational practice of “feel[ing] writing,” which she defines as “beginning again 
and again” with each new sentence in “a continuous present” (“Pictures” 243, Writings 
27). Like James, Stein answers the Emersonian call for endless renewal by preparing 
herself to be surprised by the unexpected. Yet Stein’s famously difficult lexical 
repetitions and variations go even further than James’s in challenging the sustained 
attention of her readers. 
 “Our moods do not believe in each other,” writes Emerson, and in Chapter Four I 
examine how Nella Larsen’s novel bears him out (EL 406). Since Quicksand’s (1928) 
publication at the height of the Harlem Renaissance, critics have been confounded by the 
inexplicable mood swings that fuel protagonist Helga Crane’s transatlantic traversals. 
This chapter develops an Emersonian climatology of moods as a guide for drawing 
critical connections between the shifting transience of Helga Crane’s humors and the 
shifting weather patterns that backdrop her movements. The novel’s changes in mood and 
weather converge in a series of “atmospheric events” that index the limits and 
possibilities of narrative surprise in the novel form (Arsić 145). I locate Larsen’s 
novelistic surprise in the drifting clouds that model Helga’s amorphous mutability. But 
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the novel also unexpectedly imposes overdetermined plot closure which underlines the 
fossilizing narrative logic of race and reproduction. Even more baffling than Quicksand’s 
incomprehensible central character is the incongruous ending that suddenly subjugates 
Helga’s plot-defying itinerancy to constrictive convention. Quicksand’s stock ending is 
startling precisely because the reader has learned to expect open-endedness in place of 
typical closure.  
The weather offers a more general figure for the permeating presence of surprise 
in the novels and essays that are featured in this study. As a facet of narrative time, its 
appearance can remain barely discernible, hovering between sentences and at the fringes 
of scenes. As a structure of attention, its floating openness can be quickly overtaken by 
more directive or demanding dimensions of experience. The designation of surprise as 
“Emersonian” only anchors this nebulousness in an equally amorphous figure. As Irving 
Howe has argued, “to confront American culture is to feel oneself encircled by a thin but 
strong presence: a mist, a cloud, a climate.”  For Howe, the term “Emersonian” evokes 
the “dominant spirit in the national experience” (1). In Surprise Encounters, Emerson’s 
national importance is secondary to the broad transatlantic reach of his conceptions of 
time and perception. His pervasive yet elusive idea of surprise moves atmospherically 
through the work of each writer in this study; it circulates as an ambient mood and feeling 
rather than as a locatable source of influence. If Emersonian surprise constitutes an 
indeterminate opening with indefinite effects, what might be the value of exploring its 
aesthetic representation? For writers who understand writing to be an extension of living, 
it is a matter of remaining vitally responsive to a universe that offers fewer guarantees 









“No surprise in the writer, no surprise in the reader.”  





What does it mean to read for surprise? This chapter examines the work of three 
writers who read Emerson in order to foster an exceptional openness to the uncertainty 
that comes with living in a world of chance: Charles Baudelaire, Marcel Proust, and 
William James. By tracing three facets of Emersonian surprise—experiential, formal, and 
pedagogical—through the work of these writers, I demonstrate that an investment in the 
unexpected was central not only to transatlantic modernism but also to interdisciplinary 
discussions addressing the role of attention and emotion in education at the turn of the 
twentieth century. In the first part of the chapter, I argue that Emerson’s conception of 
time and perception crucially informed concepts of modernity usually attributed to 
Baudelaire and Proust. While Baudelaire is often given pride of place as the first modern 
poet, he himself looks to Emerson for his model of the modern artist. Reading Emerson’s 
first series of Essays in the 1840s and The Conduct of Life in the 1860s, Baudelaire’s 
conceptions of modern experience and the modern self were entirely reshaped.1 Just as 
Emerson endeavors to fuse the fleeting with the timeless in his conception of an 
“everlasting Now,” Baudelaire locates correspondances between the “transitory” and 
                                                
1 Baudelaire defines “modernity” as the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is one 
half of art, the other being the eternal and the immovable” (“Painter” 403). For 
Emerson’s influence on Baudelaire see Gilman, Howells, Marchi, and especially Arsić. 
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“the Eternal” in his poetry and critical writings on modernity.2 The distinctive temporal 
order of “a present, which is infinite” finds a fresh permutation in Proust’s mémoire 
involuntaire (EL 394). As we will see, Proustian memory is only a form of retrospection 
to the extent that it partakes of Emerson’s notion of a prospective present. I bring together 
the two writers’ models of composition—Emerson’s “method of nature” and Proust’s 
method of modernism—to show how both were shaped by a Neoplatonic pedagogy of 
perception.3 The two writers find a tutelary figure in common in the ancient philosopher 
of everyday life, Plotinus. Each writer answers what Pierre Hadot has described as 
Plotinus’s call for “a conversion of attention,” where “conversion” comes not in an 
epiphanic moment of transcendence, but rather though a rigorous regime of daily 
perceptual training (Hadot 30). Far from affording an escape from daily living, Plotinus’s 
spiritual exercises provide Emerson and Proust with a means of more thoroughly 
inhabiting the existing material world. 
 To conclude this chapter I establish the centrality of Emersonian surprise to a 
pedagogical tradition dedicated to teaching students to inhabit what William James 
describes as “the instant field of the present” (WII 1175). I demonstrate how James’s 
reading of Emerson mobilized his psychological theories of emotion and attention into a 
practical philosophy of education and experience that began to crystallize in his “Talks to 
Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals” (1899). The 
seemingly disparate sensibilities of Baudelaire, Proust, and James converge on a common 
understanding of reading as a means of training perceptual habits of surprise, which in 
                                                
2 Arsić has underlined distinctive resemblances between the two writers’ attunement to 
the “fugitive element” of fleeting encounters that punctuate daily life (On Leaving 77-
79). 
3 Emerson delivered a lecture by that name in 1841. 
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each case means cultivating a posture of introspective receptivity. These writers and 
thinkers look to Emerson to question what it means to prepare oneself for the unexpected 
without dwelling in preconception. By mapping the wide historical and interdisciplinary 
reach of surprise through the twentieth century, I show how a literary and intellectual 
legacy of surprise has powerfully and persistently structured psychic and cultural 
responses to modernity.  
!!! 
Much has been made of the formative influence that Emerson’s 1833 visit to Paris 
had on his method of composition. However, relatively little attention has been paid to 
his influence on French writers and thinkers. The few critics who have noted that 
Baudelaire and Proust were readers of Emerson have tended to diminish the importance 
of their engagement with his writing. As a result, the striking congruencies between 
Emerson’s conception of composition and their modernist signatures have been largely 
overlooked. As Emerson’s fame was spreading across America he was introduced to 
France by Émile Montégut’s 1847 essay “Un Penseur et poète américain,” published in 
Revue des deux mondes. Three years later, Montégut translated Emerson’s first series of 
essays and Baudelaire’s initial contact with Emerson came shortly after the release of 
Essais de philosophie américaine (1851). Proust likely first encountered Emerson in I. 
Will’s translation of Sept essais d’Emerson (1894), with a preface by Maurice 
Maeterlinck.4 Though Baudelaire’s and Proust’s early writings immediately registered the 
decisive impact of these publications, their reading of the American writer would evolve 
over the course of their careers so that its most powerful impact was belated. 
                                                
4 I. Will is the pseudonym of the critic Marie Mali. 
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In the case of Baudelaire, critics have held up Emerson as “a mentor, a guide in 
the conduct of life” at a moment of “moral and psychological crisis” (Gilman 220, 
Howells, “Great Men” 481). The first critic to bring the two writers together, Margaret 
Gilman, concludes that Emerson’s influence was “exclusively private and personal” 
rather than aesthetic or formal (220). This opinion has held firm among the few critics 
over the last half century who have revisited Baudelaire and Emerson’s relationship. In 
the case of Proust, Emerson’s influence is generally associated with pre-Recherche 
juvenilia. As evidence of an early mentorship that is soon outgrown, scholars point to 
Proust’s multiple citations of Emerson in early writings and correspondence, followed by 
a single mention of the American in A la recherche du temps perdu.5 Indeed, if we attend 
only to Proust’s direct references to Emerson, it is difficult to contest a standard critical 
trajectory that moves from youthful, Emersonian romanticism toward the mature 
modernism of the Recherche. Tantalizingly, Proust’s biographer Jean-Yves Tadié reports 
that from his deathbed, on his final night of living, the writer paraphrased Emerson from 
memory: “There’s nothing so frivolous as dying” (Tadié 777). Though this anecdote 
suggests that Proust engaged with Emerson to the end of his life, it does little to dislodge 
the New Englander’s image as a mere dispenser of pithy aphorisms. In returning to 
Proust and Baudelaire’s reading of Emerson I want to challenge the conventional view 
that Emerson is an acceptable guide to living but not to writing, and further, to align 
Emerson’s contours of time and perception with their hallmarks of modernism.  
                                                
5 Proust used four selections from Emerson as epigraphs in the essays collected in Les 
Plaisirs et les Jours, cited him twice in Jean Santeuil, made six references in Pastiches et 
Mélanges, and made various mentions in personal letters and a book review. On Proust’s 
reading of Emerson, see Murphy. 
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The dearth of scholarship on the formal and conceptual affinities between 
Emerson and the French writers bespeaks a broader tendency to isolate Emerson’s 
insights on a conduct of life from their style and construction, which is perceived to be 
lacking in artistry. Since the 1970s, scholars such as Lawrence Buell, Julie Ellison, Joel 
Porte, Sharon Cameron, and Richard Poirier have contested the popular portrait of a 
formally naïve prophet of romantic individualism and idealism by elucidating the richly 
resonant textures of Emerson’s writing. In many cases this critical turn hinges on 
Emerson’s account of the way his dynamic writing process developed out of his 
encounter with George Cuvier’s taxonomic “cabinets of natural history” in Paris’s Jardin 
des plantes.6 According to Emerson’s multiple accounts of the visit to the Muséum 
national d’histoire naturelle, it was here that he learned to read nature as a language of 
strange surprises. The task of the writer, as he construed it, was to translate nature’s 
startling signs in all their animated immediacy. The lessons he learned from reading 
nature, Baudelaire and Proust would learn from reading Emerson. Baudelaire’s “painter 
of modern life” and Proust’s modern writer thus share a common silhouette with 
Emerson’s naturalist-poet.  
On the day of the museum visit Emerson’s journal entry opens with an 
affirmation of the exhibition that signals its seminal importance for the future of his 
writing. “How much finer things are in composition than alone,” Emerson effuses as he 
wanders in rapt attention from the botanical garden, to the ornithological exhibit, to the 
mineral display. The “beautiful collection,” he exclaims in the gallery of birds, enlarges 
                                                
6 My reading of this visit owes a particular debt to Brown’s The Emerson Museum and 
Richardson’s chapter “Emerson’s Moving Pictures” in The Natural History of 




“the limits of the possible” (Emerson in His Journals 110). Moving through the exhibits, 
Emerson is struck by the sense that nature’s “composition” has been decoded into a 
universal text that he had previously only glimpsed. As Lee Rust Brown contends, 
Emerson found himself reading “a version of precisely the kind of writing to which he 
had long aspired” (60). The cabinets’ ordering principles provide him with a formal 
template for the voluminous notebooks he had kept for the past eight years. Emerson’s 
journals are recast as a collection of specimens to be composed and recomposed over the 
course of his career. If life is a “series of surprises,” so too is the quarry of writings that 
he mined until the end of his life. 
“Composition,” as Emerson defines it, is the construction of a “living chain” 
(Emerson in His Journals 139). But the method of nature he discovers at the museum 
does not confirm any great chain of being. Instead he discerns vast webs of association 
formed by tenuous filaments of connection. The unpredictable linkages forged between 
nature’s forms are dictated by chance and accident rather than by predetermined design. 
Emerson mimes the transitive movements of the natural world by weaving the animating 
threads of his notebooks—a collection of musings, quotations, drafts of poems, personal 
reflections, critical insights, and other miscellany—into contingent, processual patterns. 
The connective links holding together his essays and indeed his oeuvre are conditional 
rather than causal, speculative rather than definitive. Each of Emerson’s sentences renews 
a propositional “what if?” that speaks to the absence of any overarching plan in nature, or 
in his writing. 
Emerson generates new work by returning to index and re-index his journals and 
earlier essays and lectures so that variations on the same key words and formulations 
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endlessly circulate and accrete fresh significance. With each revitalizing reiteration and 
revision the transitive threads between his “specimens” stretch forward and loop back on 
themselves, creating unanticipated juxtapositions at every turn. For example, the 
journalized impressions Emerson recorded from the museum are reassembled into a 
lyceum lecture that he delivered upon his return to Boston in November 1833, which in 
turn provided the germ for his first published book, Nature (1836), as well as multiple 
essays and lectures to follow. Rather than establishing an authoritative text, Emerson’s 
challenge is continually to recharge the impressions that first incited expression. His 
commitment to continuous renewal manifests a compositional method that paradoxically 
requires a recursive return—a rereading and reinvigoration of earlier writing—in order to 
inhabit the present moment of composition. As we will see, both Baudelaire’s 
correspondances and Proust’s mémoire involontaire pivot on this temporal hinge—a 
turning back to face forward that I identify as the temporality of surprise.  
The writer’s role, Emerson determined at the museum, is to transpose visceral 
impressions into dynamic forms of expression. As his journal response to the cabinets of 
natural history reveals, an animating force of feeling moves palpable perceptions into 
modes of expression that break language out of its fossil form:  
we are impressed with the inexhaustible riches of nature. The universe is a more 
amazing puzzle than ever, as you glance along this bewildering series of animated 
forms,—the hazy butterflies, the carved shells, the birds, beasts, fishes, insects, 
snakes, and the upheaving principle of life everywhere incipient, in the very rock 
aping organized forms. Not a form so grotesque, so savage, nor so beautiful but is 
an expression of some property inherent in man the observer,—an occult relation 
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between the very scorpions and man. I feel the centipede in me,—cayman, carp, 
eagle, and fox. I am moved by strange sympathies; I say continually “I will be a 
naturalist.” (Emerson in His Journals 111) 
Nature impresses itself on “man the observer” with overwhelming immediacy and 
variety. But instead of asserting cognitive distance between himself and his objects of 
observation, he is sympathetically moved into a deeper form of reception. When the eye 
is instructed by spontaneous feeling the poet-naturalist comes into inter-animating 
relation with his specimens: the centipede lives in him and he lives in it.  
Emerson resists systematizing his labyrinthine tangle of impressions into a static 
order: the “bewildering series” is recorded in disorienting paratactic listings that 
accumulate without resolving into any organizational hierarchy. The distinctive 
punctuation [“,—”] that links the clauses suggests connections without imposing a 
defining connective logic. Even as Emerson is inspired by the comprehensiveness of the 
taxonomic design, he insists on its provisionality. “We have no Theory of animated 
Nature,” he maintains, because claims to completion and finality will only deaden the 
animated forms. The classificatory principles so gloriously on display at the museum “are 
introductory and very convenient, but must be looked on as temporary” (Journals III 
293). For Emerson, the systemizing impulse is always countered by phenomena that 
overwhelm totalizing schemas: “Nature…resents generalizing, and insults the 
philosopher in every moment with a million of fresh particulars” (EL 581). Faced with 
this perpetual supply of uncategorizable phenomena, the naturalist-poet is spurred to 
abandon or revise old theories and propose “new generalizations which open into others 
and larger, which supersede them” (Later Lectures II 158). It is this endless oscillation 
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between the particular and the general that makes “the life of a man…a self-evolving 
circle” of discovery (EL 404). Emerson thus portrays a writer who readily anticipates the 
experience of having his worldview renovated or entirely reversed by a surprising new 
element of experience.  
To elaborate the above journal entry into a lecture Emerson must translate his 
impressions into a mode of public address that brings the museum to life for his listeners. 
“The Uses of Natural History,” delivered a month after his return to America, reflects on 
the intimate relationship between nature and language that makes such a translation 
possible. When he walks his audience through the museum’s various cabinets his aim is 
to channel “the power of expression that belongs to external nature” (Early Lectures 24). 
His observant “eye” casts over “more surprising objects than were known to exist” (Early 
Lectures 10-11). The surprises he in turn wants to recreate for his audience stem from the 
“correspondence of the outward world to the inward world of thought and emotions” 
(Early Lectures 24). This “radical correspondence” is felt, but can also be read (EL 22). 
Emerson describes “Nature’s proof impressions” as a “grammar of botany,” a “natural 
alphabet,” a “green and yellow and crimson dictionary” (Early Lectures 7-8). If “every 
form is a history of the thing,” then when the naturalist regards “the different shades and 
superimposition of the strata” in the rough ledges of a broken mountainside “his eye is 
reading as in a book the history of the globe” (Early Lectures 17, 18). To declare “I will 
be a naturalist” is to commit to learning the “alphabet,” “grammar,” and “dictionary” of 
Nature. Emerson closes the lecture by confirming this commitment: 
Nature is a language and every new fact one learns is a new word; but it is not a 
language taken to pieces and dead in the dictionary, but the language put together 
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in a most significant and universal sense. I wish to learn this language—not that I 
may know a new grammar, but that I may read the great book which is written in 
that tongue. (Early Lectures 26) 
Learning to read the material world is one’s primary means of grafting language with a 
natural origin. If, as Emerson asserts, words are “signs of natural facts,” then the writer’s 
linguistic materials are necessarily “borrowed from sensible things” (EL 20). 
Reanimation occurs in the startling moment that a word that has been withered by rote 
usage finds its root in the palpable world. But the intrinsic connection between word and 
thing is deeply buried. For that reason the writer-turned-naturalist must double as an 
archaeologist: “Language is fossil poetry,” which the poet works to excavate and revive 
(EL 457).  
Reading and writing under the sign of nature requires a fluency in the “surprising 
objects” that punctuate its patterns.7 The poet and naturalist’s search for generalized 
categories goes hand-in-hand with the search for anomalies—new perceptions that do not 
conform with our expectations and force us to revise the old systems which had 
structured our understanding of the world. To conclude, I will contend that the movement 
spurred by surprise from outdated belief to fresh formulation not only organizes 
Emerson’s major essays but also runs through an American psychological and 
philosophical tradition centered on questions of pedagogy. But before turning to the 
philosophical and pedagogical legacy of surprise in America, I first examine its aesthetic 
                                                
7 Emerson writes, “The eye is satisfied with seeing and strange thoughts are stirred as you 
see more surprising objects than were known to exist; transparent lumps of amber with 
gnats and flies within; radiant spars and marbles; huge blocks of quartz; native gold in all 
its forms of crystallization and combination…You are impressed with the inexhaustible 
riches of nature. The limits of the possible are enlarged, and the real is stranger than the 
imaginary” (Early Lectures 4-5). 
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legacy in Europe. Emerson’s experiences in Paris indelibly impressed themselves on his 
compositional practice and worldview. His primary discovery at the museum—that the 
only universal law is “perpetual surprise”—also animates the modernism of two of his 
readers in Paris, Baudelaire and Proust (Emerson qtd. in Brown 216).  
!!! 
 “Optimism versus disenchantment, moralism versus art for art’s sake, 
transcendentalism versus impressionism”: if one takes these entrenched binaries as a 
starting point the divide between Emerson and apparently disenchanted modernist 
aesthetes (like Baudelaire and Proust) appears unbridgeable (Virtanen 123). It may seem 
improbable that the new method of composition heralded by Emerson’s declaration—“I 
will be a naturalist!”—would so closely resemble one laid out in Baudelaire’s 
foundational essays on the urban artist. And yet, ten years after he read the first series of 
essays, Baudelaire displayed a “surprising reawakening of interest in Emerson” (Gilman 
214). His newly intensified engagement is first recorded in the journals Baudelaire began 
to keep in 1857, shortly after Emerson’s second series of essays were translated. Whereas 
Emerson’s journals were a lifelong project, Baudelaire’s idiosyncratic assemblage 
marked a transitional moment in his life and career. Though they differ in scope and tone, 
both journals represent their authors’ efforts to respond as directly and immediately as 
possible to their day-to-day experiences. Like Emerson, Baudelaire gathered (in his 
translator Christopher Isherwood’s words) “an assortment of wonderful fragments, 
cryptic memoranda, literary notes, quotations, rough drafts of prose poems, explosions of 
political anger and personal spleen” (“Translator’s Preface,” Intimate Journals 10). For 
Emerson, this repository of impressions became the source of all his writings; for 
Baudelaire, it was the site of ferment for his most influential essays on modern aesthetics.  
  
50 
Critics have generally read the material posthumously collected in a volume titled 
Intimate Journals [Journaux intimes] as Baudelaire’s response to personal breakdown.8 
The journals are scattered with Emersonsian aphorisms on autonomy, genius, and 
heroism, mostly paraphrased from The Conduct of Life. In these citations, Baudelaire 
formulates a dogmatic version of self-reliance that is pitched towards consolidating “a 
well thought-out individualism [l’individualisme bien entendu]” (Baudelaire qtd. in 
Howells, Baudelaire 28). To this end, the shifty variability of Emerson’s locutions are 
recast as instrumental moral maxims that promote productive work habits he felt himself 
to be lacking. For example, Baudelaire echoes the strident assertions of Emerson’s 
“Power” on the importance of focused attention and disciplined will in a section of the 
notebooks headed “Hygiene. Morality. Conduct [Hygiène. Conduite. Méthode]” (Intimate 
Journals 109). Elsewhere he directly quotes him: “The one prudence in life is 
concentration; the one evil is dissipation” (Baudelaire qtd. in Howells, Baudelaire 98). 
While Baudelaire initially works against the dispersal of attention and subjectivity, he 
goes on to amend his interpretation of the sentiment. In another section of the notebooks, 
Baudelaire conjoins those dynamics he had earlier opposed: “Of the vaporization and 
centralization of the Ego. Everything depends on that [De la vaporisation et de la 
centralisation du Moi. Tout est là]” (Intimate Journals 63). Any centrality or solidity of 
“le Moi” is recognized as a temporary state that might be dissolved and decentered at a 
moment’s notice. Alternately vaporous and concentrated, Baudelaire’s self-conception 
                                                
8 Baudelaire’s Intimate Journals combine two sets of notes entitled “Squibs [Fusées]” 
and  “My Heart Laid Bare [Mon coeur mis à nu].” There is evidence that Baudelaire had 
intended to combine these pages into what he described as “a big book of myself, my 
Confession [un grand livre sur moi-même, mes Confessions]” (Baudelaire, Oeuvres 
Complètes 227, my translation). 
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resembles the Emersonian self of “Illusions” for whom “dissipation” is not “evil” but 
simply a condition of living. Emerson’s essay opens with an epigraphic poem that 
reframes “power” as the enduring capacity to ride out “the wild dissipation” of existence:  
To change and to flow, 
The gas become solid,  
And phantoms and nothings 
Return to be things, 
And endless imbroglio 
Is the law and the world,— 
Then first shalt thou know, 
That in the wild turmoil, 
Horsed on the Proteus, 
Thou ridest to power 
And to endurance. (EL 1113-14) 
When the law of the world is continual change and flow between material and psychic 
states, the protean self must weather “endless imbroglio.” As becomes apparent over the 
course of the essay, “incessant flowing” is the only constant. For Emerson as for 
Baudelaire, “Life is an ecstasy” where the “everlasting” and “fugitive” converge (EL 
1113). In “The Method of Nature” Emerson spatializes this doubled temporality: the 
“work of ecstasy [is] to be represented by a circular movement, as intention might be 
signified by a straight line of definite length” (EL 120). Baudelaire follows Emerson in 
countering “straight” time with spiraling correspondences that connect a fleeting 
experience of the “now” with an enduring law of contingency. The myth of the heroic 
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individual and the original genius have a clear appeal for Baudelaire, but his journals’ 
fragmentary form ultimately performs a self in process. As Jean-Paul Sarte has argued, 
the unresolved tension between the impulses to organize and disperse the self is the 
principal drama of Baudelaire’s work.  
While Baudelaire voices intense longings for coherence and stability, an ongoing 
struggle towards self-forgetting is equally central to his writing. Sartre’s seminal study of 
Baudelaire portrays a writer so entrenched in his own consciousness that he yearns to 
escape self-scrutiny: “Baudelaire was the man who never forgot himself. He watched 
himself see; he watched in order to see himself watch” (22). This introspective loop of 
“auto-idolâtrie” at once denies and fixes the self (Baudelaire, Oeuvres Complètes 402). 
Sartre views Baudelaire’s work as a series of attempts to “take himself by surprise”: “He 
simulated a disconcerting spontaneity, pretended to surrender to the most gratuitous 
impulses so that he could suddenly appear in his own eyes as an opaque, unpredictable 
object, appear in fact as though he were Another Person...” (27). But Sartre concludes 
that Baudelaire’s efforts to surprise himself were doomed to fail because “abandonment 
was as unknown to him as spontaneity” (135). In simulating the spontaneous and 
pretending to surrender to the impulsive and unexpected, he always “foresaw and 
measured his own astonishment” and found himself “identical with the person he wished 
to surprise” (27). In other words, when Baudelaire contrived “his own plan” to encounter 
the unexpected, he remained tethered to predictability (27). But in his famous essays on 
modern aesthetics, written contemporaneously with the material collected in his Intimate 
Journals, Baudelaire developed an aesthetic approach to surprising himself out of his 
propriety, which owes a debt to Emerson.  
  
53 
Baudelaire announces Emerson’s significance to modern aesthetics in “The Work 
and Life of Eugène Delacroix [L’oeuvre et la vie d’Eugène Delacroix].” He holds up the 
writer and artist as a model of the kind of radical openness coupled with exacting 
structure to which he aspired in his own life and writing. In this essay, Baudelaire aims to 
free Emerson from his “reputation as the leader of that wearisome Bostonian school” by 
conferring on him the status of a modern “stoic” who “effectively stimulates meditation” 
on contemporary life (“Delacroix” 53). He dismisses the popular understanding of 
Emerson as a transcendental “moralist” with his depiction of a “transatlantic” figure of 
modernity whose influence stretches beyond the confines of nineteenth-century New 
England into the urban center of Paris (“Delacroix” 53).  
Beyond Baudelaire’s claims for Emerson’s cosmopolitan modernity, the essay 
advocates an artistic method that bears a remarkable resemblance to the one that Emerson 
first articulated in response to Paris’s cabinets of natural history. For Baudelaire as for 
Emerson, “The whole universe is but a store-house of images and signs,” and “Nature is 
but a dictionary” (“Delacroix” 47). The naturalist-poet and the modern artist are similarly 
tasked with internalizing, deciphering, and transposing these natural signs. For 
Baudelaire, Delacroix exemplifies an aesthetic sensibility that brings formal structure to 
immediate sensation; he is “open to every sort of idea and impression,” but “armed in 
advance with the most rapid means of translation” (“Delacroix” 46). The “genius,” as 
Baudelaire and Emerson agree, pairs a fresh, childlike “perceptiveness” with “strong 
nerves” capable of bringing “classified, ordered, harmonized” form to a chaotic store of 
impressions (“Painter” 402). Passionate “temperaments” and “tyrannical whims” must be 
matched with a “passion for method” and “firm maxims” (“Delacroix” 47). The 
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challenge is to “digest and transform” the “heap of raw materials” without deadening 
them into “inanimate nature” (“Delacroix” 49). The primary pitfalls that for Baudelaire 
deaden creativity—“copying and forget[ting] feeling”—follow likewise from Emerson 
(“Delacroix” 47). 
For Baudelaire as for Emerson, reading literature is central to the compositional 
process. Delacroix, Baudelaire establishes, is as great a reader of the poets as he is of 
nature’s dictionary. In fact, he suggests that the rapidly responsive movements of the 
artist’s brush are inspired by gestural sentences like those crafted by Emerson: the 
writer’s “unadorned prose seems to imitate the swift movements of thought,” which in 
turn leaves the artist “full of sublime, swiftly-defined images” (“Delacroix” 53, 46).  The 
conversion of another’s words into an inventive impetus is Emerson’s definition of 
“creative reading” (EL 59). His guiding mantra—“First we read, then we write”—
envisions sentences that spark something intrinsic to the reader’s own creative impulse 
(Emerson in His Journals 298). Importantly, this is a process of discovery, not a 
confirmation of preexisting ideas. Emerson maintains that “the best part of each writer” is 
that “which he does not know” (EL 293). His proposition gestures towards the strange 
form of subjectivity that emerges at the moment reading quickens into writing. In 
suspending “le moi” in “le non-moi” Baudelaire too learns to encounter himself and his 
writing with a feeling of surprise.  
 As Baudelaire’s guide from his journals to his critical essays on modern 
aesthetics, Emerson clears space for the poet to navigate a new relationship with his 
“hypocrite lecteur.” The prospect of having his words misunderstood or twisted into 
something unintended is a source of well-documented anxiety for Baudelaire. By 
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contrast, Emerson embraces the fact that the meaning and interpretation of words can’t be 
fixed; their convertibility is what makes creative reading and writing possible. Bernard 
Howells has argued that the reader’s power to alienate Baudelaire’s work from its 
original intentions “contaminated the writer’s spontaneity” and frustrated his desire for 
self-possession (“Vaporisation” 432). But at a time when his journals and essays are most 
strongly marked by Emerson, Baudelaire begins to negotiate alternatives to his paralyzing 
need for full self-possession and interpretive control. 
Baudelaire’s journals assert a “universal misunderstanding” between reader and 
writer: “The unbridgeable gulf [le gouffre infrachissable]—the cause of their failure in 
communication remains—unbridged [reste infranchi]” (Intimate Journals 90). But in 
“The Painter of Modern Life [Le peintre de la vie moderne]” an essay of the same period, 
he develops two key figures who represent alternate responses to this insurmountable 
divide: the dandy and the painter of modern life. Critics sometimes conflate these 
personages, but in fact Baudelaire’s exemplary modern artist “parts company trenchantly 
from dandyism [se détache violemment du dandysme]” (“Painter” 399). “Painter” 
crystallizes the crucial difference between their respective attitudes towards surprise. The 
dandy maintains his “cult of the ego” by “causing surprise in others and…never showing 
any oneself” (“Painter” 420). In this sense, he resembles the military man: “Accustomed 
as he is to surprises, the soldier does not easily lose his composure” (“Painter” 417). It is 
not that these figures don’t feel surprise, but that they immediately counter unsettlement 
with redoubled efforts towards composed subjectivity. While “the dandy is blasé,” 
aspiring to “cold detachment” and “self-containment,” the painter of modern life “hates 
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blasé people” (“Painter” 399). With an “insatiable passion” for “seeing and feeling” the 
artist allows sensory waves to “flood chaotically into him” (“Painter” 399, 401). He is 
a kaleidoscope endowed with consciousness, which with every one of its 
movements presents a pattern of life, in all its multiplicity, and the flowing grace 
of all the elements that go to compose life. It is an ego athirst for the non-ego, and 
reflecting it at every moment in energies more vivid than life itself, always 
inconstant and fleeting. (“Painter” 400) 
Though the artist’s ego is thirsty for non-ego, “le moi” does not effortlessly dissolve into 
“le non-moi.” At times, the stream of experience moves with a “flowing grace.” In those 
moments, “The crowd is his domain” just as “the water [is] that of the fish” (“Painter” 
399). “It becomes an immense source of enjoyment [jouissance] to establish his dwelling 
in the throng, in the ebb and flow [dans l’ondoyant, dans le mouvement] of the fleeting 
and the infinite” (“Painter” 399). But at other moments the swamped self thrashes against 
its dissolution.  
Leo Bersani describes “the Baudelairean discovery of psychic mobility, of 
unanchored identity” this way:  “Baudelaire’s work gives us images of this psychic 
fragmentation at the same time that it documents the resistance to all such ontological 
floating” (Baudelaire 2, 4). Here we might recall how Emerson likewise invokes images 
of unanchored drift to document his struggle with life’s exposure to uncertainty. Both 
writers respond to the unmoored condition of living by reorienting their aesthetic projects 
around surprise. When he admits an ever-present gap between himself and his audience, 
Baudelaire can redirect his energies. He thus sets out to present his reader with the 
unforeseen accidents of experience. In Paris Spleen [Le Spleen de Paris] Baudelaire 
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affirms that “next to feeling surprise oneself, there is no greater pleasure than giving 
someone else a surprise” (58). With surprise rather than any prescribed response as the 
goal, writer and reader are freed so that reading and writing become shared endeavors— 
even if all that is shared is misunderstanding. 
Though the contemporary artists Baudelaire focuses on are “men of the crowd,” 
their modernity is not defined by urban anomie and mass society. Unlike the Benjaminian 
flâneur who appears at a singular point of breakage in the nineteenth century, 
Baudelaire’s artist emerges in response to transitional periods in every era. His modern 
moment is constituted by an “essential quality of being in the present” (“Painter” 391). 
To fully inhabit the modernity of the present is to experience a profound 
“correspondence” between “the transient, the fleeting, the contingent” and “the eternal” 
(“Painter” 403). The evanescent circumstances of the “now” can only be understood as 
particularly “modern” in contextual relation to an enduring quality of time that spans 
history. This means “there was a form of modernity for every painter of the past” 
(“Painter” 403). The distinctive temporality of correspondances characterizes the 
immersive experience of the crowd, but as we will see, it also distinguishes Emerson’s 
solitary experience of “crossing a bare common…under a clouded sky,” and Marcel’s 
experience of tripping over a paving stone while crossing the Guermantes’ courtyard (EL 
10). The Baudelairean artist’s desire “to see the world, to be at the very center of the 
world yet to be the unseen of the world” is precisely the achievement of Emerson’s 
“transparent eyeball” (“Painter” 400, EL 10). It is also the achievement of Proust’s 




For Proust, Baudelaire’s conception of correspondances is concomitant with 
“modern beauty,” which the poet insists is “always surprising” (Illuminations 197, “Salon 
de 1859” 241). Baudelaire elaborates his conception of beauty as the unexpected 
convergence of two apparently disparate elements. For example, he admires painterly 
strokes that take on a sculptural or plastic quality and lines of poetic language that 
seamlessly fuse abstraction with the palpably concrete. Baudelaire’s central paradigm of 
the beautiful is the heterogeneous temporality of the correspondance, which merges the 
“eternal and invariable” (an enduring quality unaltered by shifts in fashion and taste) with 
a “circumstantial element” (contingent on the particulars of time and place) (“Painter” 
392). In bringing together these divergent facets of time, media, and experience, “Beauty 
is always surprising [Le Beau est toujours étonnant].” As Baudelaire maintains 
throughout his later writings on aesthetics, “artists seeking to surprise the public [qui 
cherchent à étonner le public]” and themselves take on a project without guarantees 
(“Salon de 1859” 241, my translation). While there can be no promise of fulfillment, the 
pursuit of the unsettling and unexpected maintains the vitality of art, propelling it into an 
unknown future.  
 It is this forward-looking dimension of Baudelairean correspondances, and in 
turn, Proust’s mémoire involontaire, that Benjamin and critics to follow have failed to 
account for. As I noted in my Introduction, Benjamin holds up Proust’s reflections on 
Baudelaire as evidence of the deterioration of experience. He points to the writer’s 
increasing dependence on chance encounters as an index of diminished access to the 
“data of prehistory” (Illuminations 158, 182). Benjamin quotes the following passage 
from Proust’s Finding Time Again to make his case:  
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In Baudelaire…these reminiscences are even more numerous. It is apparent that 
they are not occasioned by chance, and this, to my mind, is what gives them 
crucial importance. There is no one else who pursues the interconnected 
correspondances with such leisurely care, fastidiously and yet nonchalantly—in a 
woman’s scent for instance, in the fragrance of her hair or her breasts—
correspondances which then inspire him with lines like ‘the azure of the vast, 
vaulted sky, or ‘a harbor full of flames and masts.’ (Proust qtd. in Illuminations 
183)9 
In Benjamin’s interpretation, Proust looks back on Baudelaire with nostalgic longing for 
a time when the writer could voluntarily “take hold of his experience” in all its authentic 
fullness (Illuminations 158). Having rooted the beauty of correspondances in the “realm 
of ritual,” where it is imbued with “the data of remembrance” and traditions of the past, 
Benjamin misses an equally vital facet of Baudelaire’s emblem of aesthetic modernity: its 
future-oriented capacity to surprise the writer and his audience (Illuminations 182). In the 
final volume of the Recherche, Proust’s contemplation of Baudelairean correspondances 
brings this prospective dimension of mémoire involontaire to the fore. 
The passage that for Benjamin signals an irreparable break with the aesthetic and 
experiential richness of the past, in fact introduces the narrator’s extended meditation on 
the unbounded (yet equally uncertain) potential of a future devoted to writing. Marcel’s 
reflections on Baudelaire’s correspondances affirm his dedication to a literary “vocation” 
                                                
9 Here is the passage Benjamin is quoting: “Chez Baudelaire, enfin, ces réminiscences 
plus nombreuses encore, sont évidemment moins fortuites et par consequent, à mon avis, 
plus décisives. C’est le poète lui-même, avec plus de choix et de paresse, recherche 
volontairement, dans l’odeur d’une femme par exemple, de sa chevelure et de son sein, 
les analogies inspiratrices qui lui évoqueront « l’azur du ciel immense et rond » et « un 
port rempli de flammes et de mats »” (Temps retrouvé 73). 
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that will similarly transpose sensations—beginning with “the taste of the madeleine”—
into “aesthetic impressions” (Finding Time 228). Far from dispiriting him, Baudelaire’s 
example motivates the narrator to “establish a place for [him]self in such a noble 
tradition” and assures him that “the work which [he] no longer had the slightest hesitation 
in undertaking was worth the effort [he] was going to devote to it” (Finding Time 229). 
In this context, the gap between the narrator’s accidental “reminiscences” and 
Baudelaire’s deliberate pursuit of correspondances is one that he hopes to narrow by 
applying himself with the same “leisurely care” to his newly declared occupation. 
Contingency is as integral to correspondances as it is to mémoire involuntaire; 
Baudelaire can no more predict what wafting aroma might inspire his connection with the 
arc of azure sky than Proust can foretell what taste will bring forth the full sweep of the 
way by Swann’s. Though the particulars of the encounter itself will remain undetermined, 
the receptive state that precedes it and the expressive impetus that follows can be 
cultivated to give occasion to such an event. Like Baudelaire, the narrator fosters a mode 
of readiness and responsiveness that combines looseness with precision. By definition, 
the involuntary impression cannot be controlled by acts of will. However, Marcel’s 
reflections on Baudelaire come at a pivotal point in the final movement of the Recherche 
when he realizes that he can in fact create hospitable conditions for the unexpected; his 
state of reflective attention need not be left entirely up to chance. The narrator prepares 
himself to be a writer by preparing himself to be surprised. 
In “Contre Saint-Beuve,” Proust encapsulates the temporal schema that will come 
to be called mémoire involuntaire. He opens by correcting a critical misconception tipped 
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by the misleading word “memory.” As Proust insists, what is “restore[d] to us under the 
name of the past is not the past”:  
In reality, as soon as each hour of one’s life has died, it embodies itself in some 
material object, as do the souls of the dead…There it remains captive, captive 
forever unless we happen on the object, and recognize what lies within, call it by 
its name, and so set it free. (“Contre Saint-Beauve” 19)  
Robert Richardson identifies this passage as a rearticulation of Emerson’s view of “the 
relationship between mind and world,” only stripped of its spirituality (First We Read 
32). However, to read these lines simply as a secularization of Emerson’s claim that “the 
Universe is the externisation of the soul” is to miss the Neoplatonism intrinsic to Proust’s 
conception of the involuntary (EL 453). Proust echoes Emerson, but also Plotinus, when 
he envisions each hour of lived experience lodged in the world of objects, to be awakened 
and unleashed by a recognizant gaze. For Plotinus, to “recognize what lies within” 
requires a transformation of physical perception and inner vision with the goal of 
“surpassing the limits of individuality” (Hadot 30, 13).10 Turning inward and outward at 
once, “we become the object” and “potentially ourselves” (Plotinus qtd. by Hadot 32).11  
Emerson, and in turn Proust, transposes Plotinus’s chiasmatic structure of 
perception into a writing practice guided by an aesthetic principle of surprise. “A new 
interest surprises us, whilst…we contemplate the fearful extent and multitude of objects,” 
writes Emerson in Nature. We are surprised, in other words, by a material world of 
                                                
10 As will be apparent, Pierre Hadot has strongly shaped my reading of Plotinus.  
11 I’ve drawn from Hadot’s translation of a passage that can be found in the A.H. 
Armstrong’s translation of Ennead IV: “one’s activity…is directed towards the object of 
contemplation, and one becomes this, offering oneself to it as a kind of matter, being 
formed according to what one sees, and being oneself then only potentially” (4.2 p.141).  
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objects that manifests an agency external to the perceiver’s will. But, he continues, 
“every object rightly seen, unlocks a new faculty of the soul” (EL 25). Surprise is also the 
mark of an inner world of experience that can be accessed when the angle of vision aligns 
with what Proust refers to as our source of “celestial nourishment [céleste nourriture]”—
or what both writers call a “soul” in these examples (Time Regained 264).12 In Plotinus, 
Emerson and Proust find a painstaking method of preparing the perceptional apparatus so 
that when the object is encountered it can be “rightly seen.” 
The two writers’ inheritance of a Plotinian pedagogy of perception—along with 
the fact that Proust read Emerson—has been obscured by the long shadow of Platonic 
idealism. Those few scholars who have elaborated Proust’s reading of Emerson align the 
writers’ Platonism with bounded forms of individualism. According to this critical 
account, the two writers share a common desire to reveal “a real world” concealed behind 
“the world of appearances” (Carter 48). But their shared longing to reunite spiritual and 
material registers of reality is seen to manifest in two dispositionally different 
orientations towards time. As one critic sums up, “Emerson’s Platonism was optimistic 
and could look forward. That of Proust was precisely the ‘mystique of looking backward” 
(Virtanen 133). This formulation categorically divides the realms of internal invisibility 
and external visibility. The writers are seen to respond to the dividedness of experience 
and the impossibility of full presence by looking in opposite directions: Emerson’s 
romanticist naïveté projects an idealistic future, while the disenchanted gaze of Proust’s 
modernism stretches back to a nostalgic past.  
                                                
12 Though I have used Ian Patterson’s translation of Le temps retrouvé [Finding Time 
Again] throughout this chapter, here I quote C.K. Scott Moncrieff’s more direct 
translation of “céleste nourriture” (rather than Patterson’s “heavenly food”) (Finding 
Time 181, Temps retrouvé 15). 
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When Plato is taken as the starting point for establishing Proust and Emerson’s 
relation, they can only share an idealist opposition of inner and outer, which reinforces an 
equally oppositional model of modernism’s break with everything that came before. A 
very different order of time and perception presents itself if we take their common 
reading of Plotinus as an alternate point of departure. The Neoplatonic vision of the 
universe that Plotinus offers is characterized by a non-dualist plentitude that imbricates 
inner life and its ambient surroundings. Whereas Plato seeks spiritual oneness beyond 
this world, Plotinus seeks immersive presence within it. For Plotinus, a conversion of 
attention comes not in an epiphanic moment of transcendence, but rather through a 
demanding regime of perceptual training to be practiced over the course of life. Far from 
escaping a lived experience, Plotinus’s spiritual exercises are a means of making material 
existence more viscerally immediate.  
The final volume of the Rercherche follows a Plotinian pattern of “contemplative 
ascent” (to borrow Martha Nussbaum’s term), but the set-piece party scene of Finding 
Time Again showcases the distinctly Emersonian inflection that Proust brings to his 
Neoplatonism (Upheavals 482). 13 Each act of perception in this episode vividly confirms 
Plotinus’s contention that the physical world is entwined with an enchanted invisible 
world. This ineffable realm of experience can be awakened by a properly calibrated 
                                                
13 My reading of Proust in the terms of Neoplatonism takes an important cue from Eve 
Sedgwick’s observation that “the Neoplatonic tradition remained for Proust the 
profoundest reservoir for such ideas and images, as it also was for such of his favorite 
authors as Emerson” (Weather 6). Here she is discussing the figure of the Hubert Robert 
fountain, which exemplifies Proust’s interest in the interpenetration of open and closed 
systems like the weather. Sedgwick goes onto discuss the tutelary spirits or daimon that 
populate an ontologically intermediate realm between the sensible and spiritual world in 
the Recherche. The “queer little gods,” as she calls them, enliven the possibility of 
transindividuality in the Recherche—the merging and migration of souls.  
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faculty of attention. But “for the soul to be affected,” Plotinus explains, there has to be 
something that mediates between “the external object and the soul” (Ennead IV 4.23 
p.199).14 The nebulous intermediary form that Plotinus calls “affection” is defined in 
open-ended terms as a means of “somehow linking the extremes to each other, with the 
capacity of receiving and of transmitting information” (Ennead IV 4.23 p.199-200). From 
the moment that the narrator trips over an uneven paving stone in the Princesse de 
Guermantes’s courtyard, those mediating affections are cast in the amorphous mold of 
surprise. Marcel experiences the successive involuntary encounters that follow as 
startling expansions of perceptual consciousness that bring to light the invisible potential 
stored in people and things. In this initial instance, it is the narrator’s own obscured 
potential that suddenly comes into view. As he stumbles he dislodges the apprehensions 
impeding the “‘famous’ work” which he had “so long hoped each day to begin the next” 
(Finding Time 162,164): 
Just as at the moment when I tasted the madeleine, all the uneasiness about the 
future and all the intellectual doubt were gone. Those that had assailed me a 
moment earlier about the reality of my intellectual talent, even the reality of 
literature, were lifted as if by enchantment. (Finding Time 175)  
What differentiates the paving stone from the madeleine is the investigative purpose that 
the narrator brings to the moment. On this occasion he refuses to “resign [him]self to not 
knowing the reason” why his vision of the future (and his place in it) has undergone such 
a dramatic change (Finding Time 179). Thus begins Marcel’s exhaustive rumination on 
                                                
14 In Ennead IV, Plotinus sets out his model of perception this way: “We must suppose 
that the perception of sense-objects is for the soul or the living being an act of 
apprehension, in which the soul understands the quality attaching to bodies and takes the 
impression of their forms” (Ennead IV 4.23 p. 197). 
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the cause of these involuntary impressions and the nature of their relationship to time—
his version of a “contemplative ascent.”  
Awaiting the party in the Guermantes library, the narrator is consumed by the 
question of how an involuntary experience that exceeds willful control might properly be 
prepared for. In other words he asks how he can practice being ready for surprises. The 
dialogue Marcel carries out with himself echoes Plotinus’s self-examination two 
millennia before. Plotinus poses the question in terms of perceptual power and its 
activation: “Why then, when we have such great possession, do we not consciously grasp 
them, but are most inactive in these ways, and some of us are never active at all?” 
(Ennead V 1.12 p. 51).15 Awakening the “faculty of vision” that “everyone possesses, but 
few people ever use” is a matter of spontaneous discovery and rigorous training. The 
Plotinian epiphany, in Hadot’s words, is that “everything is within us, and we are within 
all things” (27). But a single revelatory moment is not enough. For true transformation, 
the perceptual apparatus must be disciplined to communicate with an invisible realm of 
experience—a realm that is nevertheless embedded in the terrestrial world where it can 
be accessed by corporeal beings.16 As Sedgwick has shown in The Weather in Proust, a 
potent source of such teaching in the Recherche is the novel’s Neoplatonic pantheon of 
tutelary spirits and guiding genii. In this decisive scene, however, the narrator finds that 
his own introspective attention can offer him equally powerful guidance. 
                                                
15 He responds to his own query this way: “when a particular active power does not give 
a share in its activity to the perceiving power, that activity has not yet pervaded the whole 
soul” (Ennead V 1.12 p. 51). 
16 Hadot writes, “the spiritual world was not, for him, a supraterrestrial or supracosmic 
space, from which he was separated from the vastnesses of celestial space. Neither was it 
an original state, irretrievably lost…Rather, this spiritual world was nothing other than 




Marcel’s deliberate turn of contemplative attention makes way for two more 
experiences of mémoire involontaire triggered in rapid succession by the sound of a 
spoon against a plate and the touch of a napkin against his mouth: “the signs which were, 
on this day, to bring me out of my despondency and renew my faith in literature were 
intent on multiplying themselves” (Finding Time 176). This locution affords agency to 
the objects, but Marcel also realizes his signal role in multiplying moments such as those 
occasioned by the madeleine, the pavestone, the spoon, and the napkin. He is able to 
quickly triple his encounters with “the essence of things” by attuning himself to those 
facets of experience that might otherwise pass unnoticed (Finding Time 181). In each 
case, a fleeting but palpable sensation opens the way for a startling recognition of 
“something shared between a day in the past and the present moment” (Finding Time 
179). Though the narrator feels an overwhelming flood of joy in the moment of 
recognition, it is not the pleasure of finding something that was lost. Instead, he is 
ecstatically liberated from paralyzing anxieties around “the vicissitudes of the future” 
(Finding Time 179). Freed from fear, the narrator can for the first time take uncertain yet 
decisive steps towards his chosen vocation. The liberating power of this involuntary 
series of events stems from Marcel’s understanding that preparing to be struck by attuned 
observation is in fact the embodiment of this vocation. The feeling of attention blooming 
into new words—of attention felt as writing even before it has been physically 
inscribed—instantiates the narrator’s sense of inevitable correlation between preparatory 
perception and the act of writing itself.   
The narrator’s new paradigm of perception thus fuses preparation with 
spontaneity, decisiveness with indeterminacy. He assumes a posture of ready reception 
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that floats the past and the future in a buoyant present. Although this attention to the here-
and-now increases his contact with the involuntary, Marcel also recognizes the futility of 
stabilizing these “fugitive” impressions of “eternity”: “The only way to continue to 
appreciate them was to try to understand them more completely just as they were…within 
myself” (Finding Time 181, 185). As he goes on to explain, “every impression comes in 
two parts, half of it contained within the object and the other half…extending into us” 
(Finding Time 200). Hadot elaborates a similarly chiasmatic relationship between inner 
and outer which subtends Plotinian vision: “The metamorphosis of inner vision…has as 
its counterpart the metamorphosis of physical vision…although the spiritual world is 
within us, it is also outside us” (35). Marcel succeeds in metamorphizing his internal and 
external faculties of vision by pairing an openness to the outer world with introspective 
attention to the fluctuating sensations within. Practicing this non-oppositional form of 
perception, the Proustian self begins to have the “impression that it is losing itself” (to 
draw once more on a Plotinian formulation) (Hadot 32). 
In Finding Time Again, time is regained through the process of forgetting the self 
and shedding its prior paradigms of perception. As the narrator finds when he leaves the 
Guermantes library for the drawing room, a solitary process of self-forgetting requires a 
different practice of attention than losing oneself in the company of others. Marcel’s 
decision to accept the Princesse de Guermantes’s invitation marks his “return to society” 
after a long retreat from Paris (Finding Time 227). Upon arrival at the party, he is initially 
convinced that his friends have all donned powdered wigs, make-up, and costumes to 
masquerade as elderly versions of themselves. When he finally grasps that they have 
grown old, as indeed has he, the narrator’s sense of time comes entirely unhinged. 
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However, even in this vulnerably disoriented state, Marcel’s confrontation with the 
startling realties of “old age” neither spurs his defensive retreat from the defamiliarized 
scene, nor triggers his nostalgic longing for an irrecoverable past (Finding Time 240). 
Instead, recollection reorients him toward an expansive horizon of open-ended 
possibility: “time had not only brought about the ruin of the creatures of a former epoch, 
it had made possible, had indeed created, new associations” (Finding Time 257). 
The narrator’s realization that “we are living in a new world” does not come all at 
once, but in a series of renewing recognitions facilitated by an ongoing process of 
disorientation and reorientation. Marcel’s experience and expression of surprise at each 
unforeseen encounter braids retrospection with prospection, familiarity with 
unfamiliarity. Significantly, he compares the “revelation of Time” in the wizened faces 
and figures of his friends to the “magic lantern show” that transformed his “bedroom 
doorknob in Combray” (Finding Time 233). But far from mourning the “lost time” of 
childhood, this return to the paradigmatic bedroom facilitates his “astonished [on 
s’étonnait…]” appreciation of how each “one could read the tally of years” in the face 
and figures of old friends and foes. Scanning the faces of the party guests, he detects a 
“shifting atmosphere” that has generously recast each figure with the passage of time 
(Finding Time 233): 
In the case of a woman whom one had known as narrow-minded and 
unsympathetic, an unrecognizable relaxation of the cheeks, an unpredictable 
curving of the nose, caused the same surprise, often the same pleasant surprise [la 
même surprise, la même bonne surprise], as some sensitive and profound remark 
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or some noble and courageous deed that one would never have expected of her. 
(Finding Time 234) 
Each fresh meeting with an old friend offers the narrator “something much more valuable 
than an image of the past” (Finding Time 234). The realization of “all the time that had 
passed” revitalizes his relationship to the present and serves as the “point of departure for 
a new life.” As Marcel comes to appreciate, “having lived one day to the next since [his] 
childhood” he has accumulated the “raw material” for his prospective book: “now I 
understood the meaning of death, loves, the pleasures of the mind, the use of suffering” 
(Finding Time 240). 
In each encounter at the Guermantes party, recognition comes in the moment that 
the narrator lets go of the obsolete image he had fixed of each of the guests. Freed from 
that entrenched framework, Marcel discovers, in Emerson’s words, “a spontaneity which 
forgets usages and makes the moment great” (EL 483). He meets the old friends, 
acquaintances, and nemeses as if for the first time, maintaining a sense of their history 
that doesn’t engulf the present. It is only by forgetting his certainties about this social 
world and its participants that the narrator can imagine his own future untethered from 
the past. In this sense, Proustian memory becomes as much a matter of forgetting as of 
remembrance. This episode unfolds as a confirmation of Emerson’s contention that 
“noble creative forces” are unleashed when “we have successive experiences so 
important that the new forgets the old” (EL 954). In Emerson’s use of the word, 
forgetting is not erasure but an awakening of “the present, which is infinite” (EL 394). 
Understood in this sense, the extraordinary account of self-forgetting at the end of 
Emerson’s “Circles” captures Marcel’s yearning to grasp the full temporal spectrum of 
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the involuntary: “The one thing which we seek with insatiable desire is to forget 
ourselves, to be surprised out of our propriety, to lose our sempiternal memory, and to do 
something without knowing how or why; in short, to draw a new circle” (EL 414). The 
figure that most famously embodies this self-forgetting—the experience of being 
surprised out of a proper self—is Emerson’s transparent eyeball. As we will see, William 
James takes this Emersonian figure as a touchstone for a literary pedagogy with surprise 
at its heart. 
!!! 
While Baudelaire and Proust formalize Emerson’s conception of surprise into 
modernist signatures of time, experience, and subjectivity, Williams James formalizes it 
into a principle of education. For James, Emerson provides a counterpoint to the more 
instrumental directives of psychology. Where the writer outstrips the psychologist is the 
point at which Emerson renews attention to each transitory moment in order to “feel how 
soaked and shot-through life is with values and meaning” (WI 861). As William writes to 
his brother Henry James, Emerson has thrown a paradoxically “practical light” on his 
path by illuminating the significance of those moments that might otherwise be 
overlooked because they cannot be put to utilitarian ends (LWJ 122). Rather than 
requiring a retreat from modern change, the question of how to live so that we are 
perpetually susceptible to being surprised resolves itself for William “into a practical 
question of the conduct of life”—a question which vitally informs our actions and 
experiences on a moment-by-moment basis (EL 943). In response, William transitions 
from a comprehensive enumeration of psychological principles to a more open-endedly 
philosophical orientation towards the contingency of experience in what he calls “a 
pluralistic, restless universe” (WI 589). 
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In 1892 James condensed and reformulated his Principles of Psychology into a 
“Briefer Course” as well as a series of “Talks to Teachers and to Students” that explain 
the pedagogical purposes of his psychological paradigms of habit, interest, attention, 
memory, apperception, and will. A theme that recurs across these talk is the necessity of 
putting our emotions to practical work for us. Emotion is either our ally or our adversary, 
depending on whether the habits it quickens are “systematically organized for our weal or 
work” (WI 750). Action-oriented habits developed in the classroom guide emotionally-
invested attention towards purposeful exchanges with the social and physical world. 
Equipped with James’s briefing in psychology, the audience of teachers is charged with 
implementing “practical solution[s]” to the challenges posed by the wayward movements 
of consciousness (WI 815). 
James’s educational methods are an extension of his primary investigative method 
of introspection.17 Before he proposed a set of pedagogical principles based on his 
psychological research, James recommended that readers of Principles train their 
attention to phenomena internal to their own bodies. As he notes, the subtle 
“adjustments” and barely discernible fluctuations that comprise emotional life often go 
unperceived “for want of attention and reflection” (PP 301). Introspection, as James 
understands it, is a way of heightening one’s inborn capacity to yoke “the immediate 
feltness of a feeling” with a “subsequent reflective act” (PP 189). His talks to teachers 
and students build on the insight that this intuitive capacity to feel one’s feelings and to 
                                                
17 James claims the term introspection “need hardly be defined—it means, of course, the 
looking into our mind and reporting what we there discover” (PP 185). He advocates 
introspective scrutiny of one’s own psychic state to counter what he called the 
“psychologist’s fallacy,” or the notion that an external observer offers the most 
empirically sound account of a subject’s state of mind (PP 196). 
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reflect on them can be practiced and developed. But James’s pedagogy, like his 
psychology, must grapple with two “snares” of introspection that open the potential for 
investigative error: temporal delay and subjective perception. The “changing character” 
of thought and feeling means that consciousness exists as a “process in time” rather than 
as a fixed, identifiable state (WI 431). As a result, introspective observations regarding 
the nature of consciousness will always be belated, the phenomena having already passed 
by the time it can be processed or articulated. A further complication James concedes is 
the fact that we can never separate our observations about consciousness from our 
processes of consciousness. As a result, introspecting subjects can claim no objective 
distance from their objects of introspection. 
As James discovers, however, sources of introspective fallibility also yield fresh 
discoveries. The gap between the immediacy of experience and our reflection on it 
introduces the potential for misinterpretation, but it also allows for a vital variousness of 
interpretation. Reading Emerson, James learns that the vitality of feelings and perceptions 
depends on the very changeability of our reflections on them. The interval between an 
instantaneous experience and belated awareness precludes automatism and makes room 
for novel unpredictability. The poet-naturalist teaches that those anomalous surprises, 
phenomena which refuse to adhere to preconception, are the richest source of 
unanticipated insight. The success of the introspective method therefore depends on the 
breadth and belatedness of surprise, which encompasses both the unanticipated feeling 
and the reflective response James aims to activate. For this reason, Emerson’s writings 
are foundational for a pedagogical program which enlivens students to those events and 
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feelings that unsettle what they think they know about themselves and the world around 
them. 
In James’s “Talks to Students” lectures, the “practical question of the conduct of 
life” is reframed as a question of “what makes a life significant” (WI 861). On this 
question James sees psychology’s methods falling short. Its preoccupation with causality 
and functionality can come at the expense of an ego-centered  “deadness”—a “hard 
externality” which is largely “impenetrable by others” (WI 847, 862). For James, the 
practice of literary reading most powerfully counters a “blindness with which we are all 
afflicted in regard to the feelings of creatures and people different from ourselves” (WI 
841). Reading literature, he affirms, can spur a “recognizant” turn towards otherwise 
“invisible things”: the alien other, the life of inanimate objects, and the volatile 
fluctuations of each passing moment (WI 862, 849). James emphasizes to students and 
teachers alike that judgment, perception, and action “all depend on the feelings things 
arouse in us” (WI 841). His lectures are motivated by the question of how emotional 
fluctuations can be shaped into practical habits of expression and action. But as James 
insists, those practical habits should not be divorced from the “responsive sensibilities” 
that literary reading is uniquely positioned to cultivate (WI 856). To this end, James 
quotes passages from Emerson, Walt Whitman, Robert Louis Stevenson, and Leo Tolstoy 
that teach us how they are to be read: with eyes that see beyond an “external and 
insensible point of view,” as opposed to with “the eyes of a remote spectator” (WI 862, 
865).  
Emerson in particular provides a literary compass for James throughout his career. 
In the lecture “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” James quotes Emerson’s 
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transparency passage from “Nature” as paradigmatic of the way literature can sensitize 
the reader to the Now, the new, the near and its “higher vision of inner significance” (WI 
848): 
Crossing a bare common…in snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky, 
without having in my thoughts any occurrence of special good fortune, I have 
enjoyed a perfect exhilaration, I am glad to the brink of fear. (Emerson qtd. in WI 
856) 
For James, these lines exemplify an immersive experience of the perceptual stream that 
bonds the perceiver with the perceived world. The quotidian activity of walking exposes 
the sensitized subject to the “novelty” of “the world present and alive,” but also to the 
incalculable uncertainties of an unfinished universe (WI 848). As he further contends, the 
process of reading Emerson can hone in us this kind of open attention. “We are trained to 
seek the choice, the rare, the exquisite exclusively, and to overlook the common,” James 
observes, but Emerson reinstills a deep-seated sense that “the individual fact and moment 
were indeed suffused with absolute radiance” (WII 1124). James locates Emerson’s 
power of “transfiguration”—his capacity to transform the world into something “still new 
and untried”—in his processual literary language (WII 1125, 1121). Emerson exemplifies 
what it means to go beyond a descriptive account “‘about’ this object or ‘about’ that,” to 
both convey and perform the “flights and perchings” of thought and its expression (PP 
246, 243). Through his life-long engagement with Emerson’s writing and thinking, James 
privileges literary means of expanding the capaciousness and enhancing the 
responsiveness of his psychological and philosophical frameworks. 
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As the passage James reads from continues, Emerson’s sense of exhilarating and 
fearful exposure is traced to the surprising experience of self-dissolution: 
Standing on the bare ground,—my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into 
infinite space,—all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eye-ball; I am 
nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am 
part or particle of God…The greatest delight which the fields and woods minister, 
is the suggestion of an occult relation between man and the vegetable. I am not 
alone and unacknowledged. They nod to me, and I to them. The waving of the 
boughs in the storm, is new to me and old. It takes me by surprise, and yet is not 
unknown. (EL 10) 
This paragraph crystallizes a key point of intersection between Emerson’s literary project 
and James’s conception of educational and introspective experience: a notion of selfhood 
that is composed and decomposed by fluctuations of perception and feeling. In the 
moment of transparency, one’s sense of self is swept into currents that dissolve “mean 
egotism” (EL 10). As we have seen, metaphors of circulation and erasure—dissipating, 
evaporating, floating, vanishing selves—are taken by Baudelaire and Proust, and they 
will likewise be mobilized by Henry James, Stein, and Larsen.18 Transparency, a radical 
permeability to the surrounding world, is available when the “axis of vision” is coincident 
with the “axis of things” (EL 47). In the moment that the “I” sees all it is reduced to 
“nothing.” The self becomes a point where these axes intercept one another—a vessel of 
perception with permeable walls but without predetermined content.  
                                                
18 Richard Poirier has shown that the urge towards self-disappearance has long 
precedence in western literature. Poets since Virgil have explored the possibility of self-
eradication (we might recall from the introduction that Proust compared Emerson to 
Virgil in his capacity as literary guide) (Renewal 182). 
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As James recognizes, it is Emerson’s style—the dizzying leaps and plunges of his 
sentences—that induces readers to give themselves over to flowing forces that flood the 
boundaries of the self and melt the borders between sentient and apparently non-sentient 
beings. The Emersonian “self” is alternately dissolved and discovered in various 
phenomena in nature, but also in language. As Poirier observes, “our reading-writing 
brings into existence a moment in which we are actively there, but also a moment in 
which self-present identity is reportedly lost” (Renewal 201). At the moment Emerson 
announces the self’s disappearance, he also performs the rediscovery of an “I” that 
partakes of what it encounters and describes. Passages like one above incite the reader to 
conjure and reflect on what it feels like to disappear to one’s self. Emerson’s fearful 
exhilaration segues into a sense of expansive ascendance, but reaching a state of 
transcendental sublimity is not his ultimate objective. Emerson’s idealist vision of 
uplifted infinitude is insistently rooted in the finite experience of a fleeting “now.” His 
vertiginous flights come to “perch” on buffeted branches that take him by surprise. 
Rather than representing a final destination, the “event” of surprise is simply “the first of 
a new series”: each perching expands the circle of experience to encompass a wider range 
of fresh and familiar phenomena (EL 405). The surprise of Emerson’s encounter with the 
waving boughs is a feeling of unfamiliarity that also registers as recognition. The limbs 
are “not unknown” because they are continuous with Emerson’s own limbs and because 
they are moved by the same storm. Carrying forward his first impression of Paris’s 
Muséum national d’histoire naturelle, Emerson invokes the “occult relation” that 
mutually transforms human and non-human specimens. In this case, it is human and 
herbaceous life that inter-animate one another.  
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Emerson’s compositional method of translating fluctuating feelings into literary 
forms presents a paradox that underpins an aesthetics of surprise: how can an event that 
seizes and suspends the cognizant self be perceived and reflected upon? In fact, aesthetic 
expressions of surprise will always be belated; reflection is only possible after the fact. 
Though Emerson gestures towards an immediate experience of transparency, it 
necessarily remains opaque to the present moment of writing or reading. In the passage 
above, Emerson can only recollect the feelings that circulated around a momentary 
encounter that has already passed. He can neither make those past perceptions present, 
nor promise any future fulfillment of the event in the form of new knowledge or 
immutable insight. Emerson guarantees nothing beyond his affirmation that something 
significant happened in an encounter that cannot be wholly translated. Nevertheless, as 
Emerson’s, Baudelaire’s, and Proust’s writing makes clear, just the process of belatedly, 
idiosyncratically, imperfectly evoking surprise in writing remains a powerfully 
































“There are two kinds of taste in the appreciation of imaginative literature: the 
taste for emotions of surprise and the taste for emotions of recognition.” 





 When Henry James first identified the two ways of appreciating literature outlined 
in the quote above he described surprise and recognition as mutually exclusive. The cited 
line comes at the end of his tribute to the work of the recently deceased Anthony 
Trollope, published in The Century in 1883. The essay praises Trollope for writing “for 
the day, the moment” and for helping “the heart of man to know itself” (395). In this 
context, the reader’s emotions of recognition are elicited by the author’s capacity to make 
his protagonist’s motives transparent. By implication, emotions of surprise only arise 
when a character’s mind and heart remain opaque, his motivations unclear. James’s 
praise of Trollope’s transparency, it turns out, is double-edged. It is owing to his 
uncomplicated and artless lack of form, James suggests, that Trollope is capable of 
provoking readerly recognition. As James’s own career as a novelist develops, his 
conceptions of surprise and recognition—as modes of appreciation, but also as narrative 
structures—undergo significant changes. In early approaches to his abiding expatriate 
theme, the importance of surprise is displaced by shock. Roderick Hudson (1875), The 
American (1877), and The Portrait of a Lady (1881) hinge on a sudden moment of 
recognition where new knowledge arrives all at once. These novels follow a similarly 
plotted pattern: a paralyzing confrontation between awe-struck Americans and stultified 
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Europeans forecloses the potential for reciprocity between the continents’ representatives. 
In each case, the New World innocent’s wide-eyed impressionability is overwhelmed and 
finally deadened by the shocking blows dealt by a representative of the Old World, 
whose apparently beneficent motives turn out to be a cover for malicious intent and a 
nefarious past.1 Until the moment of shocking revelation James withholds transparent 
access to this antagonist’s heart and mind from both his reader and his protagonist. The 
reader’s perspective is focalized through the naïve American so that their shock of 
recognition is simultaneous (through such simultaneity depends on the reader suspending 
his or her recollection of previous James novels that share the same story arc and 
character types). 
In his last three complete novels of consciousness, James moves from an 
organizing paradigm of shock to a more integrative model of surprise. In The Wings of 
the Dove (1903), The Ambassadors (1904), and The Golden Bowl (1905), the layered 
opacities of surprise and recognition interpenetrate one another. Instead of cultural 
collisions between a new-world sense of wonder and a shock-saturated Old World, these 
novels feature scenes of recognition that open a window (sometimes only a crack) onto a 
shared middle ground of experience between the representatives of each continent. 
Whereas shock and recognition converge all at once in the early novels, James 
distinguishes his late style with an idiosyncratic grammar of time. His set-piece scenes 
feature labyrinthine sentences that hinge on the distinctive temporal pivot of surprise. No 
longer marked by a singular moment of full disclosure, recognition and surprise unfold as 
                                                
1 The Portrait of a Lady is a transitional work in James’s oeuvre, which intermingles the 
characteristics of his earlier paradigm of expatriate shock with his later, more integrative 
model of surprise. 
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unpredictable and protracted processes. For instance, in The Ambassadors’s famous 
French countryside encounter a potentially violent confrontation is averted by an 
“overflow of surprise” that reorients the characters’ attention to newly encompass each 
other’s perspective (AM 310). The immersive moment of surprise dilates into a 
psychologically and grammatically complex web of anticipatory projections and 
retroactive reflections. “The situation was made elastic” for the protagonist, at the same 
time that James’s refracted temporality allows his sentences to reflect that elasticity (AM 
310). Shuttling between past and future tenses, a Jamesian syntax of surprise remaps the 
present as a commutable frontier of open potential. Accordingly, the protagonist’s and 
reader’s processes of recognition remain similarly open-ended and impossible to fix. In 
this chapter, I trace James’s trajectory from the repetitive narrative pattern of shock 
towards an aesthetics of surprise that extends a narrative horizon of possibility where the 
fate of his protagonists and the novel form remains suspended before an unknown future. 
!!! 
The American epitomizes James’s early oppositional approach to representing Old 
and New World relations. The first half of the novel is narrated from the ingenuously 
optimistic, but also keenly acquisitive, perspective of Christopher Newman. A fellow 
expatriate brashly characterizes the artless hero’s project in Europe: “‘You’re the great 
Western Barbarian, stepping forth in his innocence and might, gazing a while at this poor 
effete Old World, and then swooping down on it’” (A 34). Indeed, after successfully 
making his fortune as a manufacturing magnate in New York, the “superlative American” 
has come to Paris to seek, “in a word, the best article in the market,” namely, a wife (A 
37). Newman’s own droll embrace of these hyperbolic typecasts initially suggests that the 
culturally defined stereotypes of innocent barbarism and old-world corruption can be 
  
82 
playfully inhabited and negotiated. From this vantage, Europe presents a bottomless 
source of excitement and pleasure. Propelled on his European tour by the transitory 
“charm of novelty” in his somewhat haphazard search for a never-ending supply of “new 
impressions,” Newman is the very embodiment of wide-eyed wonder (A 160).  
Upon his introduction to Claire de Cintré, the beguiling daughter of the ancient 
House of Bellegarde, Newman’s distracted impressionability becomes intensely focused. 
His knack for “piling up consistent wonders” through his “general hospitality to the 
chances of life” confronts a continental antipathy to any feeling or event that the 
aristocratic clan is “not perfectly prepared for” (A 7, 98). As Claire’s uncle dryly puts it, 
“there have been no novelties in our house for a great many years” (A 150). What 
Richard Poirier describes as The American’s “confrontation between free and fixed 
characters” entrenches itself through increasingly insistent and seemingly inevitable 
images of expansion vs. contraction, hospitality vs. seclusion, and freedom vs. 
confinement (Comic 45). However, while Madame de Bellegarde and her brother are 
irretrievably incarcerated by their obscure past, Newman’s energetic force of will initially 
appears capable of liberating Claire from her bondage to the Old World. Viewing himself 
as “an antidote to oppressive secrets” that paralyze the rest of Claire’s family, “what he 
offered her was, in fact, above all things a vast, sunny immunity” from traumatically 
repeating the familial history (A 161).  
Newman insistently associates Claire with metaphors of illumination and 
openness, suggesting she need only claim her rightful place beside him to exchange fixity 
for freedom: “She was a woman for the light, not for the shade; and her natural line was 
not picturesque reserve and mysterious melancholy, but frank, joyous, brilliant action” (A 
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161). Indeed, he figures both Claire and her brother Valentin as “imprisoned Americans” 
who find themselves on the wrong side of the continental divide (Comic 64). Claire’s 
“clear bright eyes” gaze out of a face that speaks of New World promise with its “range 
of expression as delightfully vast as the wind-streaked, cloud-flecked distance on a 
Western prairie” (A 125). Unlike the previous generation, Claire need only step “across 
the frontier of friendship” to “find the region vast” with Newman in the New World (A 
119).  
The American turns on a sudden reversal that stamps out Newman’s sanguinity 
and with it, the novel’s lighthearted tone. The Bellegardes’ retraction of their consent for 
Claire’s hand in marriage is the first of a series of incidents that leave Newman 
“profoundly shocked” (A 235). His complacent confidence in the capacity for sheer force 
of will to steer his future is shattered all at once by inexorable forces that operate with 
“the strength and insolence of Destiny herself” (A 161, 251). The same impressionability 
that made Newman receptive to wonder is now recoded as his vulnerability to the 
ceaseless bombardment that overtakes the remainder of the novel. While these shocks 
violently impinge on Newman’s experience of the present and his prospects for the 
future, the source of their gravitational force is located in the Bellegardes’ harrowing 
past, which pulls him irresistibly into its deadening orbit. Recognizing it is his “tranquil 
unsuspectingness” that has left him so exposed, Newman abruptly trades in openness for 
guardedness (A 162).  
Up to the point of the Bellegardes’ betrayal, The American has primarily been 
focalized through Newman’s previously good-humored attention to the here-and-now. In 
the latter half of the novel, the culturally defined roles that Newman has approached 
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lightheartedly congeal into the immovable fixtures of timeless, tragic melodrama, 
complete with a fatal duel, a gothic convent, and patricide revealed. These hyperbolic 
plot twists are treated with humorless solemnity; if any comedic narrative vestiges 
remain, they are at Newman’s expense. The narrator now holds him at a distance and 
observes that “there was something lugubriously comical in the way Newman’s 
thoroughly contemporaneous optimism was confronted with this dusky old-world 
expedient” (A 273). Here, the narrator ironizes Newman’s stalwart hope that his 
unflagging determination to claim his intended prize will eventually outstrip both the 
Bellegardes’ vigilance and the inevitability of tragic fate. When the now ineffable Claire 
finally cloisters herself away in a Carmelite nunnery beyond both Newman and her 
family’s possessive reach, any meaningful connections formed across continental borders 
are definitively denied. 
Newman’s swift passage from innocence to disillusioning experience is matched 
by the novel’s equally abrupt shift in tone. The disconcerting switch from mannered 
levity to melodramatic gravity suggests James’s difficulty in bridging an apparently 
insurmountable gulf between American and European categories of experience at the 
level of plot and form. Leon Edel sums up a number of critical perspectives on how the 
novel derails itself: “What happened to The American was that it set off in one 
direction—a direction that gave great pleasure to its reader—and then it sharply veered 
into pathos and disaster” (“Afterword” 328). Peter Brooks understands James to be 
attempting to choose between different novelistic models without yet mastering their 
integration (62). The novel’s apparent lack of formal coherence manifests an 
insurmountable continental divide in its generic divide between comic and tragic modes. 
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There is no space in The American where the representatives of the Old World and New 
World can meet on a middle ground. If the novel had remained in the comedic mode 
Newman may have achieved communion with Claire and Valentin through love and 
friendship, but such an outcome depended on their predisposition for “frank, joyous, 
brilliant action.” In the novel’s economy these attributes are aligned with an intrinsically 
American capacity for freedom. With the onset of melodrama, however, Claire is 
reclaimed by a gothic model of old-world femininity, living entombed in “monastic 
rigidity,” while Valentin dies at the height of tragic masculinity in a duel of honor (A 
263).  
Unable to loosen stultifying social and novelistic constraints, Claire and Valentin 
are condemned to mortification, while Newman’s capacity for wonder and humor is 
entirely overtaken by the deadening shocks of their tragic world. However, the novel 
does not portray a progressive Bildungsroman-like character development from 
innocence to experience, but simply exchanges one category of experience with another. 
Dealt a decisive blow, Newman becomes himself a vengeful dealer of them, perpetuating 
the repetitive cycle of repression and eruption that consumes the latter half of The 
American. Here, similarities can be drawn with Roderick Hudson and The Portrait of a 
Lady, which are marked by a similarly dramatic turn in their second halves. A sense of 
future potential and plenitude that stretches out in the first half of the novels suddenly 
retracts as each of the Americans abroad is overcome by an oppressive old-world past 
and drawn into lockstep with an inexorable fate—literal death, or the death of the vital 
world of the present with their retreat into isolated, unchanging misery. Unlike Roderick 
Hudson and Isabel Archer, Newman re-crosses the Atlantic, but his return to America 
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finds him as numbed as the Bellegardes he tried to leave behind: “he was himself 
surprised at the extent of his indifference…he tried to interest himself and to take up his 
old occupations. But they appeared unreal to him…the end of his strong activities had 
come” (A 343). The only surprise he can muster is directed towards his own disinterest. 
Finding nothing of his formerly vigorous self in America, Newman ultimately returns to 
Europe, seeking a solitary existence as empty of shocks as it is of wonder.  
The same dichotomies that assert an insurmountable divide between American 
and European experience in James’s early novels—new vs. old, innocence vs. 
experience, freedom vs. fixity—also map onto the schism that Walter Benjamin 
establishes between urban modernity and the authentic traditions of an irrecoverable past. 
For Benjamin, the capacity for a wonder-filled fullness of experience is projected back 
into a nostalgically longed for past, while James’s early novels project it back onto 
America. Whether the receptive capacity for wonder is located “back there” or “back 
then,” shock is the source of geographic and temporal rupture.2 These continental rifts 
and historical breaks are established by an antagonistic logic that dictates violent force 
will ultimately overpower vulnerability. As we will see, however, James ultimately 
overturns this earlier oppositional novelistic structure with an open-ended narrative 
framework of surprise. 
!!! 
Since Percy Lubbock’s The Craft of Fiction (1921) privileged the Jamesian 
moment of revelation—where complete relations are comprehended in a flash and the 
                                                
2 The American therefore demonstrates how the divisiveness of shock can be spatialized 
to run along continental as well as temporal lines. The novel inverts the oppositions that 
defined the Europe-centered account of modernity so that shock is aligned with the Old 




“great hidden facts [pass] into the possession of the reader whole” (176)—the dynamics 
of sudden recognition have remained a linchpin in critical discussions of James’s novels. 
Lubbock idealizes a mode of reading that spontaneously and recursively amalgamates 
narrative details and events into an immediately apprehended unity; new knowledge 
“spring[s] up complete and solid in the reader's attention,” in the same way it congeals all 
at once for James’s protagonist. The job of the reader, in Lubbock's view, is not to read: it 
is “to extract data from the novel that make up mental wholes, to avoid everywhere the 
temporal flow and affective identifications that infect novel-reading” (Dames, “Wave-
Theories” 210). The Lubbockian values of cognitive clarity and wholeness converge on 
the Jamesian scene, which he sees as facilitating the novel’s temporal and spatial 
compression into a comprehensive totality. While the process of reading and the novel 
form necessarily unfold over time and narrative duration, the scene acts as a kind of 
mnemonic device that arrests the melt of time, momentarily bringing the “shadowy and 
fantasmal form of a book” into sharp focus (Lubbock 1). 
Lubbock’s concentration on the terms of knowledge and suddenness excludes 
feeling and duration from the Jamesian scene in ways that continue to inflect critical 
discussions of form and consciousness in his novels. James’s critical prefaces to the New 
York Edition of his work (1907-1909) place the narrative representation of what he calls 
“felt life” at the heart of his novelistic project. Yet relatively little attention has been 
devoted to the relationship between “feeling” and his “scenic” conception of the novel 
(AN 45). For James, the term “feeling” encompasses an unmediated visceral response to 
an event and the process of interpreting an influx that simultaneously stalls and spurs 
reflection and action. His critics have primarily discussed “emotion” or “affect” as 
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phenomena that either support or overwhelm cognition, generally aligning “emotion” 
with conscious rationality and “affect” with a more primal unconscious.3 Martha 
Nussbaum argues that James’s later work underlines “the cognitive role” emotions play 
in making judgments that are responsible to the endless complexity of moral life 
(“Exactly” 348). Similarly, studies of Jamesian consciousness often focus on emotions 
only to the extent that they support or inhibit the protagonists’ progress towards 
articulable and thus representable forms of knowledge. In contrast with this cognitive 
approach to emotion, psychoanalytic discussions of Jamesian desire tend to subsume any 
plurality of feeling into the unidirectional dynamics of repression and sudden exposure. 
Affect is pushed beyond the borders of representation and conscious knowledge into the 
realm of originary trauma. For example, as Kaja Silverman has influentially argued, 
James’s “extraordinary obsession with the scenic principle” is evidence that his whole 
“corpus is bound up in some very fundamental way with the primal scene” (159; also see 
Kohan, Smith, and Veeder).  
This equation of the Jamesian scene with either cognitive understanding or 
primal shock obscures James’s own account of how feeling variously inflects his “scenic 
system” of representation. The scene, for James, is the narrative unit best suited to 
representing a structure of experience that his brother William James calls emotion. 
William’s revolutionary proposition is that “an emotion [is] indicative of physical 
change, not a cause of such changes” (PP 131).4  He models an integrated feedback loop 
                                                
3 For recent examples of work that moves away from this cognitive understanding of 
affect in reading James’s novels, see Hillis Miller’s Literature as Conduct and 
Thrailkill’s Affecting Fictions. 
4 William James inverted the view that a psychological state of emotion catalyzes and 
thus precedes its physical manifestation. As he repeatedly asserts, “the emotion…is 
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that disrupts the cause-and-effect relationship between an emotional state and its 
distinguishing physiological signs. A stimulating event or object effects corporeal 
changes—a set of physiological reactions that might include “quick breathing, palpitating 
heart, flushed face, or the like”—which are in turn perceived or “felt” (PP 503). The term 
“emotion” is therefore comprised of two elements: “bodily commotions” and our feeling 
of them (“What is an Emotion?” 16). While any division between those components is 
untenable, for the purposes of clear explanation William breaks down the feedback loop 
of emotion into sequential parts that unfold as follows:  
perception of event " bodily response " feeling of bodily response.5 
Henry James’s late novels have internalized this structure but explanatory clarity 
is not his primary aim. As Richard Blackmur has argued, “his style grew elaborate to the 
degree that he rendered shades and refinements of meaning and feeling not usually 
rendered at all” (“Introduction” AN xxv). The famously intricate sentences of James’s 
late novels evidence his efforts to convey the complex imbrications of perception and 
                                                                                                                                            
nothing but the feeling of a bodily state” (PP 459). His “visceral theory of emotion” is 
revised and reformulated over the ten-year period between the initial publication of 
“What is an Emotion” in Mind in 1884 and “The Physical Basis of Emotion” in 
Psychological Review in 1894. However, its basic tenets are essentially unchanged 
through its revisions and remain intact in James’s major statement on “The Emotions” in 
Principles of Psychology, Vol. II (1890). 
5 Many contemporary theorists of affect fail to attend to the full complexity of William 
James’s theory of emotion, which Henry James draws on. Guided by Gilles Deleuze’s 
investment in unstructured intensities, critics like Brian Massumi and Lawrence 
Grossberg tend to associate the term emotion with delimiting categories that solidify 
affect’s unstructured flows into bounded subjecthood and narrative forms (Deleuze, 
“Affect” 164, 174). Henry James (like William) is similarly interested in forces that 
exceed subjectivity and signification but for him the chief question is how to represent 
those intensities in narrative form. Like his brother, Henry would reject affect theory’s 
division of corporeal flows from psychological structures. It is therefore important to 
distinguish the immersive feeling that circulates in the central scenes of his late novels 
from free-flowing affective states that “are neither structured narratively nor organized in 
response to our interpretations of situations” (Grossberg 25).  
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sensation that structure “felt life.” Henry’s preferred term signals the conception of 
experience he shares with William. For both brothers, lived experience is constituted by 
the commotions catalyzed by objects and events coupled with the feeling of those 
fluctuations. In short, life is only lived to the extent that it is felt. By quickening sensation 
and perception into responsiveness, feeling connects interiority with the external world.  
James focuses on scenes of surprise in particular because the somatic immediacy of 
encountering the unexpected can be so variously felt and lived. The set-piece scenes of 
Henry’s late novels demonstrate that the interpretive turn in an emotional feedback loop 
is not necessarily a linguistic or subjective turn; processes of feeling may give way to 
cognitive or verbal responses, but they also may not. As a comparison of The 
Ambassadors with The Golden Bowl reveals, in Henry James’s late novels the unsettling 
experience of surprise may alternately consolidate or dissolve the perceiver-protagonist’s 
sense of selfhood and linear time. 
Henry James takes two approaches to representing the ineffable facets of feeling 
over the course of his career. His “scenic system” of representing processes of feeling 
increasingly incorporates what he calls “non-scenic” elements into his later novels of 
consciousness (AN 157). A “scenic” treatment of the subject, as James clarifies in his 
preface to The Ambassadors, is synonymous with its dramatic treatment in the theatrical 
sense of the word; a scene does not portray anything beyond what would be visible to an 
audience member watching the action unfold on a stage. Conversation and action are 
depicted with minimal narratorial intervention and few reported thoughts or feelings. 
While the scene “closely and completely” describes an exterior view of “what ‘passes’ on 
a given occasion,” the non-scene shifts the focus inward, from the event itself to a 
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character’s internal, perhaps imperceptible feelings in response (AN 325). By James’s 
own admission, only The Awkward Age (1899) and The Tragic Muse (1890)—his most 
direct efforts to “dramatise, dramatise!”—come close to conforming to purely “scenic 
conditions” (AN 267, 90). 
 As James explains, The Ambassadors achieves dramatic intensity not through 
strict adherence to “scenic consistency,” but through the interiorized perspective of a 
central consciousness, which determines the course of narrative representation from 
“beginning to end without intermission or deviation” (AN 322, 317).6 The theatrically 
dramatic scene’s “direct presentability [is] diminished and compromised” in order to 
reveal “true inwardness” (AN 325). The “alternations” between these narrative principles 
move towards a “fusion and synthesis” (AN 323). The novel’s central episode renders 
entirely inseparable the elements of immediacy and duration, of dramatic action and an 
internalized drama of consciousness. The “representational virtue” of these 
interpenetrating modalities rests on “the charm of opposition and renewal,” of “disguised 
and repaired losses,” and “insidious recoveries” (AN 326). Indeed, to attend to both the 
scenic and non-scenic elements of The Ambassadors’s countryside encounter is precisely 
to recover and repair losses of critical insight that are suffered in their conflation with 
dramatic or traumatic action. Rather than turning on the typical critical terms of sudden, 
singular recognition and shocking new knowledge, the episode suspends familiar forms 
of knowing with variegated floods of feeling.7  
!!! 
                                                
6 See Cameron’s Thinking in Henry James for a probing examination of the location of 
Jamesian consciousness in his novels and prefaces. 
7 For a powerful instantiation of the terms of knowledge and recognition in James 
criticism, see Yeazell.  
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 James’s exemplary “intensive perceiver” protagonist, Lewis Lambert Strether, 
overturns a New England mode of “fine cold thought” that “doesn’t admit surprises,” 
with experiences of Paris that have “taken all his categories by surprise” (AN 71, AM 297, 
161). Sent to Paris to retrieve Chad Newsome from the ignoble influence of a married 
French woman, Strether finds instead of corrupted new-world innocence, “a case of 
transformation unsurpassed” has taken place under Marie de Vionnet’s tutelage (AM 90). 
This “phenomenon of change” unsettles Woollett-imparted categories of thinking that 
have previously left “no room…no margin, as it were, for any alteration” (AM 90, 298). 
While Woollett remains coldly unreceptive to anything that fails to conform to prior 
categories of expectation, it is Europe’s representative who inspires sentient 
responsiveness in the face of newness and unfamiliarity. But it is not simply that the 
positions of openness and fixity are reversed between the continents. At the novel’s crux, 
when Strether’s stubborn naiveté is confronted head-on by the illicit intimacy he has long 
denied, Marie’s capacity to surprise coupled with Strether’s capacity to be taken by 
surprise come together in a chance encounter where recognition and misrecognition find 
a strange coincidence with one another.  
Initially, however, Strether replaces Woollett’s “fine cold thought” with a 
“formula” that is equally impervious to surprises (AM 71, 97). Imposing an absolutist 
interpretation of Chad as an artificially ennobled archetype of “a man of the world” and 
Marie as a paragon of feminine virtue, Strether stakes himself on a gilded vision of their 
“virtuous attachment” (AM 97, 112). Even when critics have not explicitly designated the 
novel’s climactic encounter as a primal scene, Strether’s realization that “they knew how 
to do it” and “this wouldn’t at all events be the first time” is generally read through the 
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lens of shock (AM 307). From this perspective, “the scene of revelation” cements 
Strether’s impotent position as an observer who is traumatized equally by what he has 
seen and by having been caught in the act of looking (Kohan 234). His refusal to marry 
Maria Gostrey and his final concession to return to Woollett then represent a culminated 
failure to fulfill the injunction to “live all you can” as an actor rather than a bystander to 
one’s own life (AM 132). Ross Posnock conjectures that William James would have 
deemed Strether “a hopeless case of ‘ontological wonder-sickness”’ on the basis that he 
“renounces an active life for idealist, nostalgic contemplation” (Trial 242). In my view, 
something new emerges between Strether and Marie at the climactic convergence of the 
novel’s scenic and non-scenic narrative modes, which is not reducible to originary 
trauma, nostalgic regret, or even paralyzing inaction. 
On the pivotal day in question, Strether sets forth into the countryside outside of 
Paris, spurred by an “artless” urge towards picturesque “French ruralism,” though his 
claim of artlessness is immediately belied by his description of the landscape as “the 
background of fiction, the medium of art, the nursery of letters” (AM 301). The 
imaginative border Strether places around the pastoral setting further underscores his 
pictorial impulse as its “enclosing lines” align with the “oblong gilt frame” of a Lambinet 
canvas he was too poor to purchase as a young man (AM 302). Whereas he could not 
afford the painting in his youth, Strether now seeks a tight conformity between the 
landscape before him and his internal terrain of consciousness. He imagines he is viewing 
the French countryside through the same window that stood between his younger self and 
the unattainable canvas so that the temporal and spatial barrier asserted by the phantasmic 
pane of glass denies any reciprocal exchange between himself and his environment. 
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Strether contains the scene before him within the frame of previously established 
interpretive categories that organize his visual impressions; his gaze “sufficiently 
command[s]” the elements “into a composition, full of felicity,” “a finer 
harmony…according to his plan” (AM 302, 303).  
When two figures insert themselves into the frame, Strether at first succeeds in 
assimilating them into his idyllic order. The charming couple, he declares, is “exactly the 
right thing” to complete the desired compositional harmony: “It was suddenly as if these 
figures, or something like them, had been wanted in the picture” (AM 307). However, at 
the same moment that polished aesthetic perfection seems within his grasp, the smooth 
calm that “the spell of the picture” had cast is disturbed by a “sharp start” (AM 306, 308). 
Strether’s heightened attention converges on the lady’s parasol, “which made so fine a 
pink point in the shining scene,” as it twirls to reveal the identity of the couple as none 
other than Chad Newsome and Marie de Vionnet (AM 308). Observing the two are 
“expert, familiar, frequent,” Strether realizes he is intruding on a private tryst (AM 307). 
To allay the potential for the situation to spiral into a “sharp fantastic crisis,” Strether 
extends his initial startle into a “performance” that they can all partake in: “he had but 
one thing to do—to settle their common question by some sign of surprise” (AM 308, 
311, 308). By exteriorizing his surprise into a show of signs that can be recognized from 
the water, Strether gesturally conveys a feeling that has not yet cohered into thought. In 
this way, the feeling of surprise becomes readable in embodied actions and expressions, 
though it momentarily remains an unreadably interiorized state, illegible even to the one 
experiencing it. Strether alternates between an unprocessed internalization of the 
surprising event and the externalizing stance of an uninvolved observer who watches 
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from a detached distance. As he moves between these two perspectives, the scene and 
non-scene become increasingly implicated. 
When Marie’s reciprocal “overflow of surprise” meets Strether’s own, “the 
situation was made elastic” (AM 310). The eruption of “violence [is] averted…by the 
mere miracle of the encounter” (AM 309). Though “their wonderful accident” is charged 
by the potential for eruptive conflict, one side doesn’t overtake the other; all are seized by 
a surprise event that none anticipated. Strether and Marie pass through fluidly 
indeterminate states of mutual responsiveness where the “sudden and rapid” sense of 
shock and crisis bleeds into “blankness and wonder” (AM 308). Through their shared 
effort to float in unknowing “vagueness,” they together find “something to put a face 
upon,” so that they can face one another—however shame-faced they may be—on the 
common ground of “their friendship, their connexion” (AM 313, 310, 313).   
Whereas shock is locked in a closed circuit of traumatic repetition, an optic of 
surprise opens onto more capacious middle ranges of feeling that suspend and reorient 
customary patterns of perceiving and knowing. The gradated intensities of surprise unfold 
according to a “law of successive aspects” that shuttles between interiority and 
exteriority, but also between a projected future and remembered past that are integral 
with the immediate nowness of the present (IT 268). James represents an immediacy of 
feeling that paradoxically unfolds over narrative time by bringing together what Gérard 
Genette terms “prolepsis” and “analepsis”—the narratological equivalents of a cinematic 
flash-forward and flash-back. While prolepsis narrates in advance an event that will take 
place in the future, analepsis evokes an event that took place earlier than the narrated 
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present (40).8 Both fleeting and protracted, surprise’s distinctive temporal order is 
comprised of an initially disorienting seizure of startled attention, and an ongoing process 
of reorienting and reintegrating its interruptive force. At the moment of its sudden 
dehiscence surprise is not yet stabilized into determinate thought. Only from a projected 
future moment can it be woven back retrospectively into the fabric of time and 
understanding. Surprise therefore demarcates a moment discrete within the flow of time, 
separated out from the past and future, even while it incorporates their lineaments. 
In The Ambassadors, the narrator proleptically anticipates an analeptic moment 
when “Strether was to remember afterwards …” and “was to reflect later” on the present 
instant (AM 310). This distinctive convergence of prolepsis and analepsis is also 
observable in The Golden Bowl and The Wings of the Dove: Maggie Verver “was to 
remember afterwards,” while Kate Croy “afterwards imaged to herself,” and “it was not 
till afterwards that [Milly Theale] fully knew…” (GB 315; WD 89, 153). As stated 
earlier, only by projecting forward into the future can the overwhelming immediacy of 
the present be reflected back upon—and perhaps better grasped—in the past tense.9 With 
each return to the event of surprise, James’s increasingly elaborate temporal scheme and 
syntax imbricates the instantaneous with futural projections and retroactive reflections. 
The aftermath of the countryside encounter is narrated in free indirect discourse that 
                                                
8 I am indebted here to Dorrit Cohn’s discussion of analeptic prolepses in relation to The 
Golden Bowl (5-8). 
9 As Fisher observes, “what narrative adds” to an unexpected “all-at-once” experience, 
which would otherwise remain an “extremely short-lived unique moment of being,” is a 
protracted breakdown of “the sequence of recognitions that took place in fractions of a 
second of time” (Wonder 25-26). In James’s late novels, this brief “sequence of 
recognitions” can only be discerned from the perspective afforded by retrospect.  
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further complicates those entangled temporal registers by enmeshing Strether’s 
perspective with that of the narrator:   
since we have spoken of what he was, after his return, to recall and interpret, it 
may as well immediately be said that his real experience of these few hours put 
on, in that belated vision—for he scarce went to bed till morning—the aspect that 
is most to our purpose. He then knew more or less how he had been affected—he 
but half knew at the time. (AM 311) 
Markers of time function as metanarrative interjections in this passage, adding to its 
narratological and temporal convolutions and barring any straightforward sense of 
progress towards triumphant transformation or redemptive resolution. 
Critics have carefully attended to what Bill Brown calls James’s “spatializing 
poetics of cognition,” or the process by which his elaborate metaphors externalize 
multiple cognitive processes that constitute “thinking” in his novels (Sense 166). 
However, the spatialization of cognition and delayed absorption of new knowledge 
cannot be understood in isolation from James’s temporalization of feeling. Likewise, 
those “instinctive postponements of reflexion” are inseparable from the influx of feeling 
that catalyzes them (GB 303). The strange temporal turns taken by surprise interrupt a 
straightforward march from dim confusion to the enlightened dawn of understanding. 
Instead of securing a static final product of knowledge, surprise produces a moving, 
changing series of differentials that continually reengage forms of reflective attention 
contingent on the interpenetration of feeling and thinking. Critical studies that examine 
time in James’s novels have tended to focus on the “past [that is] always present,” 
“always spreading out” and relegating future potential into a “retrospective present” 
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(Poulet, Time 350; Rawlings 274).10 Reading for surprise retrieves an equally vital future 
dimension of the Jamesian event, which recasts the past and present. The feeling of 
surprise suffuses the scene of encounter with éventualité, to borrow Françoise Dastur’s 
term—the contingent yet ever-present possibility that something might at any moment 
take hold and usher us towards an unanticipated future. Clearing previous frames of 
reference and reorienting attention to the present moment, surprise projects an 
indeterminate future, opening the possibility that what is yet to come need not repeat 
what came before. 
Strether’s belated processing of his chance meeting with the lovers extends over 
the course of his return to Paris and over the remainder of the novel. But unlike traumatic 
repetition, each return to the initial interval opened by surprise further loosens him from 
entrenched patterns of perception. His field of attention expands to accommodate 
incalculable forms of relation with and between the pair. Significantly, as Strether 
apprehends the air of “fiction and fable” that pervades “the charming affair,” he 
simultaneously realizes that Chad and Marie’s “detached and deliberate” lies are 
inseparable from “the deep, deep truth of the intimacy revealed” (AM 311, 313). Even as 
he is confronted with the liaison he had steadfastly refused to acknowledge, Strether does 
not fall back on rigid interpretive modes that definitively divide truth from fabrication, 
and integrity from duplicity. He relinquishes any illusion that the pair’s intimacy can now 
be fixed as a known entity: it can no more be condemned as a dissolute attachment than it 
can be valorized as an entirely innocent one. Ultimately, Strether recognizes his 
                                                
10 See Esch for a cogent reading of Jamesian time. 
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culpability in providing “a common priceless ground for them to meet upon”; the 
admixture “of his art and his innocence” matches the couple’s own (AM 319). 
Beyond acknowledging that “his intervention had absolutely aided and intensified 
their intimacy,” Strether condemns his efforts to fix the ambiguous unknown of human 
relations: “He had made them—and by no fault of their own—momentarily pull it for 
him, the possibility, out of this vagueness” (AM 319, 313). Back in Paris, having 
recognized their mutual implication in “the situation,” Strether and Marie once again 
come face to face, newly able to expose themselves to one another with alarming and 
enabling vulnerability. And yet, Strether’s commitment to suspending himself in 
vertiginous uncertainty is matched by a competing desire to reground himself in “a 
certain command of the situation” (AM 320). For the remainder of the novel, Strether 
struggles to strike a difficult balance between swimming in vagueness and charting a 
course of action, so as not to feel “too much at sea.” As Joan Richardson points out, The 
Ambassadors’s pervasive use of the word “vague” and its variations (“vaguely,” 
“vagueness,” “waves,” “wavering”) is connected with the novel’s ubiquitous metaphors 
and tropes of nautical navigation through uncharted waters, as well as with the related 
“figures of mooring, bridges, sinking, shipwreck, the ‘abyss’” (145). Cast adrift in the 
aftermath of the countryside episode, Strether “give[s] himself quite up” to floating 
indeterminacy rather than anchoring himself with moral conclusions (AM 316). He 
refuses to judge the attachment as necessarily unvirtuous, but also refrains from entirely 
detaching himself from it. Having relinquished all sense of direction and control, Strether 
simply floats, “well in port, the outer sea behind him.” There he “rested against the side 
of his ship,” treading water in “the iridescence of his idleness” (AM 327). Letting 
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whatever comes wash over him without resistance, Strether practices immersive 
receptivity as his primary form of activity. 
Strether plunges deeper still into the metaphorics of aquatic immersion when he 
compares his time in Paris to floating down the “sacred river” of Xanadu in Coleridge’s 
poem “Kubla Khan” (1816):  “It faced him, the reckoning, over the shoulder of much 
interposing experience—which also faced him; and would float to it doubtless duly 
through these caverns of Kubla Khan” (AM 327). The Alph of Coleridge’s poem “ran 
through caverns measureless to man / Down to a sunless sea”: it traces a labyrinthine 
subterranean path, “five miles meandering with a mazy motion,” passing through 
“ceaseless turmoil seething,” erupting “momently” into “a mighty fountain,” before 
sinking “in tumult into a lifeless ocean.” Strether, like the poem’s narrator, seeks a 
“mingled measure” where he can be “floated midway on the waves” between dead calm 
and violent eruption, between fluctuating activity and immobile passivity (Coleridge 212-
13). Henry James’s maritime metaphors and his commitment to the vague are 
elaborations, as Richardson further observes, of the fluid images of flow that his brother 
uses in The Principles of Psychology to characterize “the stream of thought” (PP 145). 
William’s project, in his own summation, is “the reinstatement of the vague and 
inarticulate to its proper place in our mental life” (WI 164). Henry, like his brother, 
emphasizes vagueness in order to signal the gap between experience—understood as an 
immersive continuum of fluctuating sensations and feelings—and the language we have 
at our disposal to try to represent that experiential flow.11 But whereas William remains 
invested in language as an instrument of clarification that will help bridge this gap, Henry 
                                                
11 See also Poirier’s “The Reinstatement of the Vague” in Poetry and Pragmatism. 
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exhibits the fundamental uncertainty and opacity of language in his struggle to find a 
syntax that is expressive of endless flux.  
As a process of apprehension that exceeds comprehension, surprise can be 
understood as a form of “prehension,” to draw on Alfred Whitehead’s term.12 Just as one 
is seized by Jamesian surprise, the mind is gripped by a prehensive event that arrives 
prior to its cognitive registration. Notably, the terms share etymological roots in the verb 
to seize or grasp. In Tomkins’s system of affects, surprise similarly marks an influx of 
sensory information that seizes attention and suspends its processing.13 But before either 
thinker had theorized the prehensive event of surprise in philosophical or psychological 
terms, James had elaborated it as a structure of perceptual attention and of narrative. It is 
no accident that these three thinkers and writers conduct complementary investigations of 
the indeterminate interval between an unexpected encounter and a cognitive or linguistic 
response. Both Whitehead and Tomkins declare their indebtedness to William James’s 
psychological structures and methods, just as Henry’s conception of “felt life” owes a 
debt to his brother’s model of emotion.14 But, as argued in the previous chapter, it was 
                                                
12 See Whitehead’s Science and the Modern World (1925) for his discussion of 
prehension as “uncognitive apprehension” or the processing “of things of which at the 
time we have no explicit cognition ” (69-73). For prehension’s relation to the “event,” see 
Meyer’s Irresistible Dictation (24) and Richardson’s Natural History of Pragmatism (248 
n.41). Jean-Luc Nancy specifically connects his conception of the event with surprise, 
contending, “the ‘surprise’ is not only an attribute, quality, or property of the event, but 
the event itself” (91). 
13 Tomkinsian surprise instigates a momentary hiatus between a stimulus and our 
affective, cognitive, or motor response to it. Surprise thus precludes an entirely 
automatized behavioral feedback loop (Affect 498).  
14 Whitehead follows William James’s lead in criticizing the way that Western 
philosophical thought from Descartes onward has excessively privileged “clear and 
distinct” conscious perception to the neglect of “body, emotion, inconstancy and change, 
the radical contingency of all perspectives and all formulations” (Shaviro x). His 
conception of prehension recovers processes of apprehension that precede or exceed 
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Emerson who guided William’s explorations of the contingencies of perception and 
emotion. Acknowledging the limits of his own field’s articulations of experience, 
William James asserts that in literature “a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, 
and a feeling of by” can be viscerally felt in addition to being imparted and understood 
(PP 245). Exactly where William saw his explications of emotionally-charged experience 
foundering, Henry’s late novels, like Emerson’s essays, express and enact in their 
tortuous sentences the feeling of surprise. While William echoes Emerson’s calls for a 
“vehicular and transitive” language, Henry responds with new syntactic and narrative 
forms (EL 463).15 This is the difference between the respective ways that William and 
Henry mobilize Emerson’s phrase “the conduct of life” (also the title of his 1860 
collection of essays). Though both brothers subscribe to what Henry calls “a religion of 
doing,” it is the novelist who insists that “to ‘put’ things is very exactly and responsibly 
and interminably to do them. Our expression of them…belong[s] as nearly to our conduct 
and our life as every other feature of our freedom” (AN 347). For William, reading 
Emerson trains a way of life that is open to surprises; for Henry, this kind of 
                                                                                                                                            
cognition. Whereas a Cartesian tradition privileges the mind’s capacity to grasp and 
possess its object of knowledge, a prehending mind is gripped by an event that exceeds 
full understanding. In his opus, Process and Reality (1929), Whitehead makes prehension 
coterminous with “feeling.” He extends James’s theory of emotion with his assertion that 
processes of feeling structure experience in general. “Attribut[ing] ‘feeling’ throughout 
the actual world,” Whitehead contends that “the basis of experience is emotional” insofar 
as every experience consists of a bodily response and a second-order reflection on that 
response (Process 177, Adventures 176). For William James’s influence on Whitehead, 
see Meyer’s Irresistible Dictation (24) and Richardson’s Natural History of Pragmatism 
For his influence on Tomkins, see Demos (212-16). 
15 Richardson clarifies that while James did not experiment within the unit of the 
sentence, the expansive scope of his work pushed “larger syntactic boundaries” with a 
style that reflected “the processual nature of the changing habits of mind” (131).  
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responsiveness to the unexpected and unknown is inseparable from questions of narrative 
representation.16 
While the brothers were growing up, Emerson was a fixture in their lives as 
Henry Sr.’s best friend and as William’s godfather. In life, he loomed as an icon for the 
James boys. It was only after his death in 1882 that William began to read Emerson with 
keen and close attention that quickly came to inform every aspect of his thinking and 
writing. Henry, however, was not as immediately receptive to Emerson’s literary 
influence. Early in his career he held up Emerson as a moral exemplar but took little 
account of his writing. Around the time that he was composing The American, Henry’s 
critical writings characterize Emerson as an unworldly innocent who has successfully 
sheltered himself from the corrupting European influences that breed a numbed cynicism 
in an early protagonist like Newman. The same measures that afford Emerson “a ripe 
unconsciousness of evil” also leave him, in Henry’s view, largely insensible to the finer 
complexities of more cosmopolitan cultural forms (LC 254). He suggests that Emerson’s 
simplicity of vision remains uncontaminated by Europe and modernity to the detriment of 
his aesthetic sensibilities. In an early review of a biography of Emerson, Henry asserts 
that “the wonder of Boston” manifests an overflow of feeling unhindered by form (AU 
359). “Failing to strike us as having achieved a style,” Emerson’s “remarkable outburst of 
Romanticism on Puritan ground” is “not composed at all” and can be valued on “the 
                                                
16 Nevertheless, it remains a critical commonplace to argue that Henry simply “conveys” 
his brother’s psychological models with hyper-perceptive protagonists who serve as 
“accurate representations” of the processes of consciousness and perception that William 




strength of his message alone” (LC 271, 265, 270, 271).17 With his assertion that 
Emerson “never really mastered the art of composition,” James upholds Matthew 
Arnold’s contestation of “Emerson’s complete right to the title of a man of letters” (LC 
262, 250). Instead of directly engaging with Emerson’s work James presents a character 
study that depicts the writer as a passive conduit of natural wonders and moral lessons.  
Other critics who contest Emerson’s literary merit tend to complain about his 
contradictory and unsystematic prose. But James’s appraisal is just the opposite owing to 
the scarce attention he affords Emerson’s essays. He focuses instead on the “private 
correspondence” that best captures the “texture of [Emerson’s] history”—a texture he 
deems unvaryingly flat (LC 252, 250): 
As most of us are made up of ill-sorted pieces, his reader…envies him this 
transmitted unity, in which there was no mutual bustling of crowding of elements. 
It must have been a kind of luxury to be—that is to feel—so homogenous. (LC 
252) 
In privileging the private and personal over the compositional, Henry misses what 
William values first and foremost in Emerson’s writing: the unsettling unpredictability of 
spiraling sentences that he deemed “as fine as anything in literature” (WII 38). 
Countering claims of homogeneity, William embraces Emerson’s heterogeneous literary 
                                                
17 Tellingly, at the beginning of his career, Henry James’s major assessment of Emerson 
is his reading of Elliot Cabot’s biography, The Life of Emerson (1887), which he reviews 
for Macmillan’s in 1888. Henry’s early assessment of Emerson as an idealist figure of 
transcendental wonder aligns with a canonical tradition of what Posnock has termed 
“Emersonianism”—“the cultural appropriation and mythologizing” that simplified “the 
actual complexities and tensions in Emerson’s notion of self-reliance” to mean romantic 
individualism and idealism (304 n.10). He goes on to give a more nuanced account of 
Emerson’s connection to Transcendentalism and the Concord School in The American 
Scene (1904-1905), which considers his literary merit in ways that were largely absent 
from his early critical writing. 
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forms for the way they sensitize us to what is familiar, frequent, or close at hand. Far 
from separating his message from the medium, Emerson’s “mission,” according to 
William, was to find “the worthy form of each perception”: “his genius was insatiate for 
experience, and his truth had to be clad in the right verbal garment. The form of the 
garment was so vital with Emerson that it was impossible to separate it from the matter” 
(WII 1119). Emerson’s vertiginous turns of syntax and sentiment perform an ongoing 
process of disorientation and reorientation so that the question which opens 
“Experience”—“Where do we find ourselves?”—must be asked again and again without 
ever resolving into predictable certainties (EL 471). As Stanley Cavell puts it, 
“contradiction, the countering of diction, is the genesis of [Emerson’s] writing” (Etudes 
113).18 
William’s continual insistence that “Emerson’s mission culminated in his style” 
offers a corrective to dismissals of the writer’s perceived formal failures (WII 1120). 
Over the years that Henry was composing his last three completed novels, William’s 
letters narrate his “reading of the divine Emerson, volume after volume” and attest to the 
enriching experience of immersing himself in those writings (LWJII 190). Those volumes 
inspire him “to report in one book, at least, such impression that my own intellect has 
received from the universe” (LWJII 190). In May of 1903, as the centenary celebration of 
Emerson’s birth approached, William wrote to Henry with redoubled fervor in 
anticipation of the address he was preparing to deliver in his honor: 
                                                
18 Tanner traces Emerson’s “naïve eye” through various American modernist strategies 
for capturing the newness and potential of each present moment. But for Tanner as for 
James, the source of Emerson’s influence is in the purity of the transcendental vision—
his longing to feel the world in all its wholeness as the child does —rather than in the 
formal facets of his writing (9). 
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Emerson is exquisite! I think I told you that I have to hold forth in praise of him at 
Concord on the 25th…You too have been leading an Emersonian life—though the 
environment differs to suit the needs of the different psychophysical organism 
which you present. (LWJII 191) 
Henry’s response to his brother on the eve of the commemoration is two-fold. He writes 
of his “longing to sit in the audience at Concord” and wishes him well with a metaphor of 
floating that owes as much to Emerson as it does to William: “May you be floated 
grandly over your cataract—by which I don’t mean have any matter of fall, but only be a 
Niagara of eloquence, all continuously, whether above or below the rapids” (LWHJ 429). 
In that same letter the expatriate commits to return to the United States after a thirty-year 
absence. Though he had written about America throughout his extended period away, 
Henry expressed fear that distance and time had rendered his subject an abstraction. He 
determined that the only way to counter its growing impalpability was to return from 
whence he came so that “experience may convert itself, through the senses, through 
observation, imagination and reflection now at their maturity, into vivid and solid 
material, into a general renovation of one’s too monotonised grab-bag” (LWHJ 426). 
Only by moving across the ground of his “birthplace” could he hope to recapture its 
“poetry of motion” (LWHJ 427, 425). Henry thus supports Emerson’s contention “that 
motion, poetry…affect[s] our convictions of the reality of the external world” (EL 38).  
During the years that William’s correspondence with his brother featured 
Emerson most prominently, Henry was transitioning into what F.O. Matthiessen called 
his “major phase.” Commentators have suggested multiple factors that potentially 
contributed to Henry James’s distinctive late style. However, an overwhelming emphasis 
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on what Edmund Wilson first termed “the shock of recognition” in his late novels of 
consciousness has obscured the fact that those scenes of recognition are structured by the 
Emersonian temporality of “an everlasting Now”: a temporal paradigm that reorients 
attention from moment to moment instead of in a singular moment of breakage (Society 
167). Though Henry determined early on that he already knew what to expect from the 
“moralist,” his brother’s correspondence and writings at the turn-of-the-century 
introduced him to Emerson’s oeuvre as if for the first time (LC 269).  Henry initially 
defines both Emerson and his innocent American protagonists by the unalloyed “unity” 
of their vision (AN 171). His late novels depict a variegated field of perceptual receptivity 
shaped by the ongoing process that Emerson describes as rendering oneself 
“impressionable” to surprises (WL 965). Newman bore an uncanny likeness to James’s 
reductive depiction of Emerson’s naïve new-world sense of wonder, while Strether comes 
to resemble more closely the Emerson who approaches life as a “series of surprises.” 
However, as both writers make clear, to dwell in this state of radical openness is not 
naïvely to idealize an escape into child-like innocence or solitary retreat. Though 
Emerson celebrates “the impressionable man” as “the great man,” he also emphasizes 
that opening oneself wide enough to register “infinitesimal attractions” as “new 
perceptions” entails precarious exposure and the loss of any stable sense of a perceiving 
self (EL 965). Likewise, Strether exemplifies the risks involved in immersing oneself in 
the “incessant movement” of experiential flux (EL 412). Having been “surprised out of 
[his] propriety” the Jamesian protagonist cultivates a “way of life…by abandonment” (EL 
414). Rather than offering liberatory transcendence, the process of self-forgetting inheres 
a perilous relationship of mutual remaking that yokes together the agent and recipient of 
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surprise. This, says Emerson, is “the secret of the world”: “the tie between person and 
event. Person makes event, and event makes person” (EL 962).  
!!! 
As William James writes, “each of us literally chooses, by his way of attending to 
things, what sort of universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit” (PP 401). Strether 
chooses to inhabit an unsettled, unfinished universe by committing to delve into the 
undefined vagueness of human relations. But his willingness to be carried in 
unpredictable directions by the currents of experience is just one way of responding to an 
unknown world of chance. On the other end of the spectrum is Adam Verver of The 
Golden Bowl, who reacts to incalculably contingent forms of intimacy by circumscribing 
them within proscribed and restricted arrangements. Whereas Strether imagines giving 
himself over to the watery labyrinth of passages subtending Kubla Khan’s city, Verver’s 
mission throughout the novel is to establish his own Xanadu: “a stately pleasure dome,” 
“girdled round” with “walls and towers” that distinguish the cultivated “garden bright” 
from the encroaching forest (Coleridge 212-13). Like Khan’s stronghold, the bordering 
walls of the Verver estate demarcate strict divisions between inside and out; cultivated 
order fortifies against the chaos beyond and below. In this scene, Verver paces restlessly 
to and fro on the terrace overlooking the manicured gardens of Fawns, his palatial 
country home in Kent. He is desperate to resolve “the vagueness [that has] spread itself 
about him like some boundless carpet” (GB 152). He thinks “in a loose, an almost 
agitated order, of many things…He truly felt for a while that he should never sleep again 
till something had come to him; some light, some idea…that he had begun to want, but 
had been till now, and especially the last day or two, vainly groping for” (GB 153).  
Then, suddenly, the “light broke for him at last”:  
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As at a turn of his labyrinth he saw his issue, which opened out so wide, for the 
minute, that he held his breath with wonder. He was afterwards to recall how just 
then the autumn night seemed to clear to a view in which the whole place, 
everything round him…lay there as under some strange midnight sun. It all met 
him during these instants as a vast expanse of discovery, a world that looked, so 
lighted, extraordinarily new, and in which familiar objects had taken on a 
distinctness that, as if it had been a loud, a spoken pretension to beauty, interest, 
importance, to he scarce knew what, gave them an inordinate size. The 
hallucination, of whatever he might have called it, was brief, but it lasted long 
enough to leave him gasping. The gasp of admiration had by this time however 
lost itself in an intensity that quickly followed – the way the wonder of it, since 
wonder was in question, truly had been the strange delay of his vision. He had 
these several days groped and groped for an object that lay at his feet and as to 
which his blindness came from his stupidly looking beyond. It had sat all the 
while at his hearth-stone, whence it now gazed up in his face. (GB 155-56)  
Verver conjures the figure of a maze in order to announce his emergence from its 
convolutions. In his account, the labyrinthine period of uncertainty ends with his turn 
onto a suddenly expanded and clarified field of vision. The question that plagued him 
was how best to manage his newly configured, formerly exclusive relationship with his 
recently married daughter Maggie. Light is thrown on his “issue” in the sense that he has 
come up with a solution to the problem of his solitude and to Maggie’s sense of 
responsibility for him. Verver describes his decision to marry his daughter’s closest 
friend Charlotte Stant as a flash of illuminating reason cutting through dark uncertainty: 
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“Once he recognized it there everything became coherent. The sharp point to which all 
his light converged was that the whole call of his future to him as a father would be 
managing that Maggie would less and less appear to herself to have forsaken him” in 
having married another (GB 156). But the dark underbelly of Verver’s “issue” remains 
obscured. The double sense of the word “issue”—referring both to his conflict and to the 
offspring that is the source of his internal battle—points to the unarticulated core of 
Verver’s problem: he must learn to view Maggie as his daughter rather than the wife she 
has long stood in for. The full depth of their intimacy will remain submerged beneath a 
carefully constructed edifice of cognitive clarity.  
The clear path Verver draws from dim confusion to a lucid course of action is 
interrupted by a gap that falls between the minute “he held his breath with wonder” and 
the following sentence that begins with the distinctive Jamesian locution: “He was 
afterwards to recall.” As in The Ambassadors, Verver’s perceptual reorientation takes 
place in an indeterminate interval between an unexpected turn and a projected time 
“afterwards.” From the belated vantage of this “afterwards” he can reflect on the moment 
the “light broke for him ” as a remembered past. These proleptic and analeptic turns mark 
James’s distinctive syntax of surprise—a syntax which gives place to experiences that 
cannot be understood or articulated as immediately as they are felt. As in the preceding 
novel, James’s use of free indirect discourse makes it impossible to extricate Verver’s 
voice from the narrator’s retrospective and projected viewpoints. But unlike Strether, 
who remains enmeshed in the uncertainty of these mingled temporalities and 
perspectives, Verver decisively denies any lingering indeterminacy in the wake of his 
encounter with the unexpected. Instead, he uses hindsight to claim commanding control 
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over the scene. By the time he has exhaled his held breath, Verver has already smoothed 
over all dislocations of time and knowledge. He swiftly claims the “sharp focus” of 
enlightened understanding. In this way, Verver recasts the murky “situation” of his 
unspeakable incestuous desires as a solvable “riddle” that can be “all supremely cleared 
up” by his “moral lucidity” (GB 156). Just at the moment that Verver claims to dispel all 
ambiguity, his formulation of a lock-and-key resolution to a solvable problem illustrates 
how language continues to assert its fundamental opacity, even as he attests to its 
transparency: “It wasn’t moreover that the word, with a click, so fitted the riddle,” he 
says, “but that the riddle, in such perfection, fitted the word” (GB 156). The question is 
redescribed in such a way that Charlotte can be the simple answer to his daughter’s filial 
guilt. However, Verver’s phrasing also raises the specter of linguistic ambiguity. He 
describes his “riddle” as a language problem whose key is simply “the word”—a word 
that can’t be named. 
Reflecting on what happened in the moment he held his breath, Verver insistently 
frames his reconceived “issue” in the terms of wonder; the word is repeated three times in 
a single paragraph. “The wonder of it” lies in the all-at-once arrival of a resolution, but 
also in the “strange delay of his vision,” with vision defined as full comprehension. Until 
the moment that “everything came together” Verver “groped and groped for an object 
that lay at his feet.” He thus figures the moment of recognition as an externalized 
encounter with an object of knowledge that “had sat all the while at his hearth-stone, 
whence it now gazed up in his face” (GB 155-56). But what precisely does he recognize 
in the face reflected back at him? Even as Verver decisively marks the end of the brief 
“hallucination” that delayed understanding, he relies on a phantasmic object encounter to 
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usher uneasily cognized feelings into containable, domesticated forms. He stages a face-
to-face encounter with himself, but one that only confirms a story of rationalized mastery 
over irrational desires. 
Verver’s description of his passage from bewilderment to cognitive mastery 
enlists tropes of new world wonder. He reenchants the rolling spread of his own property 
“as a vast expanse of discovery.” His explorer-gaze bestows “familiar objects” with 
“beauty, interest, importance” so that they appear “extraordinarily new,” freshly vested 
with distinction. Framing the object encounter as a moment of “wonder,” Verver can 
have it both ways: he can discover and lay claim to objects of value as if for the first time, 
but he can also imagine that he was in possession of them all along. Innocent amazement 
can coexist with cognitive control. By equating a poetics of wonder with a poetics of 
thought Verver carries forward a Cartesian legacy that privileges cognition over feeling 
and wonder over surprise. As discussed in the Introduction, Descartes values wonder first 
and foremost because it supports rational thinking, learning, and retention (Passions 59). 
When progress from ignorance to knowledge is the only esteemed path it is easy to 
overlook or to reject registers of experience that remain unassimilable to conscious 
intelligence. For Verver, as for Descartes, surprise is a dangerously unknown quantity to 
be contained at all costs. 
The Ambassadors and The Golden Bowl exemplify the challenge of pinning down 
a Jamesian syntax of surprise when it is so often subsumed into more strident 
announcements of shock and wonder. With its fractured grammar of time, surprise 
frequently falls between James’s circuitous sentences. Yet it is detectable in temporal 
disjunctions that circumvent a clear-cut trajectory towards full comprehension or 
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dramatic revelation. When surprise is collapsed with shock, the experience of suddenness 
is coeval with rupture; when it is subsumed into knowing wonder, the end-goal of clear 
comprehension overwrites non-cognitive forms of engagement.19 Reading for surprise 
reveals how structures of time and perception emerge as a consequence of feeling in 
James’s late novels.  As James’s prefaces to the New York Edition of his oeuvre reveal, 
his method of composition was guided at every stage—from conception, to drafting and 
revision—by his desire to feel surprised by the processes of reading and writing.  
!!! 
 
James’s critical prefaces develop a theory of feeling that brings together the 
psychological and aesthetic dimensions of his late style. As the event of surprise becomes 
his subject of representation, it also shapes his mode of representation. By determining 
what seizes and directs the perceiver protagonist’s field of attention, the dynamics of 
surprise also determine what enters the novel’s narrative field. His prefaces define “life” 
as “all inclusion and confusion,” while “art” is defined by “discrimination and selection” 
(AN 120). For James, converting life’s confusion into the structured art of the novel is 
primarily a matter of marshaling the formlessness of “felt life” into a narrative order: 
“really, universally, relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is 
eternally but to draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which they shall 
happily appear to do so” (AN 45, 5). “The sublime economy” of an art that successfully 
draws such a circle is founded on surprise (AN 120). Coupling startle and interest, 
                                                
19 Just as the term surprise first designated an unexpected military attack, “interval” has 
martial etymological roots. The Latin word “intervallum” literally means a “space 
between palisades or ramparts”  [inter (between) + vallum (rampart)] (OED). Both a zone 
of contact and of separation, the interval represents an indeterminate region between 
exposed vulnerability and shielding fortification, between offensive action and a 
protective reaction.  
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surprise offers a narrative solution to James’s “exquisite problem”: it allows an expansive 
sense of relational possibility to coexist with an aesthetic principle of discriminating 
selection. The feeling of surprise is the primary mediator between “art” and “life” at the 
moment of the novel’s inception; it is equally instrumental in ushering the “productive 
germ” into a narrative structure that will sustain a reader’s attention (AN 79). If a “novel 
is in its broadest definition a personal, a direct impression of life,” as James declares, his 
ultimate aim is to “produce in the reader’s mind” an impression that “must have much in 
common with the impression originally produced on his own mind by the subject” (TF 
294). To achieve such a correspondence entails cultivating a reading experience that is 
shaped by surprise in the same way that he describes the processes of writing and 
revision as having been.  
The sudden “flush of life” that constitutes James’s “first glimpse” of the inchoate 
novel in each case arrives all at once in an unguarded moment, swelling his field of 
attention to accommodate its overwhelming surge (AN 99, 21). To separate out what is 
worthy of inclusion from what is not, James asks, “up to what point is such and such a 
development indispensable to the interest?” (AN 5). Here James refers to both his 
protagonist’s and his reader’s interest, which he hopes will become indivisible. As 
“interested and intelligent” witnesses and reporters, Jamesian protagonists “get the most 
out of all that happens to them and…in so doing enable us, as readers of their record, as 
participators by fond attention, also to get the most” (AN 62). But how do the movements 
of the protagonist’s attention foster a corresponding participatory attention in the reader? 
And further how could any reader match the intensity of feeling and analytic care that 
James himself invests in rereading and revising his novels for the New York Edition?  
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Throughout his prefaces, James develops and models an “active, appreciative 
process” of critical reading that is both emotional and reflective, rigorously structured 
and creatively open (AN 336). For James, “analytic appreciation” is a practice of 
penetrating the work’s formal structure in order to partake of the feelings that shaped its 
narrative form (AN 228). As he reminds us, his later novels are organized around the 
interpenetration of scenic and non-scenic elements: “we feel, with the definite alternation 
[between scene and non-scene], how the theme is being treated. That is we feel it when, 
in such tangled connexions, we happen to care” (AN 158). By bringing form and feeling 
together as mutually constitutive and invoking a united “we,” James aligns himself with a 
more general readership. While critical intimacy may be achieved through intensive 
engagement with those “tangled connexions” between scene and non-scene, form and 
feeling, James observes that the “finer idiosyncracies [sic] of a literary form seem to be 
regarded as outside the scope of criticism” (AN 158, 157). Even as James consistently 
invokes an ideally receptive reader who “happen[s] to care” enough to cultivate the close 
critical attention necessary for the transmission of feeling, he impatiently interrupts 
himself to lament, “I shouldn’t really go on as if this were the case with many readers” 
(AN 158).  
Despite the limitations James perceives in literary critical reading as it is being 
practiced, he perseveres in extending “an earnest invitation to the reader to dream again 
in my company and in the interest of his own larger absorption of my sense” (AN 345). 
To absorb the reader into the feeling that catalyzed the work in the first place, James 
recalls the circumstances of each novel’s conception and composition, establishing vital 
new “connexions” with the present task of revising them for the New York Edition. His 
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rereading is animated by twofold “surprises of re-perusal”; the surprise James felt at the 
novel-germ’s unexpected arrival is revived at each point when he judges that the realized 
novel has brought its germ into full fruition so that little revision is necessary (AN 157). 
But while James admits “a certain surprise” when “the march of [his] present attention 
coincides sufficiently with the march of [his] original expression,” he is equally attuned 
to “the so frequent lapse of harmony between [his] present mode of motion and that to 
which the existing footprints were due” (AN 75, 335, 336). The discrepancy James 
observes between the movements of his past and present attention—“the high spontaneity 
of these deviations and differences” between his “original tracks” and “present mode of 
motion”—activates an improvisational reading practice that injects fresh vivacity into his 
present relationship with his past work (AN 336). Central to this readerly mode is his 
inability to “forecast chances and changes and proportions” encountered in these 
shuttling movements back and forth in time; “they could but show for what they were as I 
went,” James writes (AN 342).  He continues, “criticism after the fact was to find in them 
arrests and surprise, emotions alike of disappointment and of elation: all of which means, 
obviously, that the whole thing was a living affair” (AN 342). In sum, James assigns 
literary criticism with the task of revitalizing the “felt life” that brought the novel into 
being in the first place.  
Though James returns to each novel with the advantage of authorial familiarity, 
he reads them for the surprises they yield, counterintuitively suggesting that intimate 
acquaintance with a novel may in fact facilitate rather than inhibit the capacity for 
readerly surprise. Likewise, it is only after two characters establish deep intimacy that 
they might recover a sense of the other as an unfathomable unknown—an endless source 
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of surprise. According to James, reading for surprise requires an ongoing “renewal of 
attention,” which depends less on the original newness of a first encounter than on a deep 
familiarity that provides the ground against which something unanticipated can come to 
the fore (AN 336). James reads his novels with a penetrative care that persistently hits up 
against their opacity. His rigorous concentration and fluency must therefore be coupled 
with the sense that he does not know what he will find when he revisits them. As author, 
James offers intimate insight into the “accidents and incidents of [each novel’s] growth,” 
but he maintains that such critical intimacy is not contingent on his status as writer (AN 
7). James claims reading for surprise as a more widely available reading stance that 
registers moment-by-moment departures from expectation.  
 Both Henry James and Emerson resensitize the reader to a fleeting but renewable 
here-and-now. The Emersonian “event” of surprise holds the promise of a tenuous instant 
of felt unity: “In stripping time of its illusions, in seeking to find out what is the heart of 
the day, we come to the quality of the moment and drop the duration altogether” (Society 
175). For the Jamesian protagonist as for James’s reader, duration cannot be dropped. The 
Ambassadors and The Golden Bowl exemplify the ultimate inextricability of the punctual 
moment from the durative temporal field in which it is embedded. The instantaneity of 
the event does not exist separately from the delay in its registration or from the future 
possibilities it opens up. Just as narrative representation unfolds over time, the process of 
reading is a necessarily protracted one. The initial experience of reading a James novel 
involves recursively recollecting what came before and anticipating what will come next, 
not unlike the way James’s processes of re-reading and revision bring together 
retrospective reflections with futural projections of how he will be received by 
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prospective readers. The challenge, for both James and his reader, is not only to inhabit 
that unsettling state of feeling without knowing, but also to encounter something 





Gertrude Stein’s Grammars of Attention;  




“She was surprised by anything being something.”  





For Gertrude Stein, the question of “how to write” is closely tethered to the 
question of how to cultivate what she referred to, following William James, as “habits of 
attention” (WL 84, PP 286). Over the first thirty years of her career, those comfortable 
habits remained largely unchallenged, allowing for the easy exercise of focused yet 
capacious concentration. In The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas (1933), Stein depicts a 
daily writing regime that is effortlessly continuous with her lively social life, just as her 
salon at 27 Rue de Fleurus is coextensive with Paris’s buzzing boulevards. “Much 
influenced by the sound of the streets and the movement of automobiles,” she composed 
while strolling through the city: “during those long walks Gertrude Stein meditated and 
made sentences” (ABT 209, 206). Over the three decades of living and writing in France 
that Autobiography spans, Stein deftly navigates a steady stream of social and sensory 
stimulation. She moves fluidly between domestic and urban spaces with no need to 
separate composition from the rest of her daily existence. Stein’s practices of meditating 
and making sentences are guided and sustained by pleasurable feelings of interest and 
excitement. Throughout this significant period, Stein seems utterly assured of her 
capacity to selectively register those items she deems “interesting” or “exciting” and 
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dismiss the rest—in much the same way she masterfully curates the paintings and visitors 
that populate her salon. 
The acts of discernment Stein depicts in Autobiography remain indebted to the 
model of attention that her teacher and mentor, William James, outlined in Principles of 
Psychology.1 James draws a direct parallel between the way “the artist notoriously selects 
his items” and “the essentially selective or interested character of consciousness,” which 
carves up an “indistinguishable swarming continuum” as “a sculptor works on his block 
of stone” (PP 271, 274). Before Autobiography was published to great acclaim, Stein 
likewise represented her discerning interest as an unerring guide that steered her through 
what James terms the “utter chaos” of the “stream of experience” (PP 402). But the 
sudden celebrity status that accompanied the book’s smash-hit release in the spring of 
1933 dislocated Stein’s long-held habits of selective attention, which had up to that point 
effectively directed and closely synchronized her urban perambulations and language 
experimentation. !
It is common for studies of Stein’s oeuvre to establish an irrevocable break 
between her “early” and “late” style. Of Stein’s critics, Ulla Dydo has perhaps worked 
most closely with the vast collection of Stein papers housed in the Yale archives to trace 
“how experience becomes material for composition and yields the vocabulary for her 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Stein was a favored former student of William James. In addition to studying 
psychology under him at Harvard, she also carried out experimental work under the 
supervision of Hugo Münsterberg. But as she asserts in Autobiography, “The important 
person in Gertrude Stein’s life was William James” (ABT 96). She published her research 
on “Normal Motor Automatism” in Münsterberg’s lab with Leon Solomons in 
Psychological Review (1896). In that article, Stein and Solomons argue “that habits of 
attention are reflexes of the complete character of the individual” (WL 84). A number of 
critics have elaborated the relationship between James’s psychology and Stein’s early 
theories of composition. See for example, Ashton, Levinson, Meyer, Ruddick, and Ryan. 
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writing” (Language 9). According to Dydo’s account, Autobiography’s unprecedented 
success marked a defining split between “Stein’s two voices”: “the voice of words in 
meditation and the late, strident voice of personality that leads to audience writing, an 
aspect of personality display” (Language 595). Likewise, foundational studies by Robert 
B. Haas, Richard Bridgman, and Donald Sutherland contend that Stein came to privilege 
an “an open and public” manner over the inwardly directed “real kind” of writing that she 
composed without consideration of any external audience.2 For Dydo and others, Stein’s 
struggle with the unexpected demands and diversions of fame and a newfound audience 
dramatically compromised the immediacy and integrity of her formerly full, free voice.3  
Critics who demarcate the shock of success as a definitive turning point in Stein’s 
career likewise organize their before-and-after approach to her life and writing around a 
bipolar model of consciousness and time. These critics charge that externally dictated 
concerns about securing long-term fame disperse the full presence of Stein’s undivided 
attention to the here-and-now that had hitherto guided her writing. Such commentary pits 
Steinian interiority against exterior forces and immediacy against duration, recalling the 
agonistic pairs that organize rupture-orientated accounts of modernity. In “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936), Benjamin maps the poles of 
traumatic shock and deadening habit onto the “polar opposites” of “distraction and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See Haas’s A Primer for the Gradual Understanding of Gertrude Stein, Bridgman’s 
Gertrude Stein in Pieces, and Sutherland’s Gertrude Stein, A Biography of Her Work. 
3 Stein herself used the terms “open and public books” and “real kind of books” in a letter 
on May 25, 1934 to her agent, W.A. Bradley, who was negotiating with Alfred Harcourt 
for new book contracts following Autobiography. As Dydo notes, the terms stuck 
(Language 601-2). Dydo initially intended to exclude from her comprehensive study 
Stein’s Lectures in America (1934) and the work produced in the years that followed. She 
eventually conceded that this period of Stein’s career could not be summarily dismissed 




concentration” (Illuminations 239). Stein is charged with a failure of focus that radically 
compromises her receptivity; Benjamin analogously diagnoses widespread “reception in a 
state of distraction” across the modern masses (240). Thirty years earlier, Georg Simmel 
equated the inability to pay attention with an incapacity for emotional investments in 
people and things. He memorably labels this state of perceptual and affective 
unresponsiveness the “blasé attitude [blasiertheit]” (414-15). In a like manner, Siegfried 
Kracauer labels the affective consequence of modernity’s over-stimulated, under-
attentive state as boredom—a persistent inability to take an interest in the world.4 
Stein’s initial response to literary celebrity and the mass reproduction of her work 
neatly lines up with the oppositional frameworks of these urban theorists. Her first 
reaction to “the unexpectedness of onrushing impressions” that came with fame was to 
erect a protective barrier around everything that was, as Simmel put it, “happening 
inside” (410). As Stein declares, “there is no use in the outside…[it] is no longer 
interesting” (HWW 66). Stein’s fears that public exposure would sap the interest that 
fueled her composition were self-fulfilling. Unfamiliar anxieties prompted a defensive 
self-isolating response, which only compounded the paralyzing writer’s block that had 
interrupted thirty years of writing every day. “I was not writing,” she later recalls, “I 
began to worry about identity” (EA 66). Interest vs. boredom, inner vs. outer, public vs. 
private, concentration vs. distraction—a series of dichotomies define Stein’s preliminary 
efforts to understand the relationship between identity and writing in the wake of 
Autobiography. As I will demonstrate, however, these terms did not remain polarized in 
her thinking for long. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 See Kracauer’s “Boredom” in The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays (1924). !
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Stein’s ongoing investigation of what Adam Frank has termed “the compositional 
aspect of affect in perception” brings together seemingly antithetical elements of 
experience by refusing to abstract the process of composition from its lived 
circumstances.5 Frank’s phrase indexes Stein’s career-long commitment to examining the 
central role that feelings play in shaping our perception of the world and our place in it. 
“Composition,” for Stein, designates the combination of words into sentences, and 
sentences into paragraphs, but also the arrangement of the material, sensorial, and 
emotional conditions of writing. As Frank asserts, Stein required of herself and of her 
reader multiple forms of attention to the grammatical and situational components of 
writing, which she folded back into the work itself. These forms of attention are 
“compositional” in the sense that they don’t separate aspects of living and writing that are 
conventionally held apart in the name of clarity and comprehensibility.  
The forms of compositional attention that Stein developed over the course of her 
career extended a central proposition of James’s Principles of Psychology: “each of us 
literally chooses, by his ways of attending to things, what sort of universe he shall appear 
to himself to inhabit” (PP 424). James’s primary concern with increasing the “clearness” 
and speed of our “intellectual discrimination” means that he rarely brings his model of 
attention directly to bear on questions of feeling or aesthetics (PP 426). Though 
Principles introduces James’s groundbreaking model of emotion alongside his paradigm 
of attention, the theories are developed in separate chapters that aren’t put into 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 My use of the term “compositional” in relation to Stein is indebted to Adam Frank’s 
unpublished paper, “Thinking Confusion: On the Compositional Aspect of Affect,” 
presented at Emory University on November 4, 2009. He first phrased “the compositional 




conversation with one another; the fluctuations of feeling he describes only enter into his 
schema of attention as a detrimental distraction. In the pages devoted to attention he gives 
a single, second-hand example of how feeling informs attention, quoting Wilhelm Wundt 
to argue for the importance of “anticipatory preparation”: “The surprise which 
unexpected impressions give us is due essentially to the fact that our attention, at the 
moment when the impression occurs, is not accommodated for it” (PP 426, 440). When 
we are inadequately prepared for an unexpected encounter, James contends, we are 
vulnerable to diversions from the path of knowledge acquisition and useful action. Over 
the course of his career, James becomes increasingly committed to inhabiting an 
“unfinished pluralistic universe” that allows for chance and the unexpected (WII 780). 
But in his influential psychological model of attention, experiences for which we are 
unprepared represent an infringement on concentration. In response to Principles, John 
Dewey suggests “that the application of James’s theory of emotion to his theory of 
attention would give some very interesting results,” but neither theorist takes up the task 
(“Theory of Emotions” 175). In effect, it is Stein who accepts the challenge. When 
sudden celebrity threatened to overwhelm her focus on composition, Stein turned from 
the psychology of William James and found, in his brother Henry, an aesthetic model for 
encountering the unexpected. Henry James provides Stein with a powerful example for 
locating surprise at the heart of her compositional practice of attention.  
This chapter examines a transitional work that is often overlooked in critical 
studies centering on Autobiography as a catalyst for the rupturing force of fame. A 
standard chronology of Stein’s career identifies Stanzas in Meditation (written in the 
summer of 1932) as the last major example of Stein’s “real writing” and Lectures in 
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America (composed in the spring and summer of 1934 and delivered in the fall) as the 
launch of the “personality writing” that would dominate the remainder of her career.6 
When Autobiography’s publication is taken to mark a decisive divide between Stein’s 
two voices it is easy to blanket everything that came in between under symptomatic 
silence. But in the winter of 1933, after months of uncharacteristic difficulty with writing, 
Stein began to draft a new study focusing on four American luminaries: Ulysses Grant, 
the Wright brothers, George Washington, and Henry James.7 The few critics who do 
comment on the work she eventually titled Four in America tend to read it as a record of 
her fraught struggles with fame, audience, personal and cultural identity, which she 
finally resolved by claiming her public place and voice alongside the “representative 
Americans” who were her subject.8 By contrast, I will show that the idiosyncratic studies 
of Four in America are not easily subsumed into a narrative of identity crisis and its 
resolution. On the contrary, they form a crucial pivot point in Stein’s efforts to recast “the 
problem of the external and the internal” in terms of continuity and integration rather than 
rupture and opposition (ABT 119). 
Four in America is a transitional work in the Winnicottian sense of the word. The 
defining developmental activity for psychologist D.W. Winnicott is the child’s precarious 
task of keeping inside and outside, me and not-me, separate but interrelated in “an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The first installment of Autobiography appeared in Atlantic Monthly in May of 1933 but 
the book was published as a whole at the beginning of September that same year. Dydo 
explains the significance of the fact that Stanzas and Autobiography were written in the 
same summer of 1932 in “Stanzas in Meditation: The Other Autobiography.”  
7 Four in America was written in late winter or early spring of 1934, but Stein was 
planning and making reference to it as early as the previous summer. 
8 As a contemporary reviewer summarized the project, Stein meant “to show how each of 
her representative Americans would have expressed his genius if he had been in some 




intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life both contribute” 
(Playing 3). These transitional dynamics do not resolve in completed phases of 
development but instead constitute the basis of ongoing forms of relational and creative 
“play” over the course of an entire life. Given that “no human being is free from the 
strain of relating inner and outer reality,” Winnicott asserts the importance of finding 
“relief” in a “neutral area of experience which will not be challenged” by the task of 
integrating internality and externality (Playing 18, 17). He suggests that such a “resting-
place” is located in the “intermediate” or “third area of potential space” retained in 
creative thinking and the arts (Playing 3, 72). The intermediate zone “between inner and 
outer worlds” is therefore directly continuous with the potential space where “intimate 
relationships and creativity occur” (Playing xii, “Transitional” 89).  As Stein’s 
transitional period following Autobiography makes clear, however, the relationship 
between art-making and its reception may itself challenge the artist’s ability to remain 
within a “potential space” of creative exchange. It is only by recalibrating the relationship 
between inner and outer that Stein succeeds in reopening an unthreatened space for 
composition.  
In writing Four in America Stein works to retrain habits of attention she feared 
had lapsed into deadening distraction. But as she learns in the process of composition, 
training attention does not mean tightening her focus or honing her interest to a more 
narrowly selective range. Instead, Stein fosters ever-expanding orbits of attention where 
exploratory probings are not tethered to a preconceived path and apparently aimless 
floating is not opposed to cohesion. Rather than exercising single-minded concentration, 
Stein develops a state of undifferentiated responsiveness that allows attention and 
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distraction to interpenetrate in unexpected ways. She calls this state “open feeling.”9 In 
The Making of Americans Stein defines “open feeling” as “that kind of being that has 
resisting as its natural way of fighting” (296). The guiding question of the James section 
of Four in America—“what if Henry James had been a general?”— returns Stein to her 
earlier insight that openness can constitute resistance and that “feeling” is her primary 
way of “being” in the world. Stein explores this form of resilient openness in explicitly 
military terms in the James section of Four in America.10 In that essay, questions about 
identity and audience are explicitly framed as questions about how to write. The martial 
premise of the essay unexpectedly allows Stein to conceive of the shock of public 
exposure in terms other than assaultive attack and reactive defense. The model of 
attention that Stein formulates in response to her “what if?” thought experiment is 
militant and meditative, protective and permeable. As James exemplifies, the 
commanding general and the tactical writer are both equipped with strategies of 
execution for the art of battle and of composition. But ultimately, all the careful 
preparation for everything “that could happen or not happen” allows them to respond to 
“what happened as it…happened” (WL 291).  
For Stein, “Henry James is a combination of the two ways of writing” that she 
initially held to be opposed (WL 291). She begins the essay on James by privileging 
improvisational spontaneity over deliberately planned composition; by its close, she 
asserts that strategizing and improvising are as welded in James’s work as meditation and 
premeditation are in her own. From those insights she can begin to articulate enabling !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 My understanding of Stein’s “open feeling” is indebted to Sianne Ngai’s reading of The 
Making of Americans in Ugly Feelings (see especially 261, 283). 
10 Stein’s fraught relationship to war has been well documented by critics like Whittier-
Ferguson, Detloff, Malcolm, Olson, Schoenbach, and Will.  
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continuities between the “way she used to write,” the way she is presently writing, and 
the uncertain future of her writing (HWW 66). Looking forward to look back, Stein 
situates herself in what she describes as the “continuous present,” a temporal order where 
sustaining connections with the past open onto future horizons of possibility (WL 25). 
When the present moment of writing is framed in this way, newness, suddenness, and the 
unexpected can be felt, in Stein’s own words, as “a shock of surprise” that displaces 
ennui with generative excitement (FA xi).  
When Stein names James as her “forerunner,” he appears not so much her 
“harbinger” as her “guide” (to recall a less frequently used definition of the term) (ABT 
78, OED). As her forerunner, James guides Stein back to an Emersonian conduct of life 
and composition understood as “a series of surprises.” Here we might recall that the 
etymological roots of both “surprise” and “forerunner” are themselves military. In its 
original use, “forerunner” referred to an advance-guard that cleared the way for the army 
approaching the battlefield, while surprise meant being suddenly seized or overtaken by 
an unanticipated military attack (OED). Stein’s unrelenting commitment to tracing the 
derivation of each word she uses and exploring every possible context in which it might 
appear may provide one reason why she continually returns to the unsettling analogy 
between writing and war.11 Her breezy refrain that “War is a surprise” can be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 To cite just two examples, Stein characterizes her lengthy struggle to be published as 
full of lively conflict that fuels her writing with interest: “wars are interesting because 
there is a back and forth every minute in a war” (FA 50). By contrast, the lulling “peace 
time” of success produced in her “a monotone and something of a moan” (HWW 63). 
Here she speaks to the experience of oscillating between stultifying stasis and 
directionless anxiety, utterly devoid of the combative momentum that drove the 
remarkably productive years she wrote without recognition. In Everybody’s 
Autobiography Stein frames the project of Four in America in these terms: “That is what 
war is and dancing it is forward and back, when one is out walking one wants not to go 
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disconcerting in its apparently offhand embrace of militancy (FA 51, 60). At the same 
time, the comparison between composition and battle allows her to reconnect the key 
word and event of surprise with its original usage. 
The task for Stein, as for James, is to hold open a field of attention where martial 
discipline goes hand-in-hand with adaptive improvisation. Only with such a supple yet 
robust creative infrastructure in place can she answer the Emersonian call for singular 
voices that speak to the immediacy of “an everlasting Now” (Society 167). Stein responds 
by “beginning again and again” with each new sentence (WL 27).12 Like James before 
her, she prepares herself to be surprised by the unknown future of her writing and its 
place in literary history. By establishing the place of Stein’s work in a longer line of 
Emersonian surprise, I suggest an alternative to the “genealogy of modern attention” that 
diagnoses a twentieth century malady of distraction. In Suspensions of Perception, 
Jonathan Crary contextualizes the contention of Benjamin, Simmel, Kracauer, and others 
that “perception is fundamentally characterized by experiences of fragmentation, shock, 
and dispersal” (1). As Crary shows, “the specifically modern problem of attention” 
became a burgeoning site of research and debate following a shift in conceptions of 
vision across a range of disciplines at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Enhanced 
understandings of the sensory apparatus’s complexities were accompanied by a 
destabilized faith in the full presence of perceptual experience as a reliable foundation for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
back the way they came but in dancing and in war it is forward and back. That is what I 
tried to say in Four In America” (EA 109). 
12 In Lectures in America, as I will go on to discuss, Stein returns to the phrases she 
introduces in “Composition as Explanation”: “groping toward a continuous present, a 
using everything a beginning again and again and then everything being alike then 
everything very simply everything was naturally simply different and so I as a 
contemporary was creating everything being alike was creating everything naturally 
being naturally simply different, everything being alike” (WL 27).  
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objective knowledge. Without any guarantees for the immediacy or wholeness of 
subjective vision the idea of attention came to serve as “both a simulation of presence and 
a makeshift, pragmatic substitute in the face of its impossibility” (4). As discussed, 
Benjamin argues that states of distraction and boredom have fallen from an earlier 
capacity for complete concentration. At a time when Stein became acutely aware of the 
contingencies of her own perception, she developed a model of attention that contests 
Benjamin’s binary logic and extends the implications of Crary’s study. Crary traces the 
impact of a perceived “crisis of inattentiveness” across a wide array of psychological and 
philosophical investigations in the second half of the nineteenth century, as well as 
through the explosion of experimentation in European art at that time (14). Stein directs 
us to an equally important burst of literary experimentation, which continued to gather 
momentum on both sides of the Atlantic well into the twentieth century. Where Crary 
tracks wide-ranging attempts to control the precariousness of attention, Stein lays out a 
lineage of writers who aim to facilitate rather than fix its fluctuations. The genealogy she 
draws from Emerson to herself, by way of James, is motivated by the question of how to 
renew one’s attention on a sentence-by-sentence basis. 
The vicissitudes of attention, as this lineage exemplifies, are as dependent on 
fluctuating structures of feeling as they are on the changing structures of vision that Crary 
elucidates. An Emersonian “conduct of life,” the Jamesian sentence, Steinian attention—
all hinge on surprise. As Christopher R. Miller has argued, “surprise exemplifies a crux in 
the vocabulary of affect,” with the same word designating an emotional response and its 
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cause, the feeling and the event (“Wordsworth” 413).13 The doubleness of the word 
surprise reminds us that an emotion can be understood as having an internal and external 
origin, designating both an interior state and an outside force. The dual status of surprise, 
as something that seizes from without and arises from within, brings together these two 
understandings of emotion as a physical overtaking and a psychological reaction. For vast 
the majority of her writing life, Stein embraced just such an integrative experience of 
surprise. 
!!! 
 The model of attention that Stein outlines for Thornton Wilder’s introduction to 
Four in America makes clear that learning to write for both an inside and an outside 
audience requires the ongoing negotiation of a corporal and psychic threshold. To put it 
in Winnicottian terms once again, psychological transition is a matter of “body 
experiences” that are viscerally felt (Playing 136). Stein explains her writing process to 
Wilder in this way:  
Now what we know is formed in our head by thousands of small occasions in the 
daily life….All the thousands of occasions in the daily life go into our head to 
form our ideas about these things. Now if we write, we write; and these things we 
know flow down our arm and come out on the page. The moment before we wrote 
them we did not really know we knew them; if they are in our head in the shape of 
words then that is all wrong and they will come out dead; but if we did not know 
we knew them until the moment of writing, then they come to us with a shock of 
surprise. That is the Moment of Recognition…Now, of course, there is no !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 My understanding of surprise as both an external force and internal state has been 
substantially enriched by Christopher R. Miller’s studies of surprise in the work of 
Wordsworth and Austen. 
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audience at that moment. There is no one whom you are instructing, or fighting, 
or improving, or pleasing, or provoking…At that moment you are totally alone in 
this recognition of what you know. And of that thing which you have written you 
are the first and last audience. (FA xi) 
This passage records the challenge of rendering oneself vulnerably open to “all the 
thousands of occasions in the daily life” without also taking in preconceived “ideas about 
these things.” For Stein, the “quality in a composition that makes it go dead” is automatic 
adherence to conventional lexical and syntactical structures. During the initial period of 
exposure to fame, it seems that the only way she can stave off pressures towards 
compositional conformity is to partition an interiorized and solitary “moment of writing” 
from “daily life.” In asserting this impermeable divide, Stein leaves very little room for 
indistinction or exchange between the quotidian activities of living and a cloistered 
practice of writing. However, such a divide conflicts with her commitment to 
composition that partakes of its ambient surroundings.   
For the better part of her career, Stein remained committed to “feel[ing] writing” 
in both the sensorial and the affective sense of the word (“Pictures” 243).14 The “physical 
something” of writing demands the suspension of cognitive knowing in corporeal 
immediacy. A palpable form of knowledge, which has not yet taken the shape of words, 
viscerally “flows down our arm on the page” (N 56). As Stein contends in an earlier 
series of language studies, “whenever words come before the mind there is a mistake. 
This makes instant grammar…” (HTW 66). It is only when we hold “what we know” in 
non-linguistic formlessness that we experience a “shock of surprise” at what has just !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




passed into language for the first time. In Stein’s formulation, shock is a modifiable 
rather than monolithic entity. Her partitive construction—a shock of— holds open the 
possibility that a sudden event can be variously experienced. However, at a time when 
Stein felt compelled to favor self-sufficiency over the dueling imperative of relationality, 
she posited a closed model of composition where those shocks of surprise must be 
internally rather than externally generated. To write, as Stein defines it in the passage 
quoted above, is to attend to interior bodily fluctuations to the exclusion of all exterior 
sources of stimulation or recognition. But this strict separation between internal and 
external space works on the ultimately untenable assumption that the body can be isolated 
from its environment. In fact, she devotes the lion’s share of her career to demonstrating 
the body’s coextension with its surroundings. 
It is only when “outside” demands loom large that Stein retreats inward, insisting 
that she is “the first and last audience” of what she writes (FA xi). In this newly exclusive 
economy of attention, recognition moves in a self-contained circuit between her writing 
self and reading self, which coincide as both agent and recipient of surprise.15 Only 
permitting unexpected encounters with herself, Stein makes moot the question of whether 
her surprise will be shared by others. Even when “the thing which you have written is 
bought by other people and read by them,” she suggests that the common ground 
available for meaningful exchange is severely limited by the fact that “the things they 
know have been built up by thousands of small occasions which are different from yours” 
(FA xii). If one insists on shared experience as the only grounds for mutual !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Stein’s suggestion that she is simultaneously writer and reader of her own work recalls 
the rhetoric of James’s prefaces to the New York Edition of his work, as I discussed in 
the previous chapter. But where James elides the difficulties in collapsing these two roles, 
Stein enacts her struggle to do so. 
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understanding, as Stein does here, writing for others becomes a futile and detrimental 
exercise. Stein will eventually find her way out of this quandary by arguing that 
“understanding” is a matter of enjoyment, but before she has recalibrated the balance 
between internal and external, she remains wary of disruptive intrusions (WL 282). In 
order to cloister herself from those perceived threats, Stein amends her earlier dictum—
“you will write for yourself and strangers”—and aims to do away with strangers all 
together (Making of Americans 485). 
Stein’s efforts to unilaterally separate inner and outer life, self and other, became 
impossible to sustain as she imaginatively tried to render a whole nation of strangers less 
dauntingly strange. At the same time that she claimed to seek and receive only the 
recognition she afforded herself, Stein also finally committed to a seven-month lecture 
tour of the United States that she had refused up to this point. Her assertion that she is her 
own “first and last audience” coexists uneasily with a desire to bring her work to a 
broader general audience.  After first resisting public promotion and asserting the 
impossibility of conveying the “feeling” of writing through the lecture format, what 
finally compels Stein to undertake a long series of appearances and addresses in 
America? How can we account for Stein’s simultaneous disavowal and solicitation of an 
audience beyond herself? 
As I’ve suggested, a common critical response to such questions is that Stein 
chooses “audience writing” over “real writing,” letting creative solitude give way to ego-
driven solipsism. What is at stake is a perceived problem of attention. Publicity and 
personality-oriented distractions are blamed for overtaking Stein’s vital concentration on 
the present. Stein’s model of attention may appear to have undergone a radical shift 
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between Stanzas in Meditation and Lectures in America. In fact, it was only at a time 
when she felt uncharacteristically compelled to fix her otherwise mobile conceptions of 
time and consciousness that Stein began to idealize an internalized present moment of 
writing, unmoved by external forces or inexorable duration. Her attention was not 
permanently diverted by distractions, but only temporarily compromised by her impulse 
to narrow her focus to a point that foreclosed unexpected encounters with anyone or 
anything beyond herself. When Stein turned to face her audience in Four in America and 
Lectures in America she once again expanded her briefly contracted field of attention to 
accommodate a much wider and more unpredictable horizon—one that stretches forward 
into an undefined future and back into a revisable past. Stein’s renewed commitment to 
“open feeling” during this charged period of transition is also a commitment to dwelling 
in the overwhelming uncertainty of an open-ended universe. Such a universe demands 
precarious exposure to continuous novelty. By tracing the contracting and expanding, 
prospective and retrospective turns of attention in the largely overlooked work Stein 
wrote in the months following Autobiography, it becomes possible to establish critical 
continuities between her early and late style. This writing is thus retrievable from a 
straightforward narrative of identity crisis that reduces Stein’s later writing to a 
compromised product of her reduced capacity for concentrated composition. 
In Autobiography, Stein repeats the famous dictum she introduced in The Making 
of Americans, “I write for myself and strangers,” but asks with frustration “how can one 
come into contact with any strangers” without any “adventurous publishers” (ABT 240). 
She was made hopeful, however, when her agent William Bradley reported an immersive 
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experience of reading the manuscript that matched the absorbing enthusiasm she 
experienced in writing it: 
I was instantly fascinated and went on reading, turning page after page 
automatically, not knowing that I turned them, so completely absorbed had I 
become in your story…. I had forgotten time, forgotten my lunch, forgotten a 
dozen things I had meant to do that day, so entirely had I been caught by the spell 
of your words. (HWW 62) 
Before publishing Autobiography, Stein optimistically anticipated that the same seamless 
transference of interested attention from writer to reader would likewise characterize the 
wider reception of her book:  
It can easily be realized that after these years of faith that there is and was a public 
and that somtime [sic] I would come in contact with that public, as I said in The 
Making of Americans which I wrote twenty-seven years ago, I write for myself 
and strangers, after these years to know that I have public…leaves me 
unburdened. And the readers of the autobiography will not only read the 
autobiography but they will read and see everything that has made the 
autobiography. And so all this which has pleased and contented me will please 
and content them. (HWW 62) 
Stein imagines “contact” with her public to take the form of direct, unimpeded 
transmission. She anticipates that the gratifying experience she had in making 
Autobiography will translate into an equally satisfying reading experience. Indeed, 
Autobiography’s mass popularity suggests that a great many readers took as much 
pleasure in consuming the book as she did in producing it. And yet, having elicited the 
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general audience she had long desired, Stein found herself unable to rest easily in the 
pleasurable contentment she predicted. The feeling of anonymous rather than direct 
contact had the unanticipated and unsettling effect of alienating Stein from her 
audience—and also from her own writing. 
The wide acclaim Stein received for Autobiography was accompanied by 
immediate requests for a sequel and a promotional tour. Her correspondence between 
1933 and 1934 expresses deep discomfort with her new public persona. In response to her 
publisher’s urgings for more immediately accessible work in the style of Autobiography, 
Stein worried that another book in the same mode would only contribute to a shallow 
form of celebrity without bringing the full depth and breadth of her oeuvre to a new 
readership. Likewise, she initially refused multiple requests for a lecture circuit in 
America, for fear it would be construed as a substanceless publicity tour that 
disseminated her personality rather than her body of work. Nevertheless, in the spring of 
1933 Stein began a series of short reflections on the writing and aftermath of 
Autobiography—what she referred to as her “confessions”—with the aim of developing 
them into the novel’s follow-up (Language 534). Those eventually aborted efforts were 
intended to fulfill an agreement that Harcourt would reprint Three Lives and The Making 
of Americans in exchange for publishing rights to a sequel to Autobiography (Language 
573). The arrangement initially seemed to serve both parties with Harcourt anticipating 
another bestseller and Stein hoping that her commercial success would bring the rest of 
her work to a new audience. 
Those unfinished fragments of the never-realized “confessions” record Stein’s 
labored efforts to tap the vivacious fluency she so easily channeled through the narrative 
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voice of Toklas. In the first of these compositions, written in April of 1933 and later 
published as “The Story of a Book,” Stein describes the idyllic scene of writing 
Autobiography in the country house that she and Toklas rented every summer from 1929 
forward, located in the French hamlet of Bilignin:  
Every day during those beautiful six weeks of unusually dry and sunny days, in 
the morning and in the afternoon, I sat and on a little double decked table as near 
the sunny wall as I could get I wrote about five hours a day…and in six weeks the 
autobiography was done. (HWW 61) 
The uninterrupted ease with which the book came into being stands in stark contrast with 
the subsequent blockage she experienced when it found a wider public than she could 
have ever anticipated.  
At a time when strangers were still entirely uninterested in the fact that Stein 
wrote for them, she developed a narrative voice in Autobiography that allowed her to 
address herself as her own best reader. Writing as Toklas in the first person about herself 
in the third person, Stein could generate and receive recognition in a single narrative 
gesture. But in assuming Toklas’s persona to examine her own work, Autobiography also 
teaches Toklas (her next best reader) how she wants to be read. From this vantage, an 
interested “stranger” could likewise benefit from those lessons. Stein creates a circuit of 
recognition that at first appears closed, but she holds open a place for a potential reader 
who will be in the same position to receive the Toklas-narrator’s direct address. In this 
way, Stein invites her audience to share in an apparently intimate exchange between 
Toklas and herself. Alongside immediate intimacy, Autobiography achieves the 
immediate newness of narrative innovation in a hybrid form that combines third-person 
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autobiography with first-person biography. “Making it the Autobiography of Alice B. 
Toklas made it do something,” Stein later recalls, “it made it be a recognition by never 
before that writing having it be existing” (N 62). The original novelty of that voice is a 
primary reason she was unable to fulfill demands for a sequel. Stein could no more 
replicate its fresh innovation than she could unilaterally shut out the new people and 
experiences that the book brought into her life. After Autobiography, invention and daily 
routine must take new forms but Stein had not yet established what those might be. 
Stein voices her sense of alienation from an impersonal “general public,” but far 
more disorienting is the estrangement she feels from her “inside audience”—the only 
audience (save Toklas and close friends) for whom she had hitherto written. As Stein 
“began to think about how [her] writing would sound to others, how [she] could make 
them understand,” she interrupts a formerly self-sufficient loop of affirmation between 
her own voice and ear: 
When the success began and it was a success I got completely lost. You know the 
nursery rhyme, I am I because my little dog knows me. Well you see I did not 
know myself, I lost my personality. It has always been completely included in 
myself my personality as any personality naturally is, and here all of a sudden, I 
was not just I because so many people did know me. It was just the opposite of I 
am because my little dog knows me. With so many people knowing me I was I no 
longer and for the first time since I had begun to write I could not write. (HWW 
63) 
In this passage from “And Now”—an early attempt at giving an account of “what 
happened from the day [she] wrote the autobiography”—Stein’s famous “I am I because 
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my little dog knows me” formulation serves as a straightforward narrative of identity 
crisis and its resolution (HWW 63).16 With the proliferation of “so many people knowing 
[her],” she does not know herself. Stein’s despair at the dispersal of an “I” that had, as 
she says, “always lived within myself and my writing” frames identity as something 
internal and intrinsic, which must be protected under peril of loss.  
 In this iteration, the “I am I” of Stein’s “little dog” formulation hinges on the 
causal logic of “because.” Identity becomes dependent on the confirmation of an outside 
agent—her dog, her audience, her public. However, if we trace Stein’s identity motto 
back to its first pronouncement in 1929, and forward to its reiteration in the “Henry 
James” essay of 1934, we find that both those articulations nullify a false choice between 
public and private registers of selfhood, as well as between inner- and outer-oriented 
attention.17 Recontextualized in relation to these earlier and later iterations, the 
dichotomous thinking that informs the “I am just the opposite” version from “And Now” 
appears as a temporary departure from Stein’s otherwise abiding commitment to a much 
more nuanced calculus of compositional identity. 
In contrast to the rigid dualisms of “And Now’s” identity thinking, Stein’s first “I 
am I” formulation turned on an interrogative “what…if…then” construction. As she asks 
in her grammar study “Saving the Sentence,” “What is a sentence for if I am I then my 
little dog knows me” (HTW 19). In this phrasing, the nature of identity and language are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 “And Now” was first published in Vanity Fair in September of 1934. Excerpts were 
later incorporated into Everybody’s Autobiography (1936), the sequel Stein finally writes 
four years after the first Autobiography. 
17 Further variations on Stein’s “I am I” will reappear in her lectures, but also as a 
recurring motto in her examinations of “the relation of human nature and the human mind 
and identity” in Everybody’s Autobiography and The Geographical History of America 
(1936), as well as in “Identity a Poem” (1935), which is comprised of fragments from the 
latter work.  
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actively queried rather than asserted. Stein works towards a processual grammar of the 
self and the sentence that resists predetermined forms of expression. What she is 
“gradually com[ing] to find out” in her language experimentation is that “one has no 
identity that is when one is in the act of doing anything” (WL 146). If language use is 
itself an “act of doing” as Stein’s grammar studies demonstrate, then any stable 
foundations of selfhood evaporate in the present moment of composing. Accordingly, 
when Stein opens another grammar study with the assertion “I am a grammarian,” her “I 
am” only exists in the activity of grammar experimentation (HTW 105). Stein’s 
announcement several pages later that “the subject is grammar” acknowledges that her 
status as a subject is wholly constituted by her subject of study; the grammar of the 
sentence determines the grammar of the self (HTW 108).  
Five years later, when Stein rephrases the “I am I” statement of her grammar 
investigations in the opening of “Henry James,” she is trying to return to the way that she 
“used to write” in a very different sense than in “And Now.”18 She returns to the way she 
wrote at a time when her process of composition was saturated by daily existence, with 
no separation between private and public life and writing. In Four in America she 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Stein’s avowal in “And Now” that she had conclusively solved the quandaries of 
identity and audience both underscores and misconstrues the key role that Four in 
America would play in her return to the way she “used to write.” Though she claims there 
and in correspondence with Bradley in the spring of 1933 to be writing a study of Ulysses 
Grant—the piece that would eventually open Four in America—it was not until by 
October 1933 that Stein conceived of the Grant study as a section of a four-part study and 
began to put pen to paper. At the moment Stein insists, “I write the way I used to write,” 
her claim that separating inside and outside represents a return occludes her previous 
commitment to keeping that threshold productively blurred—a commitment she will 
renew in Four in America. Though “she always was, she always is, tormented by the 
problem of the external and the internal,” as Stein puts it in Autobiography, the torment 
of that problem was previously and will once again become the generative source of her 
compositional experimentation (ABT 119).!
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maintains, “I am I not any longer when I see. This sentence is at the bottom of all creative 
activity” (WL 275). In the immediate moment of perception, the distinction between the 
seeing “I” and the thing seen dissolves, and with it, any consolidated sense of self. This 
dissolution of self into the process of perception is not experienced as a threatening 
negation, but as the vital basis of “creative activity.” Stein’s conception of identity is 
“just the exact opposite of I am I because my little dog knows me” insofar as she neither 
defines herself by the recognition afforded by others, nor by protecting an essential core 
self. In Four in America as in How to Write, the compositional “I” and the experiencing 
“I” mutually constitute each other in sentences where the activities of daily living and 
daily writing are deeply entwined (WL 275).  
Those intimate imbrications of living and writing converge on “the little dog” that 
was introduced into Stein’s life and into her sentences during the exceptionally 
innovative and generative period of grammar study and experimentation she sustained 
between 1928 and 1930. Of this work, she writes, “by way of grammar you get rid of 
sight and sound in a very intimate way and it leads to a strange sort of liberation” (Stein 
qtd. in Language 128). Stein’s experimental efforts to integrate her context into her text 
were catalyzed by several new acquisitions that transformed the texture of her everyday 
existence. In February of 1929, Stein and Toklas became the new owners of a standard 
white poodle named Basket. Shortly thereafter, Francis Picabia gave them a Chihuahua 
called Pépé, and the following month they leased the summer cottage in Bilignin, where 
they would spend the warm months of each year.19 Life in Bilignin was patterned by the 
quotidian rhythms of the Rhône Valley landscape and its inhabitants. Whereas urban 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 They had previously summered in the nearby Belley. 
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street life provided a largely non-referential backdrop to Stein’s writing in Paris, the 
sentences she composed in Bilignin register the movements of days, seasons, and 
weather, as well as those of the people and animals that shaped Stein and Toklas’s “home 
in a manoir” (Last Operas 309). In her own summation, she reconceives of “Grammar in 
relation to a tree and two horses” (HTW 111). 
For Stein, “living within [her]self and [her] writing” over these summers meant 
continuously recording her meditations on the ever-changing forms of life around her, 
and on moving forms of language: “A landscape moves as does a paragraph” (Stein qtd. 
in Language 369). 20 During this period of intensive language study, Stein filled a series 
of notebooks or carnets with collections of sentences, which she in turn copied into larger 
cahiers, often reconstructing and rearranging those sample sentences into longer 
sequences that form various grammatical series. These notebooks, excerpted in How to 
Write (1931), read like a commonplace book that draws from the common occurrences of 
her own day-to-day experience rather than on the words or quotations of others. Stein’s 
grammatical investigations of the relationship between language, identity, and feeling 
fused the question of how to write with the question of how to live. At a time when 
composition felt constricted to the point that these core components of her existence 
could no longer coexist, Stein hearkened back to those earlier years of unconstrained yet 
disciplined language study in hopes of recovering the dual sense of focus and freedom 
they afforded her. The grammars of the sentence and the self that Stein introduced in 
those studies form the basis of the model of compositional attention she develops through 
the “Henry James” section of Four in America into her Lectures in America.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 See Richardson’s The Natural History of Pragmatism and Meyer’s Irresistible 
Dictation for discussions of Steinian sentences and paragraphs as organic forms of life.  
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According to Stein, grammar as it is conventionally understood asserts limits on 
what it makes sense to say, not through the imposition of some grand schema from above, 
but by way of unexamined habits of articulation and association that have become rote 
through repetition. Stein makes those habits visible by pushing up against standards of 
correctness and comprehensibility, which she shows are not essential but accrued over 
time through individual acts of expression. She tracks these accumulated grammatical 
conventions through a regular practice of observing, recording, and reflecting upon the 
parts of speech and phrases she encounters in their day-to-day usage. When the 
relationship between words, sentences, and paragraphs is broken down and 
defamiliarized, grammar ceases to be an authoritatively totalizing system and is instead 
recast as a process-based exploration of the limits and possibilities of language use. As 
Stein explains in “How Writing is Written,” she uses “new constructions of grammar” in 
order to “get the sense of immediacy” one feels when “one feels anybody else” (HWW 
155). Such expansive yet always-provisional grammatical constructions represent her 
efforts to usher the “feeling” of words “filled with moving” into ever-new syntactical 
forms (WL 97). In How to Write’s “Arthur A Grammar,” Stein asks, “if you have a 
vocabulary have you any need of grammar except for explanation that is the question” 
(HTW 60). Just by querying the necessity of standard rules of language usage we are 
“returned from grammar” as it is conventionally understood (HTW 60). When the 
exigencies of “communication” and “intuition” direct the movements of words, 
“Grammar may be reconstituted” as “a conditional expanse” where “successions of 
words” are unsettled from accustomed arrangements (HTW 60, 57, 55, 39). Reconceived 
in the pragmatist terms of doing, “Grammar little by little is not a thing,” but an activity 
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(HTW 106). How to Write exemplifies “A grammar in collection”; instead of a dictatory 
set of principles, grammar consists in a “list of what is to be done with it” (HTW 56-57).21  
“Throughout her writing life Gertrude Stein was inventing new grammars for new 
times in which she was living,” the poet-critic Joan Retallack has observed (Stein 75). At 
a moment when she was negotiating a new audience, Wilder describes her “practice of 
meditating” in the shared solitude that she learned from country life with canine 
companionship: “In Bilignin she would sit in her rocking chair facing the valley she has 
described so often holding one or the other of her dogs on her lap” (FA ix). Basket 
appears again and again throughout the sentences Stein composed during her years of 
concentrated grammar study, as the proper name of her pet, but also as a noun, and even a 
verb, when she announces,  “I am doing it is Basketing” (Stein qtd. in Language 364).22 
In the constant presence of dogs, Stein developed a process of writing herself “out in 
relation to something” (WL 289). She thus learned to feel alone while in the company of 
another—whether close or distant, known or anonymous, absent or present.  
The cadences of rocking, walking, and coexisting with dogs provide a habitual 
ground against which “the irruption of the daily life” can come to the fore in Stein’s 
writing. Wilder observes, for example, “if her two dogs are playing at her feet while she 
is writing, she puts them into the text. She may suddenly introduce some phrases she just 
heard over the garden wall” (FA xiv). While this unexpected intrusion might give the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 According to Ulla Dydo, the “quarry of writing” Stein produced at this time not only 
worked “to keep her limber,” but also afforded her portraiture a “new freedom” from 
referentiality in the years that followed (Language 340). 
22 How to Write, for example, is full of statements like the following: “A word which 
makes basket a name. If it is a name will be confuse with whatever with it they make to 
name” (HWW 550). “All these sentences are fruitful. They may be included in 
embroidery. How are they placed. They are in a basket. They have a good deal of softness 
and are very likable. She looks at her knitting” (HWW 136). 
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reader “a bracing shock,” he argues “it refreshes in the writer the sense that the writer is 
all alone, alone with his thoughts and his struggle and even with his relation to the outside 
world that lies about him” (FA xiv-xv). What could be construed as external 
encroachments on a meditative state actually prove vital to its cultivation. Stein’s goal of 
inhabiting immediacy in writing finally cannot be achieved by isolating processes of 
thinking and writing from the everyday rhythms of life. Indeed, her abiding aspiration is 
to have her syntax partake of those rhythms. Retallack defines Stein’s compositional 
practice as “the moving principle, the literal composing of her daily life as attentive 
participant in her contemporary moment” (Poethical Wager 160). In other words, writing 
is Stein’s primary means of heightening and attuning her responsiveness to the time and 
place in which she is living. This active form of engagement with the world involves a 
continual shuttling between inner and outer impressions that endlessly enrich and enliven 
compositional experience. Instead of shutting out the external world, Stein aims to banish 
preconception in thinking and preformulation in expression with the goal of unmediated 
encounters. 
The general equilibrium Stein established during this period came out of her 
investigation of the balance that could be achieved between what she characterized as 
emotional paragraphs and unemotional sentences. Significantly, Stein’s Lectures in 
America credit both her dog and Henry James with the observation that first appeared as 
the opening gambit of How to Write: “a sentence is not emotional a paragraph is” (HTW 
23). “I found this out first in listening to basket my dog drinking,” she says, but then goes 
on to affirm that “Henry James being an American knew best” how to put this insight to 
work in his writing (WL 223). The “new balance” she discovered “had to do with the 
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sense of movement included in a given space…which is definitely the American thing” 
(WL 224). Sentences are not emotional, she explains, because they “are contained within 
themselves and anything really contained within itself has no beginning or middle or 
ending” (N 20). A sentence has an “immediate existing,” while “a succession of these 
sentences were used in paragraphing” (N 20, 18). Emotions, according to this 
formulation, are not felt in the self-contained immediacy of the sentence, but only in the 
successive unfolding of the much more open-ended form of a paragraph that is “filled 
with moving” (WL 97). Feeling, for Stein, is a process that depends on movement over 
time. Her interest in the relationship between emotional paragraphs and unemotional 
sentences is an interest in the “dynamic equilibrium” that might be struck between open 
and closed systems of time and of space—between the immediate moment and duration, 
partiality and wholeness (Retallack, Stein 13).23 The compositional lessons Stein learned 
regarding the relation between sentences and paragraphs, feeling and attention, in the 
solitary company of Basket were relearned in the absent presence of James.24  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 I will go on to elaborate Stein’s discussion of the “moving time of space” in emotional 
paragraphs in the context of her Lectures in America. 
24 The dependable regularity of Stein’s daily encounters with her dogs stands in contrast 
with the series of missed encounters with James that Stein unsuccessfully tried to arrange 
before his death in 1916. Alvin Langdon Coburn, the expatriate photographer responsible 
for the frontispieces of James’s New York Edition, attempted at her request to bring the 
two writers together when she visited London in 1912, but was unable to set up a 
meeting. “It was one of my tragedies that the introductions were not continued,” Stein 
writes of James, “a tragedy I felt for myself as well as for him at the time although I 
never knew him” (Stein qtd. in Davis “Correspondence” 214). While Stein’s connection 
with James himself remained oblique during his lifetime, she established a strong 
connection with his writing as a lifelong reader of his work. She also sent him a copy of 
Three Lives, but it is unclear whether he read it.  
Notably, it was James who stirred Stein to get a dog in the first place. As Toklas 
recalls in What is Remembered, Stein wanted to get a white poodle like the one featured 
in his novel Princess Casamassima (1886) (124-25). We can then understand Stein’s “I 




Stein agreed to return to America at the time she began to draft the project that 
would become Four in America. It is therefore not surprising that the study confronts 
head on the difficult question of how to negotiate personal and cultural identity under 
public scrutiny. The composition of Four in America marks the end of the writer’s block 
that had plagued Stein in the preceding months, but also conveys her growing recognition 
that a protective barrier intended to hold audience expectations at bay proved equally 
deadening to thought and expression. In the process of completing this work, Stein 
moved from defensively dividing inner and outer to confidently asserting that “the 
outside which is outside and the inside which is inside…are not existing” (N 39). As 
Stein will go on to attest in her lecture “Portraits and Repetition,” the “very interesting” 
experience of beginning “to feel the outside inside and the inside outside” goes hand-in-
hand with a new interest “in the relation of a lecturer to his audience,” which Stein had 
finally decided to experience first hand in America (WL 205).25 
In a letter written in September of 1933, Stein explicitly frames the project as a 
confrontation with her apprehensions around audience: 
As Henry James would say and what sensations. I am almost getting the better of 
these strange sensations and it is taking the form of meditations on Shakespeare’s 
sonnets and Before the flowers which will be a treatise that I know will interest 
you. I have just begun it and it will be all about audiences, a very fearful subject !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
In fact, the poodle that Stein refers to does not appear in that novel but in Roderick 
Hudson, as the companion of Christina Light (who will become the princess when she 
marries the duke at the end of the novel). On the significance of this misdirection, see 
Giesenkirchen. 
25 Stein had in fact delivered lectures before this tour, but none matched the scale and 
scope of the series she planned to deliver to American audiences. 
  
149 
and it is taking form. (Stein qtd. in Language 584) 
Stein describes the work as a meditative practice of giving compositional form to 
amorphous feelings. In the process, she begins to recast those “strange sensations” as 
sources of interest as opposed to sites of blockage. Reframed in this way, “a very fearful 
subject” provides a generative place “to begin again and again…and perhaps again to 
begin again,” rather than holding Stein at a stymied standstill (WL 287).  
The “meditations on Shakespeare’s sonnets and Before the flowers” that Stein 
refers to in her letter became the occasion for her essay on James.26 In James, Stein finds 
a fellow American abroad who similarly struggled with ambivalent feelings around 
literary celebrity and America. Both writers came to a point in their career where they 
were forced to consider how their expatriatism and their reputation of difficulty had the 
potential to alienate American audiences. Likewise, each somewhat reluctantly came to 
admit their vested interest in the public opinion of their home country and the massive 
market to be tapped there. Ultimately, James and Stein took advantage of the publicity 
generated around the prospect of their return journeys in order to assert their place in a 
literary tradition where they feared they would be defined by a single work or a one-
dimensional personality.27 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Before the Flowers of Friendship Faded Friendship Faded (1931) is Stein’s very loose 
and eccentric “translation” of Georges Hugnet’s poem “Enfance.” 
27 While James had enjoyed success beyond a single work, he was still best known for his 
early novella Daisy Miller (1878). His later, much denser, novels of consciousness had 
failed to find a wide audience.  
The introduction to Heather O’Donnell’s unpublished dissertation, “The Natives 
Return: Henry James and Gertrude Stein in America” (Yale U, 2003), helpfully lays out 
the parallels between their return journeys. A section of that work is published in “‘My 
Own Funny Little Lecture Boom’: Henry James’s American Performance.”   
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The question of what it means to be a “representative American” co-exists for 
Stein with the question of how to represent such a figure. Four in America is comprised 
of unconventional portraits of famous Americans premised on a set of “what if” thought 
experiments. Instead of treating the figures historically, Stein explores the relationship 
between identity, genius, nationhood, and fame by posing a rhetorical question: what 
difference would it make if her four subjects had exchanged their military, political, 
religious, and creative pursuits for an entirely different public persona.28 In a letter to 
Sherwood Anderson written in April of 1934, Stein singles out James in particular as an 
ideal proxy for examining her status as a cultural figure in the American literary field. 
What distinguishes the piece on James from those on Grant, the Wright brothers, and 
Washington is her move from a more abstracted and generalized exploration of identity 
toward an intimate identification with her subject: 
I am and have been very full of meditations about direct and indirect vision, and 
the relation between the writer and an audience either actual or not actual, I have 
just been writing about four Americans and one of them Henry James has cleared 
up a lot of things for me that is in trying to put him down. (Anderson, 
Correspondence 85) 
 James “cleared up a lot of things” that had gotten in the way of Stein’s capacity to feel 
“full of meditations.” As Stein considers how James learned to live and write in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Stein introduces her “exciting stor[ies] of what did not happen but might have” with the 
following questions:  
If Ulysses S. Grant had been a religious leader who was to become a saint what would 
he have done. 
If the Wright brothers had been artists that is painters what would they have done. 
If Henry James had been a general what would he have had to do. 




public eye, she is spurred “to write in the way [she] used to write.” She proceeds not by 
excluding outside influences and audiences, but by considering how her experience of the 
here-and-now is both singular and integral with a long-view of the compositional 
trajectory that brings her back to James. Turning to James, Stein is also returning to the 
writer who provided her with an initial impetus to write and with the literary model for 
her first novella.29    
When Stein presented Four in America to Harcourt in place of a sequel to 
Autobiography, the work was rejected in May of 1934 on the basis that it was not in the 
“open and public” style of Autobiography and left the publishers “a great deal puzzled” 
(letter from Donald Brace to Bradley qtd. in Language 601). As a result, the book was 
only posthumously published in 1947. Many of the readers who have approached this text 
since have likewise puzzled over its hermetic recalcitrance to understanding. When it is 
discussed at all in critical narratives of Stein’s career, Four in America is generally 
framed as a successful working through of her confused ambivalence around audience 
and identity, which made way for the intelligibility and authority of the public voice she 
found on tour.30 However, the book cannot be reduced to a steppingstone in Stein’s 
progress from confusion to clarity. Much is missed if Four in America is taken to be an 
incoherent first-draft of ideas that only later became lucid in lecture form. Rather, this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Q.E.D. was completed in October of 1903 (but only published posthumously in 1950), 
the year after the release of The Wings of the Dove. Beyond quoting Kate Croy directly, 
Stein’s first novella also draws on James’s triangular structure of character relations and 
its depiction of those characters’ consciousnesses. Stein’s title could also conceivably be 
a nod to a quote from Roderick Hudson, James’s first novel to depict the love triangle that 
would recur throughout his oeuvre: “‘Quod erat demonstradum!’ cried Rowland. ‘I think 
you know the Latin’” (470). See Giesenkirchen for a fuller account of the novella’s 
indebtedness to Henry James.   
30 In Dydo’s summation, these studies present “a great welter of confusing ideas” and can 
be read as “preparations for the clarity she reaches in the lectures” (Language 616-17). 
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work records Stein’s renewed commitment to unsettling certainties and dwelling in 
bewilderment. As she concludes in the section of the work devoted to James, “clarity is of 
no importance because nobody listens and nobody knows what you mean, nor how 
clearly you mean what you mean. But if you have vitality enough of knowing enough of 
what you mean…sometimes a great many will have to realize that you know what you 
mean….which is as near as anybody can come to understanding any one” (WL 282). 
When a desire for “clarity” is displaced by the force of “vitality”—or what she will 
describe in her lectures as “liveliness” and “excitement”— “understanding and enjoying” 
come to mean “the same thing” (WL 282).31 Writing and reading therefore become a 
matter of taking pleasure in sentences that afford no guarantees or guidance. Accordingly, 
Four in America’s “what if x were y” approach to its subjects refuses to grant any 
grounding assumptions in its examination of the relationship between identity, writing, 
and audience. 
The “what ifs” that circulate around “James the General” are particularly charged 
since every hypothetical proposition turns Stein back on herself. In James she found a 
powerful example of “puzzling” writing that could still be embraced in all its bewildering 
complexity. When the editor of Atlantic Monthly rejected her first submission on the 
basis that it would pose “a picture puzzle to our reader,” she responded by pointing to this 
shared quality: “My stuff has genuine literary quality, frankly let us say the only 
important literature that has come out of America since Henry James. After all Henry 
James was a picture puzzle but the Atlantic did not hesitate” (Stein qtd. in Gallup 111). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 In “Portraits and Repetition,” she reiterates, “the American thing is the vitality of 
movement…And if this vitality is lively enough is there in that clarity any confusion is 
there in that clarity any repetition. I myself do not think so. But I am inclined to believe 
that there is really no difference between clarity and confusion” (WL 103).  
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The perplexing difficulty of these writers can be attributed to the “disorienting democracy 
of attention” they afford to multiple registers of experience that we are not used to 
encountering at the same time, or in the same sentence (Goble 127). What may be 
dismissed as obfuscating ambiguity in Stein’s piece on James in fact represents her 
refusal to abstract her writing from its situational and relational specificity. To privilege 
perspicuity over perplexity would be to sacrifice this experiential richness. 
From Stein’s first foray into writing with the novella Q.E.D. in 1903—a work that 
pays homage to the style and subject of The Wings of the Dove—James remains a 
formative figure that she returns to at pivotal moments over the course of her career. In 
the unmooring storm of publicity, Stein turned back to her fellow expatriate to find her 
bearings and reorient herself towards the indeterminate future of her writing. To recall the 
Winnicottian paradigm of transition, James opens an intermediate or transitional space 
where Stein can establish a simultaneous sense of separateness and relatedness—with her 
American audience but also with other American writers. Throughout the piece, Stein 
identifies herself with James at the same time she defines herself against him, asserting 
their similarity and difference in the same gesture: 
A narrative of Henry James told by some one else telling about some one entirely 
different from Henry James…she was an entirely a different kind of human being 
from Henry James entirely a different kind of human being and one who had led 
and did lead an entirely different kind of life. She lived alone and in the country 
and so did Henry James. She was heavy set and seductive and so was Henry 
James. She was slow in movement and light in speech and could change her 
speech without changing her words so that at one time her speech was delicate 
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and witty and at another time slow and troubling and so was that of Henry James. 
She was not at all at all at all resembling to Henry James and never heard of him 
and was of another nationality and lived in another country… 
 This one the one telling the story had always admired Henry James. 
So there you are. That is the connection. (WL 308-9) 
“The connection” between James and Stein is mediated by the teller of “a narrative” that 
is both about and not about James—an unidentified third who somehow seems to partake 
of both of them and neither of them.32 In this passage, writing herself “out in relation to 
something” means rendering indistinguishable the dynamics of identification and 
disidentification (WL 289). 
The essay proceeds by laying out a series of agonistic dualisms, only to show how 
they collapse in on themselves in each case. As the title of the opening section 
immediately signals, seemingly antithetical pairings in fact form “DUETS,” compositions 
for two voices that require the collaboration of both parts to make a relational whole. 
Stein opens with the two questions that prompted her to posit “two ways of writing” in 
the first place: “What is the difference between Shakespeare’s plays and Shakespeare’s 
sonnets” and “What is the difference between accident and coincidence” (WL 274). Even 
before Stein has named her subject, she has displaced readerly expectations as well as 
James himself by devoting the first ten pages not to the titular expatriate but to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Eric Haralson identifies this third as an amalgam of Toklas (who had likewise “always 
admired Henry James”) and Madame Godet, Stein’s rich neighbor in Belley who “might 
have killed…another woman” (an Englishwoman with whom Godet kept house) 
(FA 155). Stein hints at a possible murder motive—a jealous love triangle—and assigns 
the pseudonym of “Madame Steiner” to the third woman involved (EA 83, Haralson 243). 
Like Henry James, Madame Godet inspired Stein to write: “every time I want to write I 
want to write about what happened to her” (EA 85).  
  
155 
Shakespeare, the only person “who has done anything to develop the English language,” 
according to Stein, “except [her]self, and Henry James perhaps a little” (Stein qtd. in 
McAlmon 228). 
Stein first “found out the difference” between Shakespeare’s “smooth feeling” 
sonnets, and the more uneven and “lively” texture of his plays “by accident,” which is 
“when a thing happens” purely by chance (WL 274). However, it is by “coincidence,” 
which introduces a degree of predetermination around “when a thing is going to happen 
and does,” that Stein “made [her] discovery” while she was writing Before the Flowers of 
Friendship Faded Friendship Faded (WL 274, 276). Just as Stein blurs “the difference” 
between an accidental and coincidental discovery, she will go on to merge the two ways 
of writing she initially differentiates on the basis of whether the writer knows or doesn’t 
know what is going to be written when she sits before the page. But before Stein can 
demonstrate the inadequacy of those oppositional pairs as explanatory categories, she 
first asks what difference it would make if such decisive distinctions could in fact be 
established.  
Throughout “Henry James,” Stein distinguishes spontaneity from premeditation 
only to show how those apparently irreconcilable positions productively interpenetrate 
one another. As she first establishes, the knowing writer is guided by a preformed sense 
of what she will write, as well as whom she is writing for; the present process of writing 
thus incorporates a sense of prior conception and of anticipated reception. By contrast, 
the unknowing writer resides in a present uninflected by the past or future; she is entirely 
engaged in the immediate act of writing. Distinguishing “writing the way you are 
writing” from “the way you are going to be writing,” Stein posits that Shakespeare’s 
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sonnets are planned in advance, while the plays more readily and spontaneously express 
unmediated feeling (WL 276). Stein’s stated goal of “feeling writing” in the “continuous 
present” would seem to privilege this latter model of writing without knowing. While she 
holds continual renewal from one instant to the next as the ideal state of attention, when 
Stein brings the paradigm to bear on James’s writing and her own, it becomes 
increasingly clear that the two ways of writing constitute dual facets of the same practice. 
In refusing either to accept definitive answers or to offer clear-cut distinctions, Stein 
trains herself and her willing readers to loosen the tight trusses of categorical thinking 
and make room for undecidability.  
In the process of querying the difference between these “two ways of writing,” 
Stein also enacts the process of writing “both ways” at once (WL 276, 287). In one sense, 
she finds her voice and form as she goes, refusing a preconceived stance towards her 
subject. She proceeds haltingly, often bafflingly, without suppressing any of the 
hesitations, inconsistencies, or incongruous associative paths that arise along the way. 
Where we might expect to see Stein marshalling final conclusions, we find her groping to 
assemble and reassemble propositions. Importantly, the “perpetually provisional” mode 
she shares with James’s “restless analyst” of The American Scene does not preclude 
thorough preparation (CTW 689). Stein’s correspondence and “Confessions” following 
Autobiography reveal that she had been planning this project for many months. Further, 
she has been in preparation for years to the extent that she was already drawing analogies 
between marshalling words into sentences and marshalling troops into battle in How to 
Write, where she asserts that “a grammar is fought” with “the weapons of precision” and 
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“positions of the troops” (HTW 59, 72).33 Winning the battle of composition requires 
intimate acquaintance with the contours of landscapes and sentences: “Battles become 
hills. Hills a grammar” (HTW 89). In those language studies Stein discovers that 
“premeditation” is not opposed to meditative writing, since premeditated composition is 
simply “meditated before meditation” (HTW 32). Both “prepared unpreparedness” and 
“premeditated meditation” are open to “surprise attacks,” which are not warded off but 
embraced as a source of “start startle startled abundance” (HTW 32, 60, 55). Stein 
combines painstaking preparation and radical openness in her approach to Four in 
America, which emerges as a product of both knowing and not knowing what she is 
going to write and how she is going to write it. 
Stein’s investigation of two ways of writing is charged by the pressing “question 
of audience” (WL 277). She frames her examination of the writer-reader relation as a 
pedagogic scene where she alternately assumes the role of teacher and student in a call-
and-response between voices of authoritative command and hesitating uncertainty: 
What is an audience. 
 Everybody listen. 
That is not an audience because will everybody listen. Is it an audience because 
will anybody listen. 
When you are writing who hears what you are writing.  
That is the question. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 In Autobiography Stein indicates that the general analogy is also applicable to her: “I 
[Toklas] often teased her [Stein], calling her a general, a civilian was a general of either 
of both sides” (ABT 19); “Gertrude Stein’s elder brother once said of me [Toklas], if I 
were a general I would never lose a battle, I would only mislay it” (ABT 108). For more 




Do you know who hears what you are writing and how does that affect you or 
does it affect you. 
That is another question. 
If when you are writing you are writing what some one has written without 
writing does that make a difference. 
Is that another question.  
Are there, is there many another question. Is there. 
On the one hand if you who are writing know what you are writing, does that 
change you or does it not change you. 
That might be an important question. 
If you who are writing know what it is that is coming in writing,  
does that make you make you keep on writing or does it not… 
Perhaps yes perhaps no. 
There are so many ways of writing and yet after all there are perhaps only two 
ways of writing.   
 Perhaps so. 
 Perhaps no. 
Perhaps so.  (WL 276-77) 
The litany of questions is punctuated by repeated exhortations that move between 
didactic demands (“everybody listen”) and beseeching entreaties (“will anybody listen”). 
While this tortuous line of inquiry may read somewhat haphazardly, it is guided by the 
pragmatic criteria with which she weighs the value of each query and proposition: what 
difference does it make to one’s experience? Stein returns to this refrain again and again, 
  
159 
but instead of conclusively determining “what does or does not make any difference,” she 
observes how a consideration of the question “affects” and “changes” her (WL 309). In 
the excerpt above, as in the essay as a whole, Stein’s tone is impossible to pin down as it 
ranges from frustration to self-satisfaction, edginess to playfulness, diffidence to 
confidence.  
In Autobiography’s immediate aftermath, Stein is compelled to defend herself 
against unknown forces that threaten to breach the fortifications of her compositional 
consciousness. But as she is reminded in reading James, it is insufficient for either the 
writer or the general simply to patrol with redoubled vigilance the border between inside 
and outside. James’s successful command of the art of writing depends on his capacity to 
deliberately plan and creatively improvise in the face of unexpected exigencies: “Henry 
James is a combination of the two ways of writing and that does make him a general and 
a general who does something” (WL 291). Though James is thoroughly “prepared” for 
“winning a battle and a war,” he can also throw cautious “preparation” to the wind (WL 
293). Having “no one care for plans” and “no wishes” for an outcome determined in 
advance, he simultaneously “controls something” and “controls nothing” (WL 287, 294). 
For Stein, James embodies the impulse towards “settlement in place” even as he “could 
adventure to wander way from being a general” (WL 297). She suggests that the roles we 
find ourselves playing—writer, military leader, celebrity—are as impermanent as the 
moods we pass through from one minute to the next (WL 294, 298, 297).  
Stein’s “Henry James” merges pragmatism’s emphasis on the practical 
consequences of doing with an Emersonian attention to the transience and impersonality 
of moods. Emerson’s understanding of experience as endless experimentation urges a 
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course of conduct that responds to life lived in “the instant field of the present” refracted 
through “a train of moods like a string of beads” (WII 1175, EL 473). Stein identifies 
Henry James as “a general who does something” but her recognition, following Emerson, 
that “we do not guess to-day the mood, the pleasure, the power of to-morrow,” detaches 
action from foreknowledge: “what did Henry James do, neither he nor I knew” (WL 291, 
292). The goal of William James’s pragmatic method is “to attain perfect clearness in our 
thoughts of an object” by considering “what conceivable effects of a practical kind the 
object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we 
must prepare” (WII 506-7). However, if “our moods do not believe in each other,” as this 
essay suggests with its unpredictable turns of sentiment and syntax, writing that tracks a 
“succession of moods” must necessarily wander in bewilderment instead of pursuing 
linear clarity (EL 406, 476). Stein’s writing, like Emerson’s before her, stages a central 
tension between the desire for settled security and the reality of interminable 
unsettlement. “People wish to be settled,” Emerson acknowledges, but it is “only as far as 
they are unsettled there is any hope for them” (EL 413). Stein recognizes this sense of 
groundlessness to be the condition of writing unmoored from complacent habits of 
perception and expression. But even as she maintains that neither life nor writing may “be 
seated to settle in place,” Stein expresses the longing to feel comfortably at home in 
language and in the world with a question left unanswered at the end of the essay: “what 
is to be settled in place of settling” (WL 297). 
As Stein writes in Four in America, Henry James embodies “a poetic American 
thing there might have been” (WL 301). Her use of “might” loosens the otherwise closed 
fixity of “have been” and holds open the as-yet unknown potential of a “new continent” 
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that is also “not new,” insofar as it is “always beginning” (WL 300, 301). Stein frames the 
nation and its representatives in the terms of open-ended contingency. When she returns 
to James in her lectures, she identifies the “poetic American thing” as “a space of time 
that is filled with moving,” which differentiates a new phase of twentieth-century writing 
from nineteenth-century British literary forms (WL 97). According to Stein, James ushers 
in this spatio-temporal order with paragraphs that “had a future feeling,” whereas 
everyone who came before “had the feeling of an ending” (WL 55). This “future feeling” 
points towards the uncharted path of a nation still in the making. 
!!! 
In her first major lecture, “Composition as Explanation” (delivered to the 
Cambridge Literary Club in 1926), Stein maintains that writing should be about nothing 
other than “the time of the composition and the time in the composition” (WL 27). Even 
as she “gropes towards a continuous present, a using everything a beginning again and 
again,” Stein acknowledges the inevitability of imposing a recursive understanding of the 
“prolonged present” she seeks: “Composition is not there, it is going to be there and we 
are here. This is some time ago for us… Naturally one does not know how it happened 
until it is well over beginning happening” (WL 27, 25, 24). Stein projects a future vantage 
point (“it is going to be”) from where she might reflect back on the here-and-now of 
writing as a recollected past. It is only after it is “well over beginning happening” that she 
can recognize and “formulate [what] has been made.” In this way, Stein represents an 
immediacy of feeling that paradoxically unfolds over time, incorporating as opposed to 
eliminating an anticipated future and remembered past. Four in America’s contingent 
time of composition likewise folds the past and future into the present by looking back to 
her grammatical experimentation while anticipating her lectures to come.  
  
162 
In the last chapter, I identified recursive and proleptic turns from past to future 
tense as the idiosyncratic temporality of surprise that characterized James’s late novels, as 
well as the prefaces to the New York Edition of his work. Stein was one of the few 
subscribers to this Edition and those prefaces may have offered her a powerful model for 
reflecting back on a body of work and imagining the future forms it might take. As Stein 
considers her oeuvre within a framework of surprise, she also prepares herself to meet the 
surprise unknown represented by the massive public awaiting her arrival on America’s 
shores in the fall of 1934. In returning to the United States after thirty years abroad, Stein 
follows the path that James laid out three decades earlier when he too planned a lecture 
tour of the States after a long absence.34 Both writers situated themselves as distanced 
rather than immersed observers of their home country, suggesting that it was the 
“improvised European” who could see most clearly what it is to be an American.35 The 
parallels between the expatriates’ return journeys are striking and go far to explain why 
Stein turned to James as an exemplary guide for her transatlantic passage.  
At a pivotal point in a career largely devoted to writing about Americans abroad, 
James sought to recharge his vital interest in a nation that had loomed so large in his 
imaginative landscape over the years, but which had grown somewhat abstract in the 
absence of immediate experience. Having just completed his final full novel, The Golden 
Bowl, James began to contemplate the mammoth project of revising his vast body of 
work for the New York Edition. At this moment of retrospection, he reflected on the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 James embarked upon his tour shortly after Stein moved to Europe. 
35 I borrow the term from Alex Zwerdling. For Stein’s thoughts on her expatriate 
relationship to America, see her Geographical History of America, the Washington 
section of Four in America, and “Thoughts On An American Contemporary Feeling” in 
Creative Art.  
  
163 
place of his largely unread later fiction in the American cultural imagination and in 
literary history more generally. To this end, as he writes to William, he planned “to write 
a book of ‘impressions’ (for much money)” as he traversed the country, eventually 
publishing that record of his tour as The American Scene in 1907 (LWHJ 420). Far from 
grounding his observing narratorial persona in a rooted connection with the homeland, 
this work opens with a flood of maritime images and metaphors resembling those that 
circulated through The Ambassadors. The “repentant absentee” arrives back in New York 
on a “warm wave” that breaks “over the succession of aspects and objects according to 
some odd inward rhythm” (CTW 358). Like Strether, James cultivates a “fluidity of 
appreciation” that allows him to “float” with “a certain recklessness in the largest 
surrender to impressions” (CTW 358, 359).36  
Whereas James figures himself and Strether as vessels floating among sensations 
and impressions, Stein observes an unnamable “something” irreducible to character or 
consciousness that “floated up there” above James’s paragraphs (WL 56). In “What is 
English Literature,” the first of the lectures she presents in America, Stein identifies a 
“disembodied” drift in James’s novels as the essentially “American thing” that defines !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 My reading of this opening scene is indebted to Posnock’s account of it The Trial of 
Curiosity (88-89). The purpose of James’s American tour was three-fold. First, his return 
was charged by the ambition to recapture the attention of American readers, which had 
waned considerably since the enormous success of Daisy Miller in 1878. As Henry writes 
to William, “It is more & more important I should go, to look after my material (literary) 
interests in person, & quicken & improve them, after so endless an absence” (LWHJ 420). 
Looking after his “material interests” meant putting himself back in the public eye with a 
major lectures series, for which he demanded “a positively quite maximum fee” at 
colleges and clubs across the United States. Though the speaking tour was lucrative, even 
more important was the opportunity it afforded James to directly impart his literary 
critical views to a potential readership with the hopes of fostering a greater appreciation 
and market for work that had for the most part been met with indifference up to this 




the “future feeling” of his writing, as well as her own, against stagnated nineteenth-
century European literary traditions (WL 56, 54, 56). The “American feelings” she detects 
hovering around his writing are formally manifest in the way a “whole paragraph was 
detached from what it said from what it did, what it was from what it held” (WL 53). In 
other words, the paragraph’s content no longer determines its form; rather, the form 
becomes constitutive of its content. James thus opens the way for Stein’s poetic project of 
making the process of composition its own subject.  
In Stein’s approach to her own lectures, James provides a vital touchstone that 
allows her to construct a wide-reaching and cohesive American tradition, while carving 
out her distinctive place within it. By way of James, Stein situates her work in a longer 
genealogy of writers who similarly organize their grammar of the self and of the sentence 
around the complex time of composition: 
In the American writing the words…began to detach themselves from the solidity 
of anything, they began to excitedly feel themselves as if they were anywhere or 
anything, think about American writing from Emerson, Hawthorne Walt Whitman 
Mark Twain Henry James myself Sherwood Anderson Thornton Wilder and 
Dashiell Hammitt and you will see what I mean…words left alone more and more 
feel that they are moving and all of it is detached and is detaching anything from 
anything and in this detaching and in their moving it is being in its way creating 
its existing. This is then the real difference between English and American writing 
and this then can then lead to anything. (N 10) 
The American line Stein draws from Emerson through James to herself (and her favored 
contemporary writers), shares a simultaneous sense of locatedness and dislocation. In 
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their American usage, words “have within themselves the consciousness of completely 
moving.” They “excitedly feel themselves” in a range of unpredictable combinations in 
the sentences and paragraphs they form (N 10). The vibratory excitement Stein attributes 
to this American tradition exceeds fixed structures of history, geography, and language in 
order to create and recreate itself in the face of what Emerson calls “this new yet 
unapproachable America” (EL 485). Stein attributes the excitement mobilizing American 
words to the country’s open horizon of imaginative possibility. Its expansiveness can 
“lead to anything.” Whereas British literature’s engagements with “daily island life” are 
defined by a long historical tradition and a circumscribed land-mass, American writing 
takes on an uncontainable geographical immensity and an undefined newness of 
experience (WL 33-34). Instead of a linear unfolding of time, each word and each minute 
dilates “in every and in any direction” (N 14). She contrasts the overbrimming vitality of 
American literature with a somewhat overstated account of English literary history’s 
bounded fixity as a known entity. But though Stein wants to assert a vast continental 
divide between two disparate cultural experiences and literary traditions, she also 
acknowledges that American literature develops with and against its British predecessors. 
Stein compares these two literary trajectories to “see how two nations having the same 
words all the same grammatical construction have come to be telling things that have 
nothing whatever in common” (N 7). Though “the words used are the same words” in 
both literatures, the weight of English literary history and its conventional forms puts 
“such a different pressure on them” (N 14). American words “feel moving existing inside 
in them,” which “make[s] them do something that they did not do for those who made the 
language come to exist” (N 14, 9). The kind of American writing Stein subscribes to is 
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continually uprooting itself from stultifying conventions to enliven and invigorate 
formerly deadened words. 
The connective glue adhering the American line Stein lays out is finally its “lack 
of connection”: the writers share a “disembodied way of disconnecting something from 
anything and anything from something” (WL 56). As Steven Meyer has argued, the 
American tradition that takes detachment, discontinuity and disconnection as the law of 
writing is distinctly Emersonian. In the passage cited above, he points out that Stein 
awards Emerson pride of place as the origin of that literary lineage by positioning his 
name at the opening of the line and following it with the lone comma in the sequence—a 
grammatical marker that both sets him apart from the group and distinguishes him at its 
head (Irresistible 137-42). Stein’s compositional method of detaching words from “the 
solidity of anything”—namely from settled “daily living”—shares Emerson’s 
commitment to relentless transition (EL 414). As Emerson famously reminds the reader, 
“the virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion” (EL 261). In the 
work of Emerson and Stein alike, “aversive thinking” is manifested in grammatical and 
syntactical choices that resist unthinking adherence to convention.37 Meyer goes so far as 
to claim that Emerson’s “lords of life”—“Illusion, Temperament, Succession, Surface, 
Surprise, Reality, Subjectiveness”—guided Stein’s thinking and writing “even more 
thoroughly” than they did his own work (Irresistible 141, EL 490). Among these “lords,” 
Stein values “Surprise” as a chief force of unsettlement. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Cavell has devoted many essays to Emerson’s “self-aversive sentences” that have 
influenced my reading. For his discussion of aversive thinking, see especially “Aversive 
Thinking: Emersonian Representation in Heidegger and Nietzsche,” “What is the 
Emersonian Event,” and “Emerson’s Constitutional Amending,” republished together in 
Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes. I will return to the Emersonian gesture of aversion in 
the next chapter on Larsen.  
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Though Stein distinguishes Emerson as the origin of the literary lineage she lays 
out, it is James who marshals his compositional methods into the twentieth century. 
Indeed, when Stein asserts that Henry James was “doing what American literature had 
always done,” I understand her to be saying that his conduct of life, inseparable from a 
conduct of composition, can be traced back to the source of an American literary tradition 
we find in Emerson (WL 56).38 For Stein, James is a hinge figure who serves as her most 
immediate point of connection to an Emersonian line, but also as her point of departure 
from it. Though Stein credits James with “finding” and “feeling” the way toward “the 
method of the twentieth century,” she faults him with stopping short of entirely detaching 
his paragraphs from narrative sequence; they are still tethered to the movements of plot, 
action, and character, and remain organized around “a beginning and a middle and an 
ending” (ABT 78, N 25). In decisively cutting all ties with narrative form, Stein claims to 
have done “more with the paragraph than ever had been done” (WL 56). She describes a 
continuous process of “breaking the paragraph down” and reconstituting it to make the 
words themselves the plot, so that parts of speech displace characters (WL 56). As one 
critic observes, “all the action is there in the play of one word next to another one” (Cope 
11). But doing away with linearity does not mean abolishing duration from the time of 
composition. The immediate “shock of surprise” that Stein feels in a “moment of 
recognition” is woven into a web of “open feeling” that stretches over time.39  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 As I argued in the previous chapter, James’s investment in surprise is also Emersonian 
insofar as he shares a common commitment to inhabiting and expressing an “everlasting 
Now” with the idiosyncratic temporal order that characterizes his late style (Society 167). 
39 Stein’s “open feeling” spreads out into what Gregory Morson (in another context) has 
termed the “openness of time,” making room for “middle realms of possibilities” 
presented by “unpredetermined becoming” (6, 11, 24).  
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In Psychology, a work written “expressly for use in class-room instruction,” John 
Dewey asserts that “a shock of surprise is one of the most effective methods of arousing 
attention” (iii, 127).40 Within Dewey’s educational framework, introducing “the 
unexpected in the midst of routine” serves to refresh and expand the “variety and 
mobility of psychic life.” It is for Dewey “the very contrast” between habitual rhythms 
and interruptive surprises that reorients the student into a posture conducive to learning 
(127). Stein develops a pedagogy of surprise that similarly depends on a productive 
tension between familiarity and novelty to renew and sustain her own attention and the 
attention of her audience.41 Her lectures proceed by couching the unknown in the known 
and announcing new beginnings that are also an extension of what has come before. For 
example, Stein somewhat paradoxically makes a case for doing away with narrative 
structure by narrating the progressive development of her work in the context of a 
founding lineage of American writing. On the one hand, Stein seeks to replace the “the 
feeling that something followed another thing” with an understanding of narrative that is 
always moving in all directions (N 18). On the other hand, she articulates lines of 
continuity between her past and present work, as well as between herself and James in an 
Emersonian tradition. It is on this foundation that Stein stakes her claims for the 
indeterminate future of writing beyond narrative “succession in happening” (N 18). Stein 
retrains her own receptivity to surprise by learning to write and talk about her work, but it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Though Crary does not pursue the point further, he offers in a footnote that John 
Dewey and others “had already established the inseparability of a model of attention from 
experiences of shock, dissociation, and novelty” as early as the 1880s” (49). 
41 William James likewise affirms the necessity of yoking newness with familiarity for 
pedagogical purposes: “a teacher who wishes to engage the attention of his class must 
knit his novelties on to things of which they already have preparations” (PP 447).  
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is another challenge to train her audience to meet the surprises that her writing poses to 
their routine rhythms of reading and listening.  
Lectures in America introduces Stein’s audience to her oeuvre by instantiating a 
set of critical terms that have since guided studies of her work. Throughout the lectures, 
she reiterates several core ideas regarding the relationship between time, feeling, and 
literary form until they become accustomed refrains: Stein asserts the “continually 
moving…space of time” as “the American thing”; she commits to “beginning again and 
again” in the “continuous present”; and she differentiates between “non-emotional 
sentences” and “emotional paragraphs” (WL 97). These key phrases suggest “effective 
methods” (in Deweyan terms) of formalizing her commitment to the persistent renewal of 
attention (Gass 117). Beyond simply repeating these phrases, Stein contextualizes their 
disorienting strangeness in relation to more recognizable forms of aesthetic encounter. 
She recounts her own experiences as a reader of literature, a viewer of art, and a spectator 
of theater as exemplary points of reference, but then asks her audience members to detach 
themselves “from the solidity of anything” they think they know about aesthetic 
experience. For example, “Pictures” moves through a series of idiosyncratically personal 
views of paintings that Stein attests, “give me pleasure and hold my attention”—from “a 
panorama of the battle of Waterloo” she saw when she was eight, to gold-framed oil 
paintings hanging in the Louvre, to Cézanne’s landscapes (“Pictures” 225, 226). Having 
aligned the listener with her particular perspective on these artworks, Stein introduces 
excerpts of her very unconventional literary portrait of Cézanne. Whereas one may expect 
portraiture to have a referential relation to its subject, Stein’s portrait points readers back 
to her own affectively charged perceptual experience. “And was I surprised,” she asks 
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herself: “Was I very surprised. I was surprised and in that patient.” She then turns readers 
back on their own experiences by asking, “are you patient” (“Pictures” 235). The 
suggestion is that patient readers will allow themselves to be as surprised as she is by the 
representation of her subject. Stein replaces direct description with a “disembodied 
abstract quality,” which nevertheless is infused by the corporeal immediacy and 
specificity of face-to-face encounters. When we pair surprise with the patient preparation 
of perception, close acquaintance with people and paintings alike can give way to novel 
discovery: 
when you have looked at many many faces and have become familiar with them, 
you may find something new in a new face you may be surprised by a different 
kind of a face you may even by shocked by a different kind of a face you may like 
or not like a new kind of face but you cannot refuse a new face. You must accept 
a face as a face. And so with an oil painting. (“Pictures” 236) 
Stein’s insistence that “you cannot refuse a new face” suggests the ethical and aesthetic 
implications of an attunement to surprise. For Stein, refusing to collapse “different 
kind[s] of faces” into the comforting familiarity of known entities involves learning how 
to perceive both people and paintings. The “vibration in the line” laid on the artist’s 
canvas captures the “intensity of movement” animating “the human form and the human 
face” (ABT 210). Stein notes that “most people are more predetermined as to what is the 
human form and the human face,” while a painter like Picasso surprises himself out of 
preconception by practicing uncompromising attention to “something new” (Picasso 16).  
 In “Portraits and Repetition,” Stein elaborates how the imperative for full 
responsiveness to faces informs her own literary portraiture. She writes, “I must find out 
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what is moving inside them and that makes them them, and I must find out how I by the 
thing moving excitedly inside me can make a portrait of them” (WL 108). The 
“intrinsically exciting” “intensity of movement” she identifies in her subjects and herself 
precludes rote representation (WL 108). The ever-changing “liveliness” of anything that 
is “alive” and “existing”—terms applied to words as well as to sentient beings—makes 
for endless variation in emphasis and accent: “If a thing is really existing there can be no 
repetition…it is alive it is never anything in the same way because emphasis can never be 
the same not even when it is most the same that is when it has been taught” (N xv). If we 
are conventionally taught to look for connections in homogenous uniformity, Stein 
suggests how we might begin to relate to people, words, and works of art on the basis of 
their irreducible distinctness.  
One reader of Stein aptly sums up the challenges and rewards of learning and 
relearning to read her writing with the openness to surprise she demands:   
what is this vast and contradictory, wonderful and maddening body of work? It 
means so much to us, has made so much possible, is so full of pleasure and still 
constant surprise. Yet there are long stretches that tax one’s attention, putting the 
reader in a difficult position. The work asks us to invent new ways of reading. 
(Dita Fröller qtd. in Retallack, Stein 3) 42 
The exceptionally warm reception Stein received on her American tour indicates that she 
succeeded admirably in conveying to her audience much of the pleasurable interest and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 As far as I can tell, Fröller is an alter-ego of Retallack—perhaps her vision of Stein’s 
ideal reader—who provides wonderfully apt epigraphs for both her books on Stein. The 
title she claims to be quoting from—“New Old World Marvels, Washington, DC, and 
Paris: Pre-Post-Eros Editions, frothcoming” [sic]—is nowhere to be found. She also cites 
another selection from “New Old World Marvels” entitled “Stein Stein Stein Stein Stein,” 
as well as one called “Autobio: A Littered Aria” in The Poethical Wager (29, 1).  
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enjoyment that had motivated (and might also be gleaned) from her “vast and 
contradictory, wonderful and maddening body of work.” “To hear Miss Stein read her 
own work,” a journalist reports, “is to understand it…for the first time”:  
you see why she writes as she does; you see how from sentence to sentence, 
which seem so much alike, she introduces differences of tone, or perhaps of 
accent. And then when you think she has been saying the same thing four or five 
times, you suddenly know that she has carefully, link by link, been leading you to 
a new thing. (Stein qtd. in Meyer, “Stein” 107) 
Listening to Stein read her work, this audience member learns to approach her writing 
“link by link,” discerning differences in intonation “from sentence to sentence.”43 The 
experience of suddenly knowing “a new thing” is in fact the product of a very “gradual 
making” (to borrow from the title of one of Stein’s lectures).44 “She is less invested in the 
shock of recognition,” Brian Glavey has remarked, “than in the halting, often redundant 
accretion of knowledge.”45 In arguing that Stein attunes herself and her reader to surprise, 
I have also aimed to show that she only “taxes” our attention to the extent that she 
enriches and expands it. When we read Stein’s lectures almost eighty years after they 
were delivered, her call to “begin again and again” challenges us to understand her 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Sianne Ngai’s definition of a literary or cultural artifact’s “feeling tone”—“its global 
disposition or orientation toward its audience and the world”— helpfully underscores the 
affective stakes of reading Stein for moment-by-moment tonal shifts (28). Ngai 
differentiates her “explicitly feeling-related sense” of tone from the narrower New 
Critical definition of the term as “‘a known way of speaking” or a dramatic style of 
address” (28-29). When the journalist cited above hears the changing intonation of 
Stein’s voice he is better equipped to detect the fluctuating feeling tones of her sentences 
on the page. 
44 “The Gradual Making of the Making of Americans.” 
45 This is from Glavey’s unpublished chapter entitled “Gertrude Stein’s Eye Lessons,” 
 which has helped me to think through Stein’s relationship to pedagogy. !
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memorable formulations as offering provisional support rather than definitive critical 
concepts. To keep our own “habits of attention” from hardening into complacent 
certainties we are required to continually “invent new ways of reading” Stein, never 


































“Then what do you love, you extraordinary stranger?” 
“I love clouds…drifting clouds…there…over there… 
marvelous clouds!”  
 
—Eh! Qu’aimes-tu donc, extraordinaire étranger? 
—J’aime les nuages… les nuages qui passent… là-bas…. 
là-bas… les merveilleux nuages! 





In previous chapters I have examined the scenic and formal phenomenon of 
surprise as defined by complex grammars of time and consciousness. For James and 
Stein, surprise expands a horizon of formal possibility that opens beyond the conventions 
of plot- or character-driven narratives. In James’s novels of consciousness, surprise is 
manifest in the twists of his labyrinthine sentences more than in unforeseen twists of plot. 
Stein goes further when she predicts that the future of American writing will dispense 
altogether with plotted narrative forms. In her improvisational practice of “beginning 
again and again” with each new sentence, the words themselves become the plot and 
parts of speech displace characters.2 According to Stein, only when our attention is 
relentlessly renewed can we open ourselves to surprises in living and writing that are 
unmediated by preconception. In this final chapter, I turn to a novel that self-consciously 
                                                
1 The translation is by Edward K. Kaplan. 
2 Stein describes her progressive departure from linear narrative forms in “Composition 
as Explanation” (1924), Lectures in America (1934), and Narration (1936). 
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invokes and multiplies the conventions of Anglo-American master plots that James de-
emphasized and Stein abandoned all together. 
Since its publication at the height of the Harlem Renaissance, Nella Larsen’s 
Quicksand (1928) has confounded critics with its incomprehensible protagonist and its 
inconsistent narrative line. The protagonist’s eccentricities are compounded by Larsen’s 
idiosyncratic engagement with a variety of plot conventions. As we will see, she 
alternately draws on and undermines the tradition of the tragic mulatta, the migration 
narrative, the return-to-roots saga, and the marriage plot, among others. If we read 
James’s and Stein’s progressive retreat from plot as a movement towards modernist 
innovation, Larsen’s continued recourse to these familiar storylines (however peculiar her 
combining and reworking of them may be) would appear to indicate her more 
conventional commitments. The fact that critics have compared Quicksand’s desirous 
protagonist with James’s Isabel Archer and Stein’s Melanctha seems to suggest that 
Larsen’s work aligns with earlier, less mature stages of those writers’ narrative 
experimentation. Like the freedom-seeking Isabel, Helga Crane’s maritime crossings are 
fueled by an unexpected inheritance that supports her yearning for liberation from social 
constraints. With Melanctha, Helga shares the desire to rush headlong into “a free and 
whirling future,” but both characters’ momentum suddenly stalls in jarringly 
conventional endings (Three Lives 83).3 As I will demonstrate, the strange incongruities 
                                                
3 James’s The Portrait of a Lady was published in 1881 and Stein’s “Melanctha” was 
published in Three Lives in 1909. On James and Larsen, see Lay. On Stein and Larsen, 
see Blackmer and Silverman. Quicksand is in fact a direct response to Stein’s novella. 
Larsen wrote a letter to the expatriate in 1929 attesting to having repeatedly read the 
“truly great story”: “And always I get from it some new thing.” Larsen connects Stein’s 
new ways of saying to her representation of race: “I never cease to wonder how 
you…should so accurately have caught the spirit of this race of mine” (Larsen qtd. in 
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between Quicksand’s indeterminate protagonist and its overdetermined plot introduce a 
narrative order of surprise that unsettles the foundations of the novel’s form. 
Quicksand famously refuses to explain the rapid shifts in mood that propel its 
protagonist’s movements from south to north, from America to Scandinavia, and back 
again. Where we want narrative elaboration, we get gaps and ellipses; where we seek 
emotional depth, we are met with what critics have termed Helga Crane’s “blank spots,” 
or the novel’s more general “reluctance to utter” (Ngai 178-79, Dittmar 145). Readers 
have tended to take two approaches to grappling with the novel’s apparent 
inconsistencies. Those invested in retrieving Quicksand from perceived problems of 
incoherence frequently fill its “blank spots” with diagnoses of Helga’s sexual repression.4 
                                                                                                                                            
Flowers of Friendship 216). When Larsen travelled to Paris a year later, hoping “to have 
the great good fortune of seeing and talking with [Stein],” she found that the writer had 
left the city the previous day. Though she missed a face-to-face meeting, the novel she 
had written the previous year (and enclosed with her letter)—represents Larsen’s textual 
encounter with “Melanctha,” which Stein deemed “the best Negro story [I have] ever 
read” (Stein qtd. in Hutchinson 248). For more on this epistolary exchange, see George 
Hutchinson, In Search of Nella Larsen (248, 312, 374-75). 
4 In her critical introduction to Quicksand, Deborah McDowell holds that readers “have 
been rightly perplexed” by the novel’s formal contradictions, but recommends that we 
examine the novel “through the prism of black female sexuality” in order to understand 
“the conflicting demands of [Larsen’s] racial and sexual identities and the contradictions 
of a black and female aesthetic.” We are thus better equipped to recognize her “radical 
and original efforts to acknowledge a female sexual experience most often repressed in 
both literary and social realms” (xii). Hazel Carby’s equally influential reading of the 
novel asserts that “the representation of black female sexuality meant risking its 
definition as primitive and exotic within a racist society” (174). Other critics who focus 
on the novel’s negotiation of sexual repression include Monda and Tate. Sianne Ngai 
helpfully summarizes this prevalent “repressive” line: Helga’s “repression is perceived to 
ensue directly from her entrapment between two equally disabling models of selfhood: 
“the construction of the black woman as hypersexualized primitive (an image 
promulgated by certain kinds of modernism) and middle-class ideals of chaste 
“ladyhood” (promulgated by the genteel, nineteenth-century American tradition of 
sentimental “mulatta” fiction)” (179). Ngai herself argues that the protagonist’s sexuality 




For other critics, the novel’s discontinuous plot and inconsistent character development 
are irretrievable indicators of Quicksand’s formal failure to achieve “wholeness.”5 
In this chapter I will argue that Quicksand’s formal incongruities are central to 
Larsen’s project rather than signs of its shortcomings. The novel’s narrative gaps 
deliberately puncture various Anglo-American master-plots that are invoked in order to 
be subverted; Quicksand continually sets up plotted frameworks only to exceed them. For 
example, the protagonist’s initial journey from the south and her confrontation with urban 
life in the north follows the arc of the migration narrative as Farah Griffin has outlined 
it.6 Likewise, the final lines of Langston Hughes’s epigraph to the novel—“I wonder 
where I’m gonna die, / Being neither white nor black”—suggests that Helga will suffer 
the double negation that conventionally condemns biracial protagonists to a ruinous end. 
But Helga’s transatlantic traversals extend the migration narrative’s north-bound 
trajectory, just as her flâneur-like freedom in the crowd expands the narrow possibilities 
                                                
5 Larsen’s biographer George Hutchinson summarizes the novel’s critical reception in the 
wake of its publication: “people tried to fit it into patterns to which they were 
accumstomed and, not always satisfied with the fit, found the novel wanting” (283). As 
one reviewer complains in May of 1928, “The motivation of this character is not always 
convincingly explained; the intention of the book is not even always clear” (Parsons 540, 
qtd. in Hutchinson 282). Another contemporary reviewer writes, “as portrayed the 
character is not quite of one pattern…There is no continuity of development, no 
wholeness here” (Walton 192). Critics have continued to express frustration at the 
apparently unmotivated movements of Larsen’s protagonist and plot up to the present. 
Barbara Johnson encapsulates a number of critical complaints when she observes that 
“psychological causation is missing” in Quicksand (Feminist Difference 42). 
6 According to Griffin, the migration narrative “is marked by four pivotal moments: (1) 
an event that propels the action northward, (2) a detailed representation of the initial 
confrontation with the urban landscape, (3) an illustration of the migrant’s attempts to 
negotiate that landscape and his or her resistance to the negative effects of urbanization, 
and (4) a vision of the possibilities or limitations of the Northern, Western, or 
Midwestern city and the South” (Griffin 3). 
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that are open to the figure of the tragic mulatta.7 For the majority of the novel, Helga’s 
refusal of all expectation and constraint blurs the narrative frameworks that would render 
her fully legible. It is therefore disconcerting when Helga’s plot-defying itinerancy is 
finally subjugated to constrictive conventions. Quicksand’s stock ending is startling 
precisely because the reader has learned to expect open-endedness in place of typical 
closure. I contend that Larsen juxtaposes the openness of an unpredictable protagonist 
against the closed boundaries of a novelistic frame in order to confront the limits and 
possibilities of the novel’s narrative form.  
If Quicksand stands as a problem novel for critics, in my own work it serves as a 
test case. Its power to unsettle and trouble its readers has applied productive pressures to 
three questions that have guided my study of the relationship between surprise and 
narrative form. First, how do writers narratively represent the feeling of surprise without 
allowing the conventions of plot, character, and closure to domesticate its interruptive 
force? Further, how might that narrative representation of surprise solicit a corresponding 
feeling in a receptive reader? Finally, what difference does the capacity to be surprised 
make for our experience of the novel and of everyday life more generally? As I will 
argue, Larsen recalibrates readers’ expectations in order to bring questions of narrative 
representation into contact with what Emerson calls “a practical question of the conduct 
of life” (EL 943). But Larsen also changes the terms of these questions by demanding that 
                                                
7 Jeanne Scheper argues that Larsen “rewrites those quintessential tropes of modern 
experience, la flâneuse and the crowd, through an African American experience of the 
city” (688). Helga’s experience of double negation is shared by mixed-race heroines like 
Zora Neale Hurston’s Janie Crawford and Fannie Hurst’s Peola. Her “ruin” is also 
prefigured by her own mother, whose race-mixing seduction brought the unwelcome 
baby, Helga herself, into being (Freedom’s Empire 7). On the wider tradition of the tragic 
mulatta narrative, see Berzon and Sollors. Doyle has also examined the novel in the 
context of what she calls the “Atlantic freedom plot” in Freedom’s Empire.  
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we confront the ways that an aesthetics of surprise is conditioned by what Judith Butler 
has described as “convergent modalities of power,” which are difficult to frame beyond 
the “list of attributes separated by those proverbial commas (gender, sexuality, race, 
class)” (267). Larsen reveals these modalities of power to be complicit with the narrative 
logic of multiple master plots that conspire to flatten her inexplicable protagonist into a 
categorical type.  
While critics often note Quicksand’s changeability of mood and mode, no links 
have been drawn to the novel’s equally changeable weather patterns.8 In the following 
discussion I take Emerson’s climatology of moods as a guide for drawing crucial 
connections between the shifting transience of Helga’s humors and the shifting weather 
patterns that backdrop her movements. For Emerson, the infinite variability of these 
internal and external atmospheres confirms that life is a “series of surprises” (EL 483). 
Quicksand’s changes in mood and weather converge in the novel’s pivotal scenes of 
departure, which I will read as a series of surprise “events,” where the predictable and the 
unforeseen collide. In Emerson’s distinctive use of the term, an “event” is constituted by 
“trivial experience[s] of every day,” which pass through us like “mutable cloud[s]” and 
floating moods (EL 242, 244). “Person makes event, and event person,” he writes, but 
these mutual “changes pass without violence”—“without a shock or a leap” (EL 962, 
                                                
8 My notion of “novel weather” is patterned by meteorological as well as affective 
changes in atmosphere. For a discussion of the latter sense of “atmosphere,” see Ngai 
(esp. 47, 174). The only critical discussion of meteorological weather in Larsen’s novels I 
have found was in the footnote of an essay on Passing that remarks, “it is interesting to 
observe how the change in the mother-daughter relationship, before and after the father’s 
return, is accompanied by a weather change. As a happy encounter between Irene and 
Clare takes place on a hot and sunny day, which symbolizes the universal harmony, 
Bellew’s return is accompanied by rain, fog and darkness, symbolizing (d)anger and 
destruction” (Mrozik n.10).  
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546). Instead of marking a singular break, Emerson elaborates the simultaneously 
interruptive and integrative nature of surprise events; they unfold over time rather than all 
at once, successively incorporating predictability and unpredictability.  
In his 1860 essay collection The Conduct of Life, Emerson repeats his assertion 
from “Experience” that moods, like the weather, are governed by the rule of 
changeability: “We cannot write the order of the variable winds. How can we penetrate 
the law of our shifting moods,” he asks (EL 1121). The impulsive choice that first 
catalyzes Helga’s journeying serves to corroborate Emerson’s meteorological maxim: 
“Life is March weather, savage and serene in one hour” (EL 704). Even as she 
acknowledges she is following the most impractical course of action, Helga insists on 
leaving her teaching post in mid-March instead of waiting until the end of the semester. 
In Naxos, a “black belt” college based on Tuskegee and Fisk, Helga flees an educational 
“machine” that “ruthlessly cut[s] all to a pattern.” The institution tolerates “no 
innovations, no individualisms,” so that students are stripped of all “enthusiasm” and 
“spontaneity” (Q 4). The sudden departures that follow are in every case precipitated by 
“an impetuous discharge” which releases high pressures “with a surprising ferociousness” 
(Q 5, 4). In each instance, the air grows thick with rising tensions (and temperatures), 
making a violent clash feel imminent. But the air is cleared and the threat averted by 
Helga’s snap decisions to abandon the life she has been leading and begin a new life 
elsewhere (EL 546). 
In the novel’s final sequence, drifting clouds gather directive force and finally 
culminate in a climactic storm. The storm scene stages a confrontation between two 
critical models of reading literary representations of weather, which divide along the lines 
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of “repetition” and “difference.”9 When understood as repetition, weather represents a 
predictable phenomenon that can be prognosticated; understood as difference, it remains 
an indeterminate and contingent force. The first framework suggests that weather 
constitutes a closed, fixed system of signs that needs only to be decoded, while the 
second charts an open dynamic system, where the signs may remain patternless. I will 
conclude by exploring how these competing models of weather reading map onto 
opposing worldviews, which Emerson roots in the terms of “fate” and “freedom,” and 
which William James translates into the philosophical vocabulary of determinism and 
indeterminism. Quicksand’s novel weather interleaves open and closed narrative systems 
with the unexpected effect of rendering these divergent worldviews indistinguishable.  
The interpretative problem that Helga’s impenetrable moods pose to other 
characters and to the reader is first and foremost a problem of relation. Her strange 
inscrutability forecloses the possibility of any meaningful relationships with the 
communities and partners she seeks out, and at the same time she repels readerly 
identification and sympathy.10 But when we connect Helga’s impenetrable moods with 
the novel’s variable weather it becomes possible to discern alternative forms of relation 
that move beyond the either/or choice of feeling with Helga or feeling for her. 
Quicksand’s capricious moods and weather usher us into relation with uncertainty—the 
experience of drifting without the anchorage of a preconceived plan. In contemplating 
                                                
9 I borrow this organizing distinction from Arden Reed’s Romantic Weather (8-9). 
10 As Philip Fisher has outlined, there are two primary ways that literary texts solicit 
emotion from their readers. The familiar mode of “sympathy” prompts us to feel what the 
other is feeling, to reproduce a narratively represented emotional state. The second, less 
commonly invoked mode, which he calls “volunteered passion,” compels us to “feel 
something exactly because the other does not” (Vehement Passions 142). This kind of 
identification requires that we fill in the blank ourselves “without a represented model for 
us to copy” (145).  
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“clouds and opaque airs,” Emerson writes, “I shall see and comprehend my relations” 
(EL 451). “The web of relation” that ties together person and event can therefore be 
described as “atmospheric”; as he advises, our “attitude of mind and reality of relation” 
should be carried “atmospherically” (EL 951, 520). For Emerson, the nature of 
atmospheric events cannot be determined in advance, but Quicksand shows how they can 
be overdetermined by fixed formulations of racialized and gendered identity.  
I take a two-fold approach to reading Quicksand according to an Emersonian 
climatology of weather and moods. First, I examine how Larsen’s use of pathetic fallacy 
unsettles the novel at the level of plot and character. The literary device at first appears to 
help us read our illegible protagonist. The novel’s weather signs can be taken as an 
externalized phenomenology of otherwise impenetrable interior states. However, 
Quicksand’s primary meteorological referent—the clouds—prove as symbolically 
obscure as Helga’s moods. The vaporous phenomena that circulate through the novel’s 
pivotal scenes serve only to corroborate that Quicksand is patterned by inconsistency. I 
therefore track the appearance and dispersal of clouds at the novel’s crucial moments of 
transition, but in a second level of analysis I suggest that the scenes themselves are 
organized around the charged poles of cloud formation—the pressured dynamics of 
attraction and repulsion, condensation and precipitation. After examining how these 
exemplary episodes are patterned like the weather and by the weather, I close with a 
discussion of the incongruous ending that has baffled readers even more than 
Quicksand’s incomprehensible central character. 
 
Larsen’s working title for her manuscript, Cloudy Amber, suggests one way of 
correlating the novel’s multiple material state changes within a framework of surprise.  
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Just as shifts in air pressure and temperature form clouds from condensation and amber 
from sap, Helga’s changes in mood and direction fluctuate between fluidity and fixity. I 
locate Larsen’s narrative surprise in the drifting clouds that model Helga’s mutability, but 
also in the novel’s sudden imposition of predetermined plot turns which underline the 
fossilizing narrative logic of race and reproduction. Larsen’s original title evidently 
references the intermediate color of Helga’s skin and the novel’s pervasive atmospheric 
imagery, but amber and clouds also offer more general emblems for transfiguring 
processes that are catalyzed by rising temperatures and pressures. Amber’s process of 
transformation—from liquid tree sap into solid resin and a final fossilized form—
resembles the way that Quicksand’s fluidity of plot eventually congeals into rigid 
conventionality. Significantly, cloudy amber owes its opacity to trapped bubbles of air. 
Helga’s marked fascination with drifting clouds suggests that her own affective and 
imaginative idiom is primarily aerial. As Gaston Bachelard observes, “the imagination 
uses the cloud like an ectoplasm that sensitizes our mobility” (19).11 This imaginative 
“ectoplasm” externalizes and materializes the atmospheric changes that spur Helga to 
flight. In Quicksand, clouds provide a model for a character, but also for a narrative, that 
might at any moment lapse into formless flux.  
Just as a novel patterned around clouds eludes determinate definition, these 
mutable weather signs have long challenged philosophical and meteorological 
designation. For example, in Descartes’s Discourse on Meteorology, ungraspable mists, 
vapors, and exhalations skew the senses and confound judgment. A cloud’s suspension 
                                                
11 The term ectoplasm was originally used by the French physiologist Charles Richet to 




between form and formlessness seemed to pose a fundamental ontological problem that 
undermined the meteorological laws Descartes had worked to establish.12 A century and a 
half later, the meteorologist Luke Howard—sometimes simply referred to as “the namer 
of clouds”—responded to clouds’ amorphousness with a nomenclature (which we still 
use today) capable of denoting moment-by-moment modification.13 Fueled by ongoing 
processes of vaporous exchange, clouds, he discerned, might at any time pass into a new 
fleeting formation; the layered haze of stratus clouds could heap into cottony cumulus 
forms, or thin into wispy cirrus strands.14 Though their theories and approaches widely 
diverged, both Descartes and Howard sought a language that would register the infinitely 
variable processes of condensation and dispersal. In tracing the contours of a subject that 
fluctuates between congealed and dispersed forms, whose only constant is volatility, 
Larsen faces a similar set of challenges. The meteorological account of clouds as open 
forms offers a remarkably apt description of Helga Crane. Like the clouds she tracks 
across the sky, Helga is portrayed as “a series of self-canceling evanescences…a fugitive 
presence hastened to its onward dissolution” (Hamblyn 171). As the “fugitive” figure of 
the protagonist achieves her “onward dissolution” by elemental forces of attraction and 
repulsion, so too does Quicksand dissolve the series of plot conventions it invokes.  
                                                
12 If you can philosophize about clouds, Descartes contends, then you can philosophize 
about anything else in the natural world. For a helpful discussion of Descartes’s 
Discourse on Meteorology, see Hamblyn’s The Invention of Clouds (esp. 40-43). See also 
Arsić’s discussion of Descartes and Melville in Passive Constitutions (158-64). 
13 Howard is referred to by that moniker on the English Heritage plaque that marks the 
building where he died in Tottenham in 1846 at the age of ninety-one. 
<http://openplaques.org/plaques/190>  
14 Howard first delivered his extraordinarily influential lecture “On the Modifications of 
Clouds,” in December of 1802. It was published in the science journal Philosophical 
Magazine in 1803. On the development of Howard’s cloud theory, see Hamblyn. 
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At each point of departure, Helga casts her gaze upon the firmament, as if its 
aspect will offer her guidance. As the train trundles her away from Naxos in the novel’s 
opening pages, she observes out the window that the early evening sky is streaked with 
“long, soft white clouds, clouds like shreds of incredibly fine cotton.” The banded clouds 
seem to run parallel to the tracks, mapping out a flight path to the city along the “flying 
landscape” of the sky (Q 22). When Helga arrives in Chicago, and soon after in Harlem, 
she is drawn by “an uncontrollable desire to mingle with the crowd” (Q 30). Every time 
she steps out into “the glimmering…swarming” street, the “tremulous” clouds both 
mirror and appear to motivate her “aimless strolling” (Q 30, 32).15 At first, she emulates 
their floating waywardness, “drifting here and there with a sort of endless lack of 
purpose” (Q 30). But Helga’s initial sense of itinerant freedom in each city inevitably 
gives way to stifling claustrophobia. After her brief period of contented belonging a new 
weather front moves in marked by changes in temperature and season. It is only with 
Helga’s tempestuous departures that these mounting pressures finally break. 
In its quotidian ordinariness, the weather can easily pass unnoticed as the prosaic 
ground against which the narrative action unfolds. When we bring Quicksand’s weather 
patterns to the fore, the novel’s apparently straightforward use of pathetic fallacy 
suggests that its meteorological signs can be taken as a sentient reflection of Helga’s 
                                                
15 Raymond Williams’s account of “structures of feeling” provides another suggestive 
framework for understanding how Helga suspends herself in an “intermediate zone of 
urban experience” in each new city. In his usage, “feelings” refer to a set of “formative 
processes”—fluctuating forms of experience that “escape from the fixed and the explicit 
and the known.” As Williams’s use of the term “structure” signals, these feelings are 
“never mere flux,” but are “formations on the very edge of semantic availability” 
(Marxism 134). In Quicksand, “feeling” takes the form of an unmediated visceral influx 
that suspends thought and spurs action. But as Williams helps us to see, at no point are 
those feelings formless.  
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otherwise indecipherable interior states. The literary device invites us to fill in her “blank 
spots” with reference to the skies. But as meteorologists and literary critics agree, the 
weather is hard to interpret. Despite the challenge, meteorology from Aristotle’s 
Meteorologica forward has been driven by the impulse to read the weather as a language. 
A recent study of Howard and clouds establishes this long-standing link between words 
and weather: 
[Meteorology] is a search for narrative order among events governed not by laws 
alone but by the shapeless caprices of the atmosphere. Weather writes, erases, and 
rewrites itself upon the sky with the endless fluidity of language; and it is with 
language that we have sought throughout history to apprehend it. Since the sky 
has always been more read than measured, it has always been the province of 
words. (Hamblyn 16-17) 
While we may be compelled to compare the weather with semantic signs, its script is not 
readily legible. Perhaps more than any other aerial phenomena, clouds exemplify the 
interpretive difficulties posed by sky-writing that morphs as soon as its marks are made. 
Rather than helping us to penetrate Helga’s opacity, the clouds we are given only 
intensify her inscrutability. As an author of the first International Cloud Atlas (1896) 
affirmed, “clouds always tell a true story, but one which is difficult to read” (Abercromby 
145).16 The Cloud Atlas addressed this difficulty by pairing Howard’s nomenclature with 
referential photographs; the burgeoning field of modern meteorology deemed it necessary 
to supplement semantic descriptions with visual aids. By contrast, Quicksand provides 
                                                
16 Richard Abercromby’s “On the Identity of Cloud Forms All Over the World” was 
published in the Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society in 1887. The 
Cloud Atlas that Abercromby contributed to remains the basis of our modern 
understanding of clouds.  
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neither an illustrative key for reading the clouds nor a psychological code for cracking 
Helga’s moods.  
 Though the novel’s instances of pathetic fallacy further obscure instead of clarify, 
the novel’s engagement with literary convention points us towards a climatology that has 
variability at its core. Emerson’s career-long commitment to tracing temperamental 
moods and weather suggests powerful continuities between internal and external registers 
of atmospheric change. However, Emerson scholars have generally treated these 
phenomena separately. For example, Eduardo Cadava’s Emerson and the Climates of 
History demonstrates how Emerson’s climatic figures shape his discourses of war, race, 
and slavery. As Sharon Cameron’s work on “Emerson’s Impersonal” demonstrates, his 
emphasis on the transience of moods erodes the commonplace idea that mental states are 
personal and reside “within.” While these critics have powerfully elucidated Emerson’s 
models of historical flux and unbounded selfhood, surprisingly little work has explored 
how Emerson’s epistemologies of weather and moods inflect each other.17 An exemplary 
passage of the essay “Experience” underscores the intimate connection between the 
fluctuation of moods and the “circulation” of celestial bodies, suggesting generative 
inroads for reading Emerson and Larsen together: 
The secret of the illusoriness [of life] is in the necessity of the succession of 
moods or objects. Gladly we would anchor, but the anchorage is quicksand. This 
                                                
17 An important exception is Arsić’s On Leaving. She describes the conjoining of 
Emersonian moods and the weather this way: “[Emerson’s] moods and perceptions 
inhabit us as so many atmospheric events…as if coming to us from outside, registering 
changes in the weather” (145). My understanding of Quicksand as a series of 
“atmospheric events” is indebted to her reading of Emerson. 
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onward trick of nature is too strong for us: Pero si muove. When, at night, I look 
at the moon and stars, I seem stationary, and they to hurry. (EL 476)  
Looking to the sky, Emerson aligns the successiveness of moods with the onwardness of 
nature. The strength and necessity of these forces overtake us from within and without. 
Our impulse, he suggests, is to anchor the self, but when we seek stationary 
“permanence,” we find that the grounds of selfhood are “quicksand.”18 The self is 
groundless because our moods are no more intrinsic to us than the heavenly orbs passing 
overhead. In this passage, it is the moon and stars that hurry across the sky, but more 
often, Emerson watches clouds sweep across the “overarching vault” (EL 337).19  
“Our moods do not believe in each other,” writes Emerson (EL 406). Larsen’s 
heroine bears him out. The anchorless Helga Crane moves like the emblematic bird of 
“Experience,” “which alights nowhere, but hops perpetually from bough to bough,” or in 
her case, from continent to continent (EL 477). We might also recall the comparison 
William James draws between the ever-moving stream of consciousness and “a bird’s 
life…made of an alternation of flights and perchings.” He observes that “the rhythm of 
language” expresses our continual vacillation between “subjective states” by alternating 
between “transitive parts” and “substantive parts” or “resting places.” According to 
James, as soon as we try to follow those transitive “flights to a conclusion,” we risk 
“annihilating them”; the “stability” of the substantive “quite eclipses and swallows them 
up” (PP 243-44). In Quicksand, this oscillation between transitive and substantive parts 
of speech moves in tandem with Helga’s fluctuation between grammatical (or 
                                                
18 See Stanley Cavell’s powerful reading of this passage in “Thinking of Emerson” from 
Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes (esp. 12-13). 
19 For a sampling of Emerson’s cloud references in Essays and Lectures, see pages 15, 
206, 242, 245, 305, 331, 451, 484, 553, 974. 
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morphological) moods. Her transitivity is driven by the “optative mood” (closely related 
to the subjunctive), which indicates a wish or hope—the mood of potentiality that 
Emerson associates with America’s literary and spiritual yearnings.20 To put it in the 
terms of the weather, those optative longings pressurize internal and external 
atmospheres. When rising pressures reach their culminating apex, Helga finds release in 
precipitated travel. Upon arrival, she moves into the indicative, making definitive 
declarations of “security and permanence in her new life” (Q 77). Two conflicting 
imperatives propel and arrest Helga’s flights: on the one hand, the urge to uproot herself 
from any defining categories of identity or place, and the desire, on the other, to claim a 
grounded sense of self and home. 
When Helga first arrives in Harlem from Naxos, then Chicago, she “seem[s] at 
last to belong somewhere” (Q 44). But “as the days became hotter and the streets more 
swarming,” her “happiness” is subsumed by a “restlessness”:  
her need of something, something vaguely familiar, but which she could not put a 
name to and hold for definitive examination became almost intolerable…She felt 
shut in, trapped…All interest had gone out of living…for some unknown reason, 
it was of herself she was afraid. (Q 47) 
With these changes in mood and temperature, the “crowds of nameless folk” that had 
earlier offered freedom and belonging, now “encompassed her” with a sense of 
“estrangement and isolation” (Q 47-48). The bodily “repulsion” and “aversion” she feels 
in the street only intensifies “with the waning of summer…swallowing up all else like 
some dense fog” (Q 48, 53). Just at the point when Helga is sure that the thick miasma of 
                                                
20 Emerson writes, “our American literature and spiritual history are, we confess, in the 
optative mood” (EL 199). 
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“excruciating agony” will never lift, an escape route presents itself in the form of a five 
thousand dollar inheritance and an invitation to Copenhagen from her Scandinavian aunt.  
 At this transitional moment, Helga sets out on a “sulky, humid…thick furry night” 
(Q 48-49, 53). It is “an atrocious night for cabareting,” she reflects as she is dragged into 
a Harlem jazz bar. She is immediately engulfed by the sensorial overwhelm of the club:  
“A glare of light struck her eyes, a blare of jazz split her ears. For a moment everything 
seemed to be spinning around,” but as Helga “grew accustomed to the smoke and din,” 
she becomes absorbed within the room’s “moving mosaic” (Q 60):  
They danced, ambling lazily to a crooning melody, or violently twisting their 
bodies, like whirling leaves, to a sudden streaming rhythm, or shaking themselves 
ecstatically to a thumping of unseen tomtoms. For a while, Helga was oblivious of 
the reek of flesh, smoke, and alcohol, oblivious of the oblivion of other gyrating 
pairs, oblivious of the color, the noise, and the grand distorted childishness of it 
all. She was drugged, lifted, sustained, by the extraordinary music, blown out, 
ripped out, beaten out, by the joyous, wild, murky orchestra. The essence of life 
seemed bodily motion. (Q 59) 
How are we to reconcile the ecstasy and essentialism that converge in this moment? The 
surprise of the scene is in its disconcerting collision of moving sensation and hardened 
cultural stereotypes. The strange episode is marked out by a shift in narrative time and 
voice. “For a while,” onward momentum is suspended by an alternate temporal order. 
The narrative perspective vacillates between intimate proximity and detached distance, 
fissuring the novel’s otherwise relatively seamless free indirect discourse. Set apart from 
what has come before, the scene requires the reader’s reoriented attention. Indeed, a great 
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deal of critical attention has been paid to the episode, but divergent readings suggest that 
its conflicting pressures of fluidity and fixity cannot easily be reconciled. 
Flitting in and out of bodily consciousness, Helga glimpses her medial relation to 
a world from which she has felt estranged. But this immediacy of relation is mediated by 
racialized constructions of a primal “jungle” whirl. As the jazz rhythms blow, beat, and 
rip at the bounds of selfhood, she is carried on an intoxicating wave of oblivion that 
promises bodily release and psychic expansion. Helga’s identity-obliterating immersion 
in a sensory stream resembles William James’s account of “pure experience,” but here 
any “purity” of ecstatic experience is at once mixed with the clichés of thumping 
tomtoms and gyrating flesh (Q 62, Esteve 274). The trope of losing oneself in the crowd 
or dissolving into the stream of experience becomes very differently charged in a context 
where racism has inflicted compulsory rather than elective forms of anonymity. In a 
study of crowds and the Harlem Renaissance, Mary Esteve reminds us that 
“sociopolitically disenfranchised blacks in the US have historically been consigned to a 
multitude, a race, prior to, if not instead of, a self” (270). In this scene, Helga oscillates 
between equally alienated states—an isolated sense of being “singularly apart from it 
all,” and a stigmatized sense of deindividuation by the racialized multitude (Q 58). In 
Helga’s experience of the Harlem cabaret, the sensual pleasures of ecstatic self-
disappearance are inextricable from the violence of stigmatizing cultural essentialism. 
The experience of being “born with a veil,” as W.E.B. Du Bois describes it, is a 
central theme of twentieth-century African-American literature (45). The destructive 
anonymity negotiated by James Weldon Johnson’s autobiographical “Ex-Colored Man” 
or Ralph Ellison’s unnamed “Invisible Man,” for example, is clearly of a different order 
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than the invisibility that Benjamin’s flâneur actively cultivates. Esteve argues in relation 
to these texts and others that the primary literary strategy of opposing enforced 
anonymity is the cultivation of self-consciousness (284n.2). As soon as Helga begins to 
lose herself in the music (a transfigurative medium in each of the transitional scenes) she 
becomes acutely aware of having been invaded by the racial constructs she associates 
with its “savage strains”: “She dragged herself back to the present with a conscious 
effort; and a shameful certainty that not only had she been in the jungle, but that she had 
enjoyed it, began to taunt her” (Q 59). With a deliberate exercise of will, Helga extracts 
herself from the sensorial absorption that has engulfed her. She is returned to her senses, 
as it were, but her heightened perceptual awareness turns against itself. When the surprise 
of self-disappearance couples with shame in this way, self-consciousness becomes 
coterminous with self-contempt, limiting its potential as a “strategy of opposing 
compulsory anonymity” (Esteve 284n.2).  
In this regard, we might recall Du Bois’s famous assertion that the black man in 
America is denied any “true self-consciousness” by the experience of “always looking at 
one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that 
looks on in amused contempt and pity” (45). This doubled self-perception results in “two 
unreconciled strivings,” “two warring ideals in one dark body” (Du Bois 45). Du Bois’s 
“double consciousness” suggests an internally divided body and self yet, a half century 
later, Franz Fanon’s account of “third person consciousness” elaborates that decoupling 
of a person from himself in phenomenological and grammatical terms that go further to 
explain the cabaret scene’s atmospheric pressures. For Fanon, an embodied sense of self 
is constructed “in the middle of a spatial and temporal world,” out of “a real dialectic 
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between my body and the world” (110). But, as he explains, “in the white world, the man 
of color encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema”: “the body is 
surrounded by an atmosphere of uncertainty” (111). “For a while,” Helga allows herself 
to inhabit and be inhabited by an immersive unknown that might enable rather than 
negate expansive experience. According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the experience of 
being outside ourselves in an “intercorporeal” world is one of risky exposure, but also 
generative possibility.21 It is only by opening ourselves to atmospheric uncertainty that 
we “acquire a social horizon”—one that allows us to come into relation with people and 
temporalities “outside [our] living experience” (Merleau-Ponty 433).22 Fanon attends to 
the social forces that contract the horizon. Suspended in uncertainty, a racialized 
consciousness is easily infiltrated by alienating images of aberrant inferiority. As a result, 
the founding self!relation is permeated by “shame and self-contempt” (Fanon 116). When 
the openness of surprise is overwhelmed by shame, guilt, and nausea, any potential 
aperture is felt as an open wound. Every time Larsen’s protagonist faces the fresh horizon 
of a new beginning, promising prospects are rapidly constricted by the sutures she has 
tried to stitch around the “obscene sore” that throbs at the core of her being (Q 29). 
According to Fanon, the “atmosphere of uncertainty” that permeates a third-
person consciousness is grammatically expressed in the gap between the first-person “I” 
and an objectivized “he” or “she” (110). Casting such an objectivizing gaze back on 
                                                
21 Merleau-Ponty uses the term “intercorporeality” to describe the embodied, 
interdependent connection we involuntarily share with other bodies and things in the 
world.  
22 Here, I owe a debt to Posnock’s discussion of Fanon and Du Bois in “How It Feels to 
Be a Problem.” Laura Doyle’s “Toward a Philosophy of Transnationalism” draws 
important connections between these thinkers and Merleau-Ponty, which have also 
informed my thinking. 
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himself, Fanon finds that he has assimilated an array of stultifying stereotypes, which are 
remarkably resonant with the terms that Helga uses to characterize her cabaret 
experience: “I discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered 
down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-
ships” (112). As indicated, Quicksand’s otherwise relatively unobtrusive free indirect 
style suddenly makes itself felt in the above scene. Throughout this episode, the third 
person narrator’s fluctuating perspective is as hard to pin down as the moods that 
successively overtake Helga’s third person consciousness. As she is subsumed into the 
music’s momentum, the narrative focalization appears intimately fused with her own. 
The dynamic series of active verbs surge in unison with the jazz that moves Helga; for 
both the narrator and the protagonist, all is “bodily motion” (Q 59). Laura Doyle posits 
that this is “the only moment in the narrative when Helga and her narrator shed their 
vexed sense of double-consciousness” (Freedom’s Empire 401). And yet, any ecstatic 
cohesion is riven with the disturbing primitivism that permeates the scene. Just as the 
protagonist is swept into the “swirling mass,” the sinuous sentences threaten to sweep 
readers into implicated relation with racist stereotypes (Q 59). Laced with clichés of 
jungle savagery, these formulations have an insidious potential for contagion that feels all 
the more dangerous because of the uncertain proximity between the narrator and 
character. Without clear narrative footholds, the reader potentially partakes of Helga’s 
dislocated ambivalence. For the reader, as for the protagonist, anxious unease permeates 
the division between “me” and “not me.”  
Dragging herself out of the fray, Helga admonishes her own implication in the 
“semi-barbaric” scene: “She wasn’t, she told herself, a jungle creature” (Q 59). But 
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instead of rejecting wholesale these primitivizing tropes, Helga defensively “cloak[s] 
herself in faint disgust” and turns an exoticizing mode of spectatorship back onto “this 
oppressed race of hers” (Q 59). While the club’s “fantastic motley” will remain “in the 
heart of the jungle,” she insists she will escape (Q 59, 62). Helga’s stereotyping 
projections point to the “absolute density” of a racialized consciousness that has been 
saturated with oppressive racial constructions (Fanon 135). Charged with these troubling 
tropes, the atmospheric exchanges between Helga’s moods and her ambient surroundings 
feel stiflingly airless. Following her dizzying swing from ecstatic oblivion to self-
flagellation, Helga aims to cover her bared shame with “aloof” and “contemptuous” 
disinterest (Q 60). But rather than achieving detached neutrality, her vertiginous seesaw 
between attraction and repulsion cathects around the mysterious figure of Audrey 
Denney, “the beautiful, calm, cool, girl, who had the assurance, the courage [to] so 
placidly ignore racial barriers” (Q 62). Denney gives herself over to the music with all the 
“abandon” and “obvious pleasure” that Helga only fleetingly glimpses. As she watches 
the woman’s mesmerizing movements, Helga’s “envious admiration…was augmented by 
another, a more primitive emotion” that leaves her “heart throbbing…panting, confused.” 
Suddenly desperate to escape the charged room, she staggers back into the sweltering 
night. Helga is left at the end of the chapter in a broken heap, “a small crumpled thing in 
a fragile, flying black and gold dress…unhappy, misunderstood, and forlorn” (Q 62). In 
disavowing the primal sexuality she associates with jazz, Helga also rejects all of Harlem. 
Shame “harden[s] her determination to get away” to the non-racialized utopia she 




The jazz club episode exemplifies the patterned shifts in narrative perspective that 
dissolve and congeal the protagonist’s materiality in each of the novel’s transitional 
scenes. As atmospheric pressures build, Helga’s affective and sensorial experience of her 
internal and external world becomes intensely concentrated. Her every fluctuation of 
feeling is held in claustrophobic close-up. But in the moment of departure, the charge is 
released, ushering in a low-pressure weather system that disperses the discomfiting 
contiguities exemplified by the cabaret episode. These shifts from high- to low-pressure 
zones are marked by shifts in focalization. The narrative perspective pulls back so that 
Helga floats at a distance, a barely materialized presence in the cinematic scope of the 
new scene. As the liner pulls away from the “cliff-like towers” of New York “into the 
open sea,” she leaves behind the “torrid summer [that] had so oppressed her” (Q 63). 
Stretching before her is “the serene calm of the lingering September summer, under 
whose sky the sea was smooth like a length of watered silk, unruffled by the stir of any 
wind…she revel[ed] like a released bird in her returned feeling of happiness and freedom, 
that blessed sense of belonging to herself and not to a race” (Q 65). Facing this open 
expanse, she announces, “It had begun, a new life for Helga Crane” (Q 66). 
Shortly thereafter, the cycle is again underway. Helga is once more overtaken by 
“an indefinite discontent…like a storm gathering far on the horizon”—a storm that breaks 
on another night of acute shame (Q 81). But whereas the experience of self-loss in the 
jazz club provokes her disidentification from the black community of Harlem, the 
spectacle of minstrel performers playing ragtime in a Scandinavian Circus prompts an 
identificatory journey of return. Helga’s projection of a post-racial utopia in Copenhagen 
is shattered all at once by the “gesticulating black figures” and the “delight” and “avidity” 
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with which the audience “drank [it] in” (Q 82):  
she was filled with a fierce hatred for the cavorting Negroes on the stage. She felt 
shamed, betrayed, as if these pale pink and white people among whom she lived 
had suddenly been invited to look upon something in her which she had hidden 
away and wanted to forget…(Q 83) 
Helga feels shamed by the vaudeville performance because she senses that “some 
characteristic, different from any that they [the Danes] themselves possessed,” has 
suddenly been put on display for all to see (Q 83). Her internalization of America’s color 
line, drawn as deeply in Harlem as in Naxos, is only exacerbated by her status as an 
exotic rarity in Copenhagen. Though the Danes hold her racial difference as a “precious 
thing…to be enhanced, preserved” and “admired” rather than “despised,” that difference 
is nonetheless deemed essential and irreducible (Q 83). The shame she feels before the 
minstrel performers betrays the extent to which this noxious racial thinking has become 
her own. The vaudeville show leaves Helga “profoundly disquieted” and heralds 
atmospheric disturbances to her “transformed existence” in Denmark: “Her old unhappy 
questioning mood came again upon her…a suspensive conflict in which were fused 
doubts, rebellion, expediency, and urgent longings” (Q 84).  
 Quicksand’s high-pressure scenes draw on racialized clichés—of jungle 
animality, cavorting ragtime minstrels, and in the concluding sequence, the tragic 
mulatta’s fall and religious revival. In each case, the over-familiarity of these shame-
inducing tropes seems at first to be inimical to surprise. However, the episodes’ framing 
in the terms of “aversion” offers an important clue for how such hackneyed tropes can 
open up rather than foreclose new possibilities for reading (Q 48 and 63). According to 
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Cavell, Emersonian aversion is a gesture of turning against “ourselves in our conformity” 
(Etudes 165). The aversive turn against unquestioned orthodoxies fosters “a self-
consciousness” that “expresses itself as shame” (Etudes 155).23 In the face of conformist 
convention, shame is for Emerson “the condition under which anything new can be said” 
(Etudes 121). But as Fanon has shown, racialized shame turns self-consciousness into 
paralyzing self-contempt that drastically constricts the field of expressive possibility. As 
Helga’s responses to the jazz club and the vaudeville show make clear, those aversive 
feelings instigate an oppositional turn away, but also a fascinated turn towards the object 
of aversion. After her first visit to the Circus, Helga “returned again and again,” 
compelled and repelled by the spectacle on stage (Q 83). In each pivotal episode of 
Quicksand, Larsen stages the event of surprise as a “suspensive conflict” between 
conformity and nonconformity with the narrative logic of race (Q 83). 
In taking leave of anchored selfhood, Helga in effect answers Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
call for “unfinalizability” and “surprisingness” in novelistic representations of character 
(Problems 59). These narrative principles stave off the deadening determinism he 
identifies as the primary problem with the novel form.24 In both the cabaret and circus 
scenes, Helga meets Bakhtin’s mandate that characters must “render untrue any 
externalizing and finalizing definition” of them. According to Bakhtin, surprise is 
intrinsic to life, and should be to the novel, because “a man never coincides with himself. 
One cannot apply to him the formula of identity A=A” (Problems 59). In Helga’s case, 
however, such surprising non-coincidence is constantly threatened by essentializing 
                                                
23 Cavell is meditating on the following lines from “Self-Reliance”: “The virtue in most 
request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion” (EL 261).  
24 My reading of Bakhtin’s Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics has been greatly enriched 
by Gary Morson’s commentary in Narrative and Freedom.  
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formulas of racial identity that demand fixed self-sameness.  
With an “unfinalizable” protagonist driving the narrative action, Quicksand’s plot 
deviates from linear causality. Her final embrace of marriage is disconcerting precisely 
because, up to this point, her peripatetic path has evaded romantic overtures. For 
example, immediately following the Copenhagen Circus scene, Helga refuses a marriage 
that she had previously yearned for. She receives the unexpected proposal from a famous 
Danish artist who has hitherto treated her with ambivalence. The scene unfolds as a 
contest of competing understandings of what it means to feel and to express surprise. The 
scene opens abruptly: “Axel Olsen asked her to marry him. And now Helga Crane was 
surprised” (Q 84). She is taken aback by the sudden arrival of an event that she had 
“much wanted,” but “had relinquished as impossible of achievement” (Q 84). Each time 
Helga reiterates her surprise (three times to herself and twice more out loud to Olsen), she 
marks the distance between the self that had longed for this moment and the self that now 
inhabits it. Whereas she was once consumed by the “intangible” feeling that “her origin a 
little repelled him,” she now turns Olsen’s “racial antagonism” and “repugnance” back 
upon him (Q 84, 85). 
When Helga reports to Olsen that “his offer was…unexpected,” the artist’s 
response is sardonic and leaves her with “a stripped, naked feeling”: “But of course I 
expected surprise. It is, is it not, the proper thing? And always you are proper, Frokken 
Helga, always” (Q 85, 86). Her insistent reiteration that “she was surprised” asserts a 
fundamental difference in their respective understandings of the feeling. For Helga, 
surprise marks her encounter with non-coincident selves who desire disparate futures. By 
contrast, Olsen’s suggestion that Helga’s expression of surprise is a feigned show of 
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modesty indicates that he understands the emotion to belong to the realm of contrived 
social decorum. When he declines to believe that Helga “was being quite sincere, quite 
truthful,” her repudiation ensures that he feels the proximity of surprise to the self as 
sharply as she does (Q 86). Her refusal of marriage controverts Olsen’s allegation that 
she has “the soul of a prostitute” and can be bought by “the highest bidder”: 
“But you see, Herr Olsen, I’m not for sale. Not to you. Not to any white man. I 
don’t at all care to be owned. Even by you…You see, I couldn’t marry a white 
man. I simply couldn’t. It isn’t just you, not just personal, you understand. It’s 
deeper, broader than that. It’s racial. Some day you’ll be glad. We can’t tell, you 
know; if we were married, you might come to be ashamed of me, to hate me, to 
hate all dark people. My mother did that.” (Q 87-88) 
Helga’s unanticipated missive hits home with all its intended force. Olsen can only look 
at her with “the surprised stare of a puzzled baby” (Q 87). Helga’s rejection shatters 
Olsen’s assurance of acceptance, but also derails any expectation that the Copenhagen 
courtship will resolve itself into a conventional marriage plot and bring her transatlantic 
seeking to an end. Olsen’s parting words frame his disappointment in generic terms. 
According to his account, their story ends in “tragedy” rather than in happy nuptials 
because of Helga’s compromised moral character. He indicts her with the assessment that 
his primitivizing portrait “is, after all, the true Helga Crane” (Q 88-89). Helga denounces 
the “disgusting sensual creature” in the picture as vehemently as she disavowed the 
glimpse of herself as “a jungle creature” in the Harlem jazz club (Q 89). But even as she 
violently denies any likeness between herself and these images of primal sexuality, “race 
and shame” remain toxically coupled for Helga (Q 88).  
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The shame Helga feels in the cabaret, at the vaudeville Circus, and here, in front 
of Olsen’s painting, is paralyzing and mobilizing in equal measure. On the one hand, she 
decisively denounces Olsen’s misogynist racism. Her multiple expressions of surprise 
reject his claim that she is always “proper” in several senses of the word. She spurns his 
idea of social decorum and his conception of persons as purchasable property. In this 
sense, Helga embraces what Emerson describes as “the way of life…by abandonment,” 
which begins when we allow ourselves “to be surprised out of our propriety.” Only when 
we have abandoned conformity with convention and shed the sense of a “proper” self can 
we “draw a new circle” (EL 414). And yet, even as she abandons Olsen and Copenhagen, 
Helga has already incorporated the painter’s belief that she is defined by those racial 
characteristics he deems “proper” to her. These internalized constructs finally restrict the 
newness of the circle she is capable of drawing. Helga has already summed up her 
irresolvable double bind at the novel’s outset: “She could neither conform, nor be happy 
in her unconformity” (Q 7). Just as opposition and acquiescence comingle in Helga’s 
stance towards racial essentialism, Quicksand’s final sequence enmeshes the 
conventional and atypical at the level of plot. The capitulating forms of closure feel 
strangely dissonant because they diverge from the novel’s unconventional itinerary up to 
that point. In the novel’s apparently incongruous concluding pages, the protagonist’s 
aversive turns upon herself converge with the novel’s aversive relationship to plot.  
 
Having left America to escape a racialized sense of self, Helga frames her return 
as a “surrender to the irresistible ties of race” (Q 92). In the same way that Denmark 
failed to offer any post-racial utopia, her romanticized ideals of racial reconnection and 
belonging in Harlem are soon disillusioned. Upon arrival in New York, Helga attends a 
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party where she unexpectedly encounters two men who represent the life she fled at 
Naxos. With a “stab of surprise,” she first spots her ex-fiancé (Q 100). James Vayle’s 
appearance reminds us that the novel opened with her rejection of the normative stability 
promised by marriage into a “first family” where “it was presumptuous of you to be 
anything but inconspicuous and conformable” (Q 8). Such an arrangement would require 
that she pair the “veil” she was born under with another self-effacing “Vayle.” Their 
encounter only reaffirms her initial decision but Helga’s reunion with the director of 
Naxos is a great deal more charged. Since her flight from the institution, the figure of Dr. 
Robert Anderson had “obtruded itself with surprising vividness” at unforeseen moments. 
The last time it had “surprisingly risen” was at the jazz club, where Anderson danced 
with Denney (Q 64).25 Though he is newly married, she now finds herself caught in a 
stolen embrace with him in the apartment hallway. Helga fends off a marriage plot with 
Olsen only to have the “ecstasy” of Anderson’s embrace trigger an equally familiar 
plotline. From the moment she swoons in his arms, the rhetoric of fallenness infiltrates 
the narrative with “the suddenness of a dream” (Q 105, 104). For a time, then, her 
“irrepressible longing”—elsewhere described as a “strange ill-defined emotion, a vague 
yearning rising within her”—finds a clear object (Q 106, 50). But in her final encounter 
with Anderson, as with Olsen, incongruent forms of surprise leave her in a shamed state 
of “exposure” (Q 107). While Helga anticipates the “consummation” of reciprocal desire, 
she is met only with his regretful contrition, followed by his “surprised” relief that she is 
not angry (Q 107). Her “mortification” and “self-loathing” are felt all the more sharply 
                                                
25 Significantly, both of these surprise encounters interrupt Helga’s trajectory towards 
Audrey Denney, whom she has spotted at the party and has longed to meet since she 
watched her dance at the Harlem jazz club.  
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because “she had deluded herself” into expecting mutuality: “The wish to give herself 
had been so intense that Dr. Anderson’s surprising, trivial apology loomed as a direct 
refusal of the offering” (Q 109). When Helga finds her “voluptuous visions” unshared, 
she laments that she has “ruined everything” (Q 109, 108). Without reciprocity, she 
recasts the once hopeful future as “an endless stretch of dreary years” (Q 108). 
 Helga’s conviction that she has been doomed to a dismal destiny is almost 
immediately corroborated by the weather. The ominous darkening of the clouds and 
eventual downpour externalizes the deluge of despair she feels.  In his study of narrative 
time, Gary Morson singles out the “gathering storm” as a primary emblem of 
foreshadowing—a shadow cast by a pending “reversal of fortune” on the narrative 
horizon (47-48).26 Whereas Quicksand’s clouds have hitherto indicated an open, 
amorphous temporal order, here their gathering heralds the closed inevitability of 
predestination. In this way, Helga is subjected to the predetermined plots that she had 
previously outstripped. “Alone, isolated from all other humans, separated even from her 
own anterior existence,” she gives herself over to the elemental forces of the storm (Q 
109): 
Helga Crane, walking rapidly, aimlessly, could decide on no definite 
destination… Rain and wind whipped cruelly about her, drenching her garments 
and chilling her body… A sudden more ruthless gust of wind ripped the small hat 
from her head. In the next minute the black clouds opened wider and spilled their 
                                                
26 As Morson explains, foreshadowing depends on an asymmetry between the knowledge 
of the character and the recognizant “reader of fiction,” but also between the protagonist 
and author: “it is the fact that the story is already written and the structure already 
determined that makes such a sign possible, and so foreshadowing is an infallible 
remainder of the author’s essential surplus. It establishes the merely illusory nature of 
what the character experiences as open temporality” (48). 
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water with unusual fury. The streets became swirling rivers…she began 
desperately to struggle through wind and rain toward one of the buildings, where 
she could take shelter in a store or a doorway. But another whirl of wind lashed 
her and, scornful of her slight strength, tossed her into the swollen gutter. (Q 110) 
Seeking refuge, Helga is washed up on the threshold of a revival storefront church. As 
the choir within repeats a refrain from Ezekiel—“…Showers of blessings, / Showers of 
blessings…”—Helga is struck by the absurd “appropriateness of the song” (Q 111). Her 
wild laughter gradually turns to weeping as the hymn connects the falling showers with 
the relinquishment of self. Helga is “penetrated” by the charismatic Gospel choir’s 
singing in the same way she was overcome by the Harlem jazz, but here her orgiastic 
self-disappearance spurs a conversionary return to race rather than its rejection. The 
bellowing wind and “the wailing singing” merge with Helga’s weeping as the chorus 
progresses from “All of self, and none of Thee,” to “Some of self, and some of Thee,” to 
“Less of self, and more of Thee” (Q 111-12). Her deafening yells for mercy and “torrents 
of tears” “drown every other clamor,” so that the hymn’s final verse, which declares the 
sinner a conquered suppliant—“None of self, and all of Thee”—is not articulated but 
only enacted by Helga’s prostrate body (Feminist Difference 48). 
 Helga retreats from the flash of ecstatic oblivion she feels at the jazz club, but 
now she gives herself wholly over to the “wild, ecstatic fury” she finds within the church 
walls, welcoming the sexually and racially coded identifications with the music: 
“Gradually a curious influence penetrated her; she felt an echo of the weird orgy resound 
in her own heart; she felt herself possessed by the same madness; she too felt a brutal 
desire to shout and sling herself about” (Q 112, 113). When “arms were stretched toward 
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her with savage frenzy,” she allows herself to be embraced as an “errin’ sistah” and a 
“pore los’ sinner” (Q 112). In the charged moments before “the thing became real,” the 
poles of ruination and redemption become indistinguishable. As the bellowing wind and 
the wailing singing interpenetrate, the storm inside and outside converge in “a thunder-
clap of joy” at the moment “she was lost—or saved” (Q 114).  
 Suspending her protagonist between ruin and salvation, Larsen self-consciously 
engages with the figure of the tragic mulatta—a special case of the “fallen woman” 
whose mixed blood dictates her compromised entry into the world. The obstacles 
presented by this figure’s inauspicious birth are very often compounded by her 
experience of being orphaned, isolated, and variously abandoned.27 From the outset, 
Larsen invokes the conventions of a tragic mulatta narrative only to turn them back on 
themselves, wholly inverting the expectations they raise. Helga’s “painful isolation” is 
the product of her West Indian father’s desertion and her Danish mother’s death, but for 
the majority of the novel she assumes the role of abandoner, taking sudden leave of each 
person who tries in vain to embrace her (Q 24). She suffers the psychic dislocation of 
feeling “neither black nor white and yet both,” to borrow Werner Sollors’s phrase; but 
while this in-between status is a constant source of unease, Larsen refuses to collapse the 
horizontal logic of crossing into the vertical axis of fallenness.28 In calling Helga a 
“Jezebel,” the parishioners echo Olsen’s assessment that she “has the soul of a 
prostitute,” but like the Dane they have mistaken her for a “scarlet ‘oman” (Q 112, 87, 
                                                
27 In Tainted Souls and Painted Faces, Amanda Anderson explores the literary theme of 
fallenness as a preoccupation with what she calls “attenuated agency.” She argues that 
commentators attribute to the fallen woman only “the minimal and paradoxical freedom 
of knowing that she cannot alter her character, for it is no longer her own” (57). 




112). When Helga declares that everything is “ruined,” she refers to the failure of desired 
mutuality rather than sexual ruination (Q 108). In Anderson, she sought a reciprocity that 
is the very opposite of the economic transaction Olsen proposed. Having given herself 
over to the Baptists’ definitions of sin and deliverance, she tacitly accepts the 
congregation’s judgment. But a closer examination of the way Larsen frames the 
climactic conversion reveals that Helga’s sudden turn towards religion and the South is 
no less aversive than the transatlantic turns that have preceded. Indeed, “aversion” and 
“conversion” share a common etymological root in the verb “to turn.” As the scene 
proceeds, a turn towards and a turn away become recognizable as one and the same 
gesture. 
The gathering storm marks the novel’s move into a formal register of surprise that 
has the potential to implicate the reader in the kind of “aversive thinking” Helga has 
modeled. In Cavell’s definition, this oppositional mode of thought is guided by “the 
imperative to an incessant conversion or refiguration of society’s incessant demands for 
[our] consent—[our] conforming [our]self—to its doings” (Etudes 145). Having followed 
Helga’s aversive turns up to this point we have learned, paradoxically, to expect 
unconventionality. As a result, the reasserted tropes of fallenness, religious revival, 
domesticating nuptials, and a return to Southern roots, feel strangely misplaced.29 Thus 
far, Larsen has twisted readily recognizable plots into unfamiliar forms, but in the 
concluding pages, the final plot twist is that narrative closure comes to us straight. This 
apparent capitulation to convention also signals Helga’s submission to those regulatory 
sexual norms she had relentlessly evaded up to that point. For many readers, the church 
                                                
29 As Posnock puts it, “the ties of race ensnare the nearly illegible Helga in the plainly 
readable plot of return” (Color & Culture 80). 
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scene constitutes a rupturing break with what came before. As Esteve attests, “in the final 
episodes all bets are off. Reader and writer have been abandoned to the cause of 
narratological causelessness” (279). In my reading, the storm that ushers Helga into the 
church also ushers in a new narrative order, but one that exists in generatively dialectical 
relation with what has come before. Reframed as an atmospheric event, the apparent 
“causelessness” of this concluding sequence supplies a fitting culmination with important 
narrative effects. 
To read Quicksand’s final plot turns as structured by surprise and congruent with 
the novelistic project as a whole, it is helpful to bear in mind the way that an Emersonian 
conception of surprise vitally inflected William James’s pragmatism. For James, the 
decision to embrace an open-ended universe that is “still in the making” differentiates the 
pragmatist world-view from the determinist’s “ready-made” reality (WII 599). For our 
actions to have genuine consequences, James insists we must suspend ourselves in a 
pluralistic universe of chance where their impact cannot be known in advance. The 
novel’s climactic storm stages a confrontation between these two competing world-
views: determinism and indeterminism collide in a shared symbolic landscape. On the 
one hand, the scene indexes the inexorable forces that overpower Helga’s “slight 
strength” (Q 110). From this perspective, the storm is a closed system that drives her 
towards a predetermined end. At the same time, James’s principal metaphor of 
indeterminism—the swirling stream of experience—is literalized in the flooded streets. 
However, James’s celebration of flux appears conclusively cancelled out when the torrent 




The final pile-up of predictable plots would seem to confirm that Helga has 
become a plaything of fatalistic forces rather than the agent of her own actions. Indeed, 
that is how most commentators have interpreted Quicksand’s ending. But several factors 
complicate a straightforwardly deterministic reading. From the outset, the very hyperbole 
of Larsen’s final invocation of pathetic fallacy tonally shifts the scene from the pathos of 
tragic fate into a bathetic parody of its fatalism. Further, just when Helga’s agency seems 
entirely obliterated at the storm’s climax, she makes a pragmatic decision: “Now she 
knew beyond all doubt that that she had no desire to die, and certainly not there nor 
then…Death had lost all of its picturesque aspects to the girl soaked and soiled in the 
flooded gutter” (Q 110). In this moment, she decides to live rather than to die the 
prototypical death of “ruined” despair. The pragmatic method of measured deliberation 
between world-views can make it easy to forget that William James’s own decision to 
believe that life is worth living, staked against a long depressive struggle, is a moment 
that crucially contributes to the founding of pragmatism.30 For James, our ability to 
choose life over death confirms that we live in an indeterminate world where we will be 
faced with what he describes in The Will to Believe as a “genuine option”—a momentous 
choice that can’t be decided on detached, dispassionate grounds (WI 458). Quicksand 
confronts us with the constraints that condition such a choice and its life-and-death 
                                                
30 My thinking has been shaped here by Isabelle Stengers’s discussion of William 
James’s pragmatic investment in “choices which engage and expose” in “William James: 
An Ethics of Thought?” (9). Stengers argues that “James writes ‘before’ the suicidal, 
before those who succumbed, whereas he had a second chance” (12). A pragmatic ethics 
of thinking, according to Stengers, treats every thought as “an affirmation that there is 
something to think and that it can be thought” (12). To think is thus to affirm that “‘life is 
worth living,’ to decide to live against the real possibility of suicide” (11). Stengers 
defines pragmatism as “a thinking that accepts as a constraint the exclusion of every idea 
that implies, amongst its consequences, a transmutation of our reasons into Reason, into 
what should have been valid also for those who disregarded it and chose not to live” (19). 
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consequences. James urged the audience of east coast academics who attended his 
pragmatism lectures to open themselves to “a tramp and vagrant world” (WII 601). What 
Larsen describes as Helga’s “vagrant primitive groping” involves a different order of 
exposure (Q 95). Whereas James’s figurative phrase serves a rhetorical purpose in his 
philosophical call-to-arms, Helga struggles throughout the novel to hold literal vagrancy 
at bay.31  
Helga’s determination to live in the face of death directly feeds her decision to 
believe in “some One, some Power, who was interested in her. Would help her.” The 
conversionary moment of religious ecstasy exceeds deliberation but in its wake Helga 
resolves “for once in her life to be practical.” She describes her conversion in the terms of 
exchange, cost, and use value. “Her resolution” to believe in a higher power is pragmatic 
to the extent that she asks what difference it would make to her daily existence. She finds 
that the “chance at stability, at permanent happiness” is “worth the risk” (Q 116-17). But 
where James chooses to believe in “a pluralistic, restless universe,” Helga determines that 
this lone “chance at stability” is her last chance at living (WI 589). With one last glance at 
“the wind scattering the gray-white clouds”—the novel’s emblem of endless drift—she 
resolves “to retain, to bear this happiness at such a cost as she must pay for it” (Q 116). 32 
                                                
31 In this respect, Helga’s itinerant wanderings are also strategic. 
32 Helga’s final glance at the clouds before marrying the Reverend assumes particular 
significance when considered in light of Emerson’s claim that marriage only avoids 
stultification when we allow our “warm loves and fears” to sweep across the 
“overarching vault” of the mind like “clouds” (EL 337). When “a man and a woman, so 
variously and correlatively gifted, are shut up in one house to spend in the nuptial society 
forty or fifty years” with only institutional conventions as their guide, each partner begins 
to appropriate the other into a rigid mold. When we fail to recognize that our selves and 
our “circumstances vary every hour,” our spouse’s “incongruities” are felt as 
disproportionate “defects” (EL 336). In this scenario, according to Emerson, the 
“surprise” of the non-coincident other becomes a source of endless “crisis” rather than 
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The cost Helga pays is her relinquished commitment to an open-ended universe. She 
trades precarity for predictability—what she calls the “anaesthetic satisfaction” of a life-
plan that is finished, closed, already written (Q 118).33  
Helga’s decision to convert, and the following day, to marry the Reverend 
Pleasant Green and return to the rural South, is a pragmatic choice, but also an aversive 
one. The novel opens with Helga’s catalyzing decision to break off her engagement and 
to cut all ties with the South. But her sudden repudiation of a Bible Belt marriage is, in 
the end, inverted by her equally sudden re-embrace of married life in Alabama. What at 
first felt like unbearably constraining demands for conformity now appear as an escape 
from far worse fates. With this concluding return to matrimony and the religious South, 
the novel seems to turn against its own opening impetus. In the final sequence, the plots 
of romance and return reinscribe the limits of a raced female destiny where the 
domesticating roles of wife and child-bearer appear as the only alternatives to fallenness 
or death. Helga’s choice to crawl out of the gutter is a commitment to life but also to 
staving off omnipresent threats of literal and figurative falls. In the concluding pages, she 
fights at every turn to stay standing. Helga’s contemptuous bemusement at the 
congregation praying for her soul gives way to a nauseous dizziness. At the moment “she 
fell forward” the frenzied worshippers “clos[e] her in on all sides” (Q 113). When the 
Reverend Green walks her back to the hotel, the decision to seduce him into marriage 
likewise comes upon her in the instant she is “seized with a hateful feeling of vertigo and 
obliged to hold on his arm to keep from falling” (Q 115). The following day, Helga 
                                                                                                                                            
renewal.  
33 As James acknowledges, “there can be no doubt that when men are reduced to their last 
extremity absolutism is the only saving scheme” (WII 615). 
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marries the man she deems guarantor of the conversionary promise of racial homecoming 
and permanent belonging. Their union is construed as a safeguard against the gutter, but 
she is soon laid flat by the labor of five consecutive pregnancies. 
With the turn of a page, Helga has returned to the south and become Mrs. 
Reverend Green, pious wife and doting mother. With another turn she has become a 
spectral shadow, drained of all her vitality by unremitting poverty and procreation. Upon 
arrival, Helga “eagerly…accepted everything” about her new life, “even that bleak air of 
poverty” and “the atmosphere of self-satisfaction which poured from [her new husband] 
like gas from a leaking pipe” (Q 119). As before, Helga enjoys a temporary calm after the 
pre-departure storm. For a time, the “unbelievably bright sky” stretches wide with fresh 
possibility. But when she is bedbound, convalescing after the birth of her fourth child, 
“that bleak air” and moldering atmosphere close in to the point of “suffocation” and 
“asphyxiation” (Q 134). The vivid expanse of the “Chinese blue sky” narrows to a 
meager sliver: ““Pie in the sky,” Helga said aloud derisively….Pie—by and by. That’s 
the trouble”” (Q 134). The last words Helga Crane speaks in the novel assert that the 
skies lie when we take them to promise future deliverance from present suffering.  
Though this oppressively airless conclusion feels incompatible with the rest of the 
novel, in fact, Helga’s conversion follows the same aversive turns as the previous scenes 
of transition. Even as she expresses hope that she might have broken out of the cycle of 
rising and releasing pressures, Helga acknowledges that her sudden departures and 
arrivals have been similarly structured by a common pattern of feeling. In the church, she 
is filled with the same ambivalent feelings amidst the “contact of bodies” in “concerted 
convulsions” that she had before the jazz club dancers and the ragtime minstrels (Q 112). 
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Her move to Alabama is accompanied by a “recurrence of the feeling that now, at last, 
she had found a place for herself, that she was really living”: “if she remembered that she 
had had something like this feeling before, she put the unwelcome memory from her…” 
(Q 118). But there comes a point when she can no longer hold the familiar affective 
upsurge at bay. Her relationship with Reverend Green is inexorably overtaken by her 
“unconquerable aversion.” Turning her face from him, Helga “cared nothing…for his 
hurt surprise” (Q 129). With the inevitable pressure change “she had to admit that it 
wasn’t new, this feeling of dissatisfaction, of asphyxiation. Something like it she had 
experienced before. In Naxos. In New York. In Copenhagen. This differed only in 
degree” (Q 134).  
Our protagonist maintains that the aversive feelings guiding her conversion and 
its aftermath differ in degree rather than in kind from those that she has previously 
experienced. Emerson goes so far as to claim that a turn of aversion—understood as a 
“gesture of departing from oneself”—constitutes a transfiguring moment of conversion; 
in his account, aversive and conversionary turns are coextensive (On Leaving 31). Why, 
then, have so many readers felt this concluding sequence of events to be of an entirely 
different order than what came before?  Most critics measure the difference in the degree 
of narrative control that Larsen exercises over narrative closure. Deborah McDowell’s 
introduction to the text confirms that critics “have consistently criticized the endings of 
her novels” for sacrificing her heroines “to the most conventional fates of narrative 
history: marriage and death” (xi). Though Helga is still alive at the end of Quicksand, she 
has suffered a social and spiritual death. Passing (1929) ends even more abruptly with 
Clare Kendry’s ambiguous fall to her death from an open window. The novels’ “unearned 
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and unsettling endings” have been chalked up to Larsen’s lack of mastery over the novel 
form: their “abrupt and contradictory” imposition is taken to “reveal her difficulty with 
rounding off stories convincingly” (xii, xi). Nancy K. Miller’s study of gender and 
narrative form argues that women’s novels often feature “implausible twists of plot,” 
especially around the narrative conclusion, which suddenly veer away from convention 
(122). Through Quicksand’s turns in the opposite direction, towards conventional social 
plots, Larsen cultivates a reader response that is strangely akin to the one that Miller 
attributes to female writers who demand “something else” for their heroines—an 
“unscriptable wish” for a story that would turn out differently (123). Most critics attribute 
their frustration with Quicksand’s unsatisfying ending to two kinds of shortcomings: 
either Helga has proved inadequate to her character’s potential, or, Larsen has failed to 
achieve the novel’s fullest potential. But the very fact that Quicksand has solicited so 
much dissatisfaction with its unfulfilled narrative possibilities suggests that we may also 
imagine a life for Helga beyond the novel’s jarring conclusion. 
Under what conditions could Larsen have closed the novel in a way that didn’t 
arrest all narrative drift and thus annul its working title Cloudy Amber? Is the 
protagonist’s eventual entrapment as inescapable as the new title Quicksand suggests? 
Like clouds and amber, quicksand is an emblem of material changes in state. The 
saturated sediment may act like a solid until pressure changes initiate liquefaction, 
causing the sand to form a suspension. In the novel, this suspended form of fluidity 
comes to represent treacherous flux from which there is no lifeline. Helga’s dream of 
“freedom and cities” finally sinks under the weight of her fifth pregnancy (Q 135). 
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Significantly, readers’ reactions indicate that Larsen has created narrative conditions 
wherein her protagonist’s plunging descent feels anything but inevitable.   
As Bakhtin recognized, novels must have something like a coherent plot to be 
readable. But the same structures of closure that mark the difference between the shape of 
narrative and the shape of experience, he argued, also endanger our “sense of life as an 
open process” (Morson 79, 9). Quicksand shows how the narrative constraints of the 
novel form conspire with the deterministic logic of race and reproduction. Larsen works 
against these social and formal determinisms in two ways. From the outset, she develops 
a character who seems to have the potential to outstrip any predetermined plan for her. In 
this way, Helga’s “vague yearning” for “something else” (a phrase repeated ten times by 
my count) bespeaks her “unrealized potential” (to borrow Bakhtin’s words) (Q 10, 
Dialogic Imagination 37). In the end, Larsen stages a confrontation of open and closed 
narrative universes. Helga’s ultimate resignation to the promise of apparent stability—an 
existence stripped of surprises—is implicated in Larsen’s narrative relationship to her 
readers, for whom familiar forms of closure have been defamiliarized over the course of 
the novel. As evident in Chapters Two and Three, Jamesian syntax and Steinian grammar 
require that we go back to each disorienting sentence before we move on. Following 
Richard Poirier, Cavell terms this recursive requirement “slow reading,” which he defines 
as a “mode of…attention in which you are prepared to be taken by surprise, stopped, 
thrown back as it were upon the text” (Cities 15).34 Quicksand’s disjunctive ending turns 
us back on what came before to grapple with how Helga’s indecipherability becomes 
                                                
34 Cavell’s conception of “slow reading” is closely related to the process of “reading in 
slow motion” that Richard Poirier discusses in “Reading Pragmatically: The Example of 
Hum 6,” published in Poetry and Pragmatism (180). 
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“plainly readable” (Color & Culture 80). Turning back, we also turn forward to glimpse a 










In the preceding pages, I have focused on the formal facets of literary modernism, 
exploring how processes of composition for several writers were guided by a shared set 
of imperatives: to construct sentences, paragraphs, scenes, and plots that take unexpected 
turns—in some cases unforeseen even by the person who wrote them. Those turns 
introduce strange folds and pockets in the grammatical and narrative fabric of essays by 
Emerson, Baudelaire, and Stein; of novels by Proust, James, and Larsen. Yet while such 
folds can visibly swell and amplify the surface of the text with new dimensions of 
possibility, they can also prove harder to discern, opening as silent and unprecipitated 
hinges or latent gaps within an argumentative, plotted, or lexical logic. We might here 
recall Emerson’s reliance on rhetorical rifts, the small overturning eddy placed between 
propositions such that no certainty is allowed to settle or stand. We might also recall 
Larsen’s heroine in Quicksand as an embodiment of this constant unsettlement; reversing 
life paths without warning or explanation, Helga fissures her own sense of coherence and 
threatens the coherence of the novel as a whole.  
In neither case can surprise be definitively located in a moment, word, predicate, 
or object: Emerson’s surprises are elusively pocketed in the lacunae between sentences as 
they turn on one another, while Larsen’s surprises lodge in the chasms between chapters, 
where unexplained shifts in narrative trajectory interrupt the novel’s storyline and 
character arc. As the work of both writers demonstrates, literary surprise can often 
register not as a manifest narrative presence but in the negative blip of an elision.   
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What is to be made of surprise’s strange turns and gaps, which can compromise 
coherence and intelligibility? Why should such subtle intangibles matter to readers? As a 
final note, I want to suggest that in training our attention to these lacunae of surprise we 
also confront the most fundamental conditions of reading. As I have defined it, surprise is 
experienced as an unsettling suspension of time and cognition; the surprised 
consciousness is temporarily unmoored from its conventional patterns of perception. 
Such a disoriented state of attention may seem to bear little resemblance to a mind in the 
process of reading. However, encounters with literary representations of consciousness 
are strikingly congruent with surprise encounters to the extent that each requires us to 
traverse an uncertain border between me and not me. Both reading and surprise hinge on 
a constitutive gap between discrepant orders of consciousness. When we read we 
encounter another’s consciousness as if it were our own; when we are surprised we 
encounter our own consciousness as if it belonged to another. Such encounters baffle all 
efforts to demarcate the boundaries of a discrete self who apprehends another. Instead of 
a separate subject and object of apprehension, there emerges a simultaneous sense of 
apprehending and being apprehended by a consciousness that both is and is not one’s 
own. 
Novels like James’s The Ambassadors and Proust’s Recherche invite readers to 
open themselves to the thoughts and feelings of their protagonists. Yet instead of 
facilitating a seamless merging, such an opening makes way for a more disjunctive 
jostling between consciousnesses that are experienced as both mine and not mine. Even 
the most powerfully immediate encounter between reader and book is marked by the 
hiatus between what characters like Strether or Marcel feel and the reader’s necessarily 
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belated response. This gap in feeling registers as a disconcerting delay in experience that 
designates the difference between the represented consciousness and the reader’s 
consciousness. Instead of making any effort to bridge this non-coincidence, the writers 
examined in this study heighten their readers’ sense of schism by inducing these 
backfolding gaps at the level of grammar and plot. 
While those writers working in an Emersonian literary line were questioning how 
to attune themselves and their readers to intervals and absences, William James was 
developing experimental techniques for probing facets of consciousness that remained 
unregistered, unconsidered, unknown. As he readily admitted, “it is hard to focus our 
attention on the nameless” (PP 195). As I’ve suggested, James’s advice for cultivating a 
fresh awareness around unnamed, unnoticed registers of experience was to read writers 
like Emerson. Indeed, Emerson’s rhetorical pockets closely correspond with the potential 
pockets of encounter not yet discovered in James’s uncharted realms of consciousness. 
Accordingly, critics who read for surprise face a set of challenges similar to those James 
outlines for practitioners of introspection, his primary method of psychological 
investigation. The goal of introspection, like the goal of Emerson and his inheritors, is to 
cultivate “an immediate consciousness of consciousness itself” (WII 1143). However, 
James acknowledges an inevitable “difference between the immediate feltness of a 
feeling, and its perception by a subsequent reflective act,” just as the formal innovations 
explored in this study refract the impossibility of full immediacy (PP 65). In both cases, 
the unavoidable “difference” between feeling and reflection manifests as a temporal 
delay and a split subjective state. If, as James claims, the very first insight that 
introspection yields is that consciousness moves in a continuous and immersive stream, it 
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cannot be split into feeling and reflecting parts of consciousness without distortion. As 
James realizes, “No subjective state, whilst present, is its own object; its object is always 
something else” (PP 190). The “feltness of feeling” has already passed into another state 
by the time it is subsequently reflected upon. Always belated, introspection might more 
accurately be characterized as retrospection, an inferential process that relies on memory. 
James must then grapple with the question of whether introspection-as-retrospection 
necessarily reduces the moving, changing fluidity of consciousness to a static object of 
scrutiny excised from the stream. Like reading for surprise, learning to introspect one’s 
own psyche means yoking paradoxes of immediacy and delay, keen focus and a fissured 
consciousness. 
As James emphasized in accounts of his introspective method, the challenges 
posed by splitting and belatedness are compounded by a problem of language. He 
observes how the difficulty of contemplating psychic processes on the edge of 
articulation results in “a certain vacuousness in the descriptive parts” of psychology (PP 
195). If we are to discover something genuinely new about the nature of consciousness, 
we will inevitably encounter the limits of our frame of reference for describing what we 
have observed or experienced. Even the most fundamental introspective insight—that 
language is a rapid, continuous stream—is undermined by the fact that common 
descriptive language emphasizes the substantive parts of speech rather than the transitive 
parts. As a result, static, already-known entities are emphasized over unfamiliarity and 
change. Without perceptual or linguistic frames of reference, surprises register as 
interruptions rather than potential discoveries. With this recognition, James upholds 
William Wundt’s contention that “the surprise which unexpected impressions give us” is 
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due to the fact that our attention is not accommodated for what it fails to anticipate (PP 
440). As James’s studies showed, it is exceptionally difficult to train attention to what is 
unanticipated because we have a limited capacity for perceiving phenomena that have not 
been “preperceived” and “labeled” according to previous encounters (PP 443-44). 
Eluding ready recognition or easy expression, surprise encounters can have polarizing 
effects on attention: they might stimulate fresh sensitivity, but just as often unexpected 
phenomena may escape and even inhibit perception.  
By reconceiving the introspective method as the basis of his pragmatic method 
James transforms error-inducing gaps and schisms into vital sources of insight. This 
pragmatist solution to the problem of introspective fallibility also instructively reframes 
reading for surprise as a way of attending to how the contingencies of life enter and alter 
composition. James’s transition from the field of psychology to philosophy is rooted in 
the recognition that introspective insights matter most when they have practical 
consequences in the day-to-day living of the person introspecting. For James, then, the 
truth value of all introspective findings came to be measured by the way they answer the 
pragmatist’s guiding question: “What concrete difference will its being true make in any 
one’s actual life?” (WII 573). Introspection is thus re-tasked with discerning the 
difference that “our aesthetic, emotional, and active needs” might make in our daily 
existence (PPII 312). 
Recast in terms of aesthetic and emotional discernment, the activities of 
introspecting consciousness and reading literature become reciprocal processes that 
bridge life and art. What unifies William James’s godfather Emerson, brother Henry, and 
former student Stein is the common commitment to fostering an order of attention that 
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might remain vitally responsive to those realms of experience which are recalcitrant to 
knowing or naming. Rather than requiring wholly absorbed concentration, the lacunae 
that lodge in literary scenes and syntaxes of surprise quicken a more diffuse awareness 
freed from predetermined direction. Instead of excluding distraction, interruption, and 
dispersal, this kind of attunement to namelessness recursively enfolds what William 
James describes as “the peculiar feeling of attention” (PP 440). The peculiarity of that 
recursive feeling of attention to attention fluctuates between effortless floating and 
effortful straining, between spontaneous suspension and a taxing dearth of resting places.  
While the field of psychology is tasked with filling the descriptive vacuum that 
exists around uncharted states of consciousness, writers who develop an aesthetics of 
surprise approach vacuity as an unknown quantity to be framed and felt rather than filled. 
In the literary genealogy I have traced, Stein’s non-narrative writing tests the outer limits 
of paying attention to the non-referential. However, the blank spots that punctuate her 
prose inaugurate an unexpected compositional legacy that is extended in new ways by the 
work of John Cage, who uses unpunctuated silence to further challenge our attention to 
the nameless. As Cage would attest, it was the exacting process of learning to read Stein 
that taught him to activate new angles of attunement to the indeterminacies of experience. 
Under the tutelage of Stein’s prose, Cage became aware of how structured silence allows 
the life’s contingencies to inflect what he called “composition as process” in 
unpredictable ways.1 
Cage exported this Steinian programme from the realm of language to the realm 
of music (“a language already without sentences and not confined to any subject”) in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Cage’s lecture by that name is published in Silence (18-56). 
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order that its effect and its exposure be magnified by formal advantages inherent to music 
itself (Empty Words 65). Recognizing, for example, that people have “great difficulty” in 
“paying attention to something they don’t understand,” Cage saw music’s lesser emphasis 
on understanding as key to the receptivity of its audience: “Music is about changing the 
mind—not to understand, but to be aware” (Cage qtd. by Kostelanetz). As he found, the 
mind becomes most acutely aware of itself in contact with its surroundings when music is 
reconstrued as silence. In 4’33” (1952), his first “silent piece,” Cage enacts a radical 
redirection of the habitual vectors of noticing (Silence 98). Structured only by three 
noteless time brackets totaling a duration of four minutes and thirty-three seconds, the 
ostensibly empty score offers no directive to its performers beyond “Pay[ing] attention to 
what it is, just as it is” (Silence 96). The extended caesurae Cage asserts in the auditory 
and visual field act by countering habits of hearing and seeing “for the sake of greater 
freshness”; instead of “an attempt to bring order out of chaos” he offers “a way of waking 
up to the very life we’re living” (Silence 106, 12). As Joan Retallack observes, Cage 
performs a “figure/ground swerve that opens up an entirely new perceptual and 
conceptual field: where what was previously ground (ambient noise) becomes figure 
(music reconfigured); where what previously lay dormant outside the scope of our 
attention becomes possibility” (xxxiii). In reconfiguring the conventional relation 
between music and noise, Cage cultivates an ambient awareness where attention and 
distraction, presence and absence are not easily distinguishable. He undoes meaning-
making distinctions between sound and silence with an invitation to share in the 
experience of an empty receptivity. By reducing the border between art and life to the 
most permeable threshold possible, Cage exposes his audience to the daunting, 
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disorienting experience of living in a world guided by contingency and chance. In 
seeming response to Emerson’s foundational question—“Where do we find 
ourselves?”—Cage offers no directive beyond the implicit: Notice where you are, what 
you see, and what you hear. Like the transatlantic literary line that inspired him, Cage 
displaces a desire for answers with unknowing, and in the face of an uncertain universe, 
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